


中共的宣傳
與思想統制
侯服五著



FRANKLIN W. HOUN

TO CHANGE A NATION

Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China



Born in China, Dr. Franklin W. Houn is currently on the political science faculty at the University of Nebraska. Earlier he did research on Communist China at Stanford University and taught Far Eastern politics and Western governments at Michigan State University. Prior to his coming to the United States in 1948, he was on the editorial staff of the official Chinese government gazette while serving as executive director of the Chinese Association of Social Sciences. Trained in a number of social sciences and versed in Chinese social and political institutions, past and present, he is the author of over forty articles in professional journals in both the Chinese and English languages. He has also contributed numerous chapters to scholarly monographs, including *The Press in Authoritarian Countries* published in 1959 by the International Press Institute at Zurich, Switzerland. His last book, *Central Government of China, 1912-1928*, has been widely hailed as a standard work on the subject. His present work will soon be followed by a volume on the Communist monolith and the Chinese tradition.

951.05 H83t
Houn
To change a nation

62-24966



kansas city



public library

kansas city, missouri

Books will be issued only
on presentation of library card.

Please report lost cards and
change of residence promptly.

Card holders are responsible for
all books, records, films, pictures
or other library materials
checked out on their cards.

— *See* *Journal of the American Medical Association*

STAR DUST

[illegible]

中共的宣傳與思想統制

**TO CHANGE
A NATION**

與中共的思想統制宣傳

TO CHANGE A NATION

Propaganda and Indoctrination in Communist China

by FRANKLIN W. HOUN

侯服五著

THE FREE PRESS of Glencoe
A division of the
CROWELL-COLLIER PUBLISHING CO.
New York

BUREAU OF SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL RESEARCH
Michigan State University
East Lansing

Bureau of Social and Political Research
College of Business and Public Service

Dean of the College
ALFRED L. SEELYE

Director of the Bureau
FRANK A. PINNER

Research Associates
DANIEL GOLDRICH
FRANCIS M. SIM
CAROLYN STIEBER

Editor
HILDA JAFFE

Research Assistants
HENRY F. COOKE
HELENAN S. LEWIS
IRA S. ROHTER

Clerical Staff
SHARON KNUTSON
LIN NOVAK

Bureau Advisory Board
LUCILLE K. BARBER
MYLES G. BOYLAN
ARTHUR F. BRANDSTATTER
ALFRED G. MEYER
EDWARD W. WEIDNER

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

COPYRIGHT © 1961
BY THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
EAST LANSING, MICHIGAN

Library of Congress
Catalog Card Number: 61-62518

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables	viii
Preface	ix
Chapter 1 PARTY, STATE, AND NATION	1
INDOCTRINATION AND PROPAGANDA, page 2. / COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES, page 7. / LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL, page 20. / INDUSTRIALIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND POLITICAL EDUCATION, page 26.	
Chapter 2 SCHOOLS, SCHOLARS, AND PROPAGANDISTS	37
PROBLEMS AND GOALS, page 37. / MASS PROPAGANDA NETWORK (ORAL AGITATION), page 45. / THOUGHT REFORM AND "IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION," page 55. / CHANGES IN FORMAL EDUCATION, page 69.	
Chapter 3 THE PRINTED WORD AND THE DOGMA	91
PUBLICATION AS A PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT, page 91. / STRUCTURE, OPERATION, AND CONTROL OF THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY, page 97. / QUANTITY AND NATURE OF COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS, page 116. / CIRCULATION AND READERSHIP, page 120. / TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS, page 128.	
Chapter 4 ONE MIND AND MANY TONGUES	155
TECHNICAL FACILITIES, page 155. / FORMAL ADMINISTRATION, page 158. / RADIO RECEPTION FACILITIES, page 159. / METHODS OF INCREASING AUDIENCES, page 160. / CONTENT OF PROGRAMS, page 166.	
Chapter 5 STAGE, SCREEN, AND THE MESSAGE	179
THE OPERA, page 180. / THE SPOKEN DRAMA, page 192. / THE FILMS, page 198. / SUMMARY, page 219.	
Chapter 6 CONCLUSION	229
Appendix List of Newspapers and Journals	239
Index	243

6.50

KANSAS CITY (MO.) PUBLIC LIBRARY
6224966

LIST OF TABLES

1	Social Backgrounds of the Membership of the Chinese Communist Party (September, 1957)	14
2	Breakdown of the Membership of the Chinese Communist Party by Sex (June, 1956)	14
3	The Growth of the Membership of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1956	15
4	Enrollment in Schools and Colleges in Communist China: 1949-1959	40
5	Comparative Analysis of the Composition of Books Printed: 1950 and 1952	95
6	Annual Output of Books and Periodicals: 1950-1957	117
7	Distribution of Radio-Diffusion Exchanges in Communist China, November, 1955	163
8	Radio Broadcasting Stations in Communist China, March, 1958	175
9	Growth of Film Audience in Communist China: 1950-1957	202
10	Growth of Film Projection Facilities in Communist China: 1949-1957	203
11	Annual Output of Feature Pictures of the Chinese Communist Film Industry: 1949-1958	206

PREFACE

This volume is based almost exclusively on information drawn from the Chinese Communist press and other publications. In portraying the organization and operation of the Communist propaganda and indoctrination apparatus, I felt throughout that I should take the part neither of critic nor apologist, but simply that of dispassionate reporter -- neither to attack nor defend the Communist policy, but simply to describe it as accurately as possible. Partly for this reason, and partly because of the very nature of the subject-matter, I have consistently refrained from subjective analysis and from "general theories" that would only give this work the appearance of profundity while oversimplifying or even distorting the fact.

I welcome this opportunity to express my feelings of obligation to the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, which granted me the privilege of free access to its precious collection of Chinese Communist publications. I am particularly grateful to Dr. C. Easton Rothwell, then Director of the Institution and now President of Mills College, who showed me so much courtesy during my stay at Stanford.

This study was undertaken at the urging of Professor Wilbur Schramm of Stanford University and Professor Arthur F. Wright, now of Yale University; both of them most kindly read the preliminary draft of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions for which I find it difficult to express my gratitude adequately.

Some of my colleagues on the political science faculty at Michigan State University were very generous with their interest while the manuscript was in preparation. Professor Guy H. Fox, then Acting Head of the Department, and Professor Lewis Edinger were especially helpful.

Dr. Frank A. Pinner, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Bureau of Social and Political Research at the same institution unselfishly spent many hours with me, discussing both the content and organization of the manuscript, and his friendly criticisms and original ideas have been of immeasurable benefit.

I have also had much encouragement from Professors Leon D. Epstein, David Fellman, and Ralph K. Huitt, all of the University

of Wisconsin. Many thanks are due also to several colleagues in the Chinese field: Dr. Howard L. Boorman of Columbia University, Professor Harold C. Hinton of the Foreign Service Institute, Professor Robert C. North of Stanford University, Professor Robert Ward of the University of Michigan, and Dr. Allen Whiting of the Rand Corporation.

I should also like to mention the editorial assistance given me by Mrs. Hilda Jaffe. The secretarial staff of the Bureau of Social and Political Research at Michigan State University, including Mrs. Ruth Bosworth, Mrs. Zelda Fein, and Mrs. Sharon Knutson, were most cooperative in preparing the manuscript and the production proofs.

Finally, I wish to thank the editors of the Far Eastern Survey, the Journalism Quarterly, the Pacific Spectator, and the Public Opinion Quarterly for permission to reproduce here in revised form materials from the articles which I contributed to their pages.

For errors and shortcomings I am, of course, solely responsible.

April, 1959

Franklin W. Houn

中共的宣傳與思想統制

**TO CHANGE
A NATION**

Propaganda, in our world, has become a commonplace. Every day the battle for men's minds is waged unabated; the air waves are filled with the clamor of contending claims and exhortations; tons of newsprint, laden with threats and persuasion, pour out of propaganda agencies the world over; and all too often, the press, the stage, and the screen are not too subtly drafted into the service of rivalling governments and dogmas. Nor is the war of words confined to the Homeric exchanges between adversaries; each government and many a political party feel forever impelled to insure the solidity of their own fronts by coaxing, baiting, and alarming their own followers.

Among the bandmasters of mass persuasion, the Chinese Communists deserve special attention. Theirs is perhaps the most extensive propaganda effort of all time, and one likely to be of the greatest consequence in the course of world affairs.

The vastness of the propaganda campaign immediately impresses itself upon anyone visiting the Chinese Mainland. Travelers report that the official radio keeps up a steady bombardment of reports and exhortations about Communist policy and its purported achievements. This bombardment is inescapable: in city offices and village squares, wherever people congregate, loudspeakers inexorably drone out the regime's slogans and the latest news of "socialist reconstruction." At the same time, the circulation of newspapers — almost entirely

devoted to political and economic affairs — has been vastly increased; pamphlets and other Communist literature are pressed into the hands of millions of people; agitators belonging to dozens of "mass organizations" attempt to enlist popular cooperation; and stage and screen have been put into the service of the regime.

The central objective of the campaign is to mobilize the entire Chinese population in support of Communist policy. In this ambitious effort, extending over a vast territory and reaching out for the world's most populous nation, the rulers of Red China enjoy one great advantage: they are "working new territory" — to use the vernacular of the salesman. China has never in the past been the object of the saturation campaign so characteristic of advertising and political agitation in modern countries. For many a Chinese peasant, the experience of fairly direct communication from the seat of national power is new and exciting — whether in the form of the constant din of the loudspeaker or the first newspaper to reach his hamlet. Thus he is less likely, at first, to be resentful of the attack upon his mind or to offer passive resistance than are his jaded brethren in more highly technological civilizations. While the initial reaction of the masses of Chinese peasants and of workers may thus favor the Communist propaganda effort, it is possible to detect some signs of lassitude and of exasperation over the monotonous repetitiveness of the official message. We will note the evidence for such developments in the pages of our account although, in the absence of careful public opinion studies, we will be unable to make an accurate assessment of present attitudes on the Chinese Mainland.

It would seem, in any event, that the Communists are engaged in a race against time. They must win the hearts of a substantial number of the Chinese before they outstay their welcome. Should they succeed, they will weld the largest nation on earth into an efficient economic and political machine whose impact upon world affairs can scarcely be estimated.

INDOCTRINATION AND PROPAGANDA

In this book we will deal mainly with Communist propaganda policy and organization in China. We will pay less atten-

tion to the content of the Communist message, since its study would require a detailed survey and analysis of many essential yet nearly unobtainable materials. And we cannot deal in any systematic fashion with the popular response to the Communist message.

But the problems of policy and organization are, in themselves, of great intricacy and worthy of careful study. For the purpose of Communist propaganda is not merely to generate conformity in certain limited areas of an individual's life, as might be the case with the political and advertising campaigns in non-totalitarian countries. Rather, the Communist appeal is all-embracing, addressing itself to the whole person. Hence we have found it necessary to pay a great deal of attention to the connection between propaganda and indoctrination. By propaganda we understand the broad and rather impersonal appeal of a regime, chiefly by means of the mass media; by indoctrination, the more direct enlisting of personal loyalties through the use of social institutions, such as schools and membership associations.

Indoctrination is, of course, present in every society. The permanence of the values which insure social stability could hardly be maintained unless schools, religious institutions, military organizations, and scores of other associations — both compulsory and voluntary — worked to implant in the minds the ethical norms and behavior patterns of a social and political culture. The rigidity of such norms may vary from place to place, and there may be more or less uniformity in the messages issuing from agencies and organizations. Still, in any society, the area of consensus fostered by popular indoctrination needs to be substantial — particularly in times of internal and external crisis.

Chinese culture differs from that of the West in that indoctrination by governmental agency is not commonly held to be objectionable. The Communists are thus unlikely to encounter resistance based on a feeling that the teaching of social and political doctrine is not properly an activity of the government. There is, however, much less precedent and practically no

traditional position with respect to the conduct of governmental propaganda.

While historically Chinese rulers have resorted to propaganda in times of crisis, the creation of new mass audiences which is a condition of modern propaganda is almost entirely a phenomenon of the recent past, and in China peculiarly the mark of the Communist effort. Propaganda had no real place in the static Chinese society of the past. So long as no drastic changes in the economic and social framework of society are under way, indoctrination alone is sufficient to insure conformity. Where the flow of human events is occasionally interrupted by violent outbursts that reflect power struggles rather than abrupt changes in a country's social framework, propaganda alone — without a firm and explicit connection with the agencies of indoctrination — is sufficient to take care of the needs of the day. But the current changes on the Chinese Mainland are of a different order: they are at once social, cultural, and political, and they are under the goal-conscious direction of a revolutionary party.

Totalitarian aims call for the employment of totalitarian practices in the conduct of propaganda. And it would seem that totalitarian regimes differ from less prescriptive forms of political organization in the closeness of the connection which they establish between propaganda and indoctrination. Propaganda here serves as a coordinating device whereby all agencies of indoctrination are linked together and made to serve a common purpose. The social groupings of various types, whose messages might otherwise have been discordant enough to foster discussion and gradual change, are made to speak as of one mouth and mind. The chief problem of any totalitarian propaganda policy is the achievement of a degree of conformity without stifling creativity or generating explosive tensions. The history of the Communist propaganda policy in China is one of vacillation between rigid Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy and limited accommodation to changing conditions, an accommodation often of only short duration and reflecting no basic change in orientation toward constitutionalism or the protection of individual freedom.

A brief survey of the recent Communist policies toward the non-Communist intellectuals will illustrate this point. In order

to win their support in the fight against the Kuomintang during the 1940's, the Communist party posed as a staunch champion of political and academic freedom. This stand won over a number of the intellectuals who, since the Kuomintang policy gave considerable latitude in academic and political freedom, were able to exert their influence in support of the Communist cause.

After their assumption of power in 1949, the Communists still needed the services of the non-Communist intellectuals, but continued to distrust their political loyalty. During the past ten years the regime has adopted various measures to reform these non-Communist intellectuals, hoping to make them politically reliable and professionally useful. As the Peking regime was preoccupied with consolidating its power in 1949 and 1950, comparatively mild forms of "study" were then prescribed for the intellectuals. Beginning in 1951, the Communists substituted a coercive type of ideological reform for these milder forms of study, now demanding active and complete remoulding of the minds of the intellectuals. Both the Korean war situation and the consolidation of the regime can be held responsible for this intensification of intellectual controls. In the ensuing years the Communists launched successive campaigns against the bourgeois and other deviant ideologies. During these campaigns prominent scholars, like their relatively obscure colleagues, were publicly denounced for alleged errors of thought and action.

Disheartened and fearful, the intellectuals ostensibly submitted, signing confessions and pledging self-reform. Actually they became reserved, passive but inwardly hostile to the regime. Faced with a need to obtain active assistance from all available trained personnel, the regime switched to a more conciliatory policy toward the intelligentsia. In January, 1956, Premier Chou En-lai admitted that the treatment of the intellectuals had been too harsh and the demand for intellectual conformity excessive.¹ He promised remedial measures. The non-Communist intellectuals were told that henceforth the thought reformers would be more patient and gentle in criticizing their un-proletarian thought as long as nothing was said or done against the interests of the people.

The announcement of this policy was followed a few months later by the emergence of the slogan, "Let One Hundred Schools of Thought Contend and One Hundred Flowers Bloom" — a classical Chinese phrase used originally to describe a period in Chinese history, when new schools of thought emerged following a period of civil war, social disintegration, and the collapse of a central value system. This slogan was first used by Mao Tse-tung in a speech on May 2, 1956, before the Supreme State Conference. It has never been entirely clear what Mao meant by the slogan, though many non-Communist scholars interpreted it as implying toleration of freedom of intellectual and political expression. Mao's original statement was not published, but its main points were repeated officially by Lu Ting-i, Director of the Department of Propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party, in a speech delivered a fortnight later before a gathering of journalists and writers in Peking.²

According to Lu's speech, Mao intended to foster a kind of socialist competition in the educational, literary, and artistic fields.³ Scientists, philosophers, novelists, playwrights, artists, and other intellectuals were encouraged to be active and explicit in rectifying one another's non-Marxist views and in raising their professional standards. Thus they were to increase their effectiveness in building a socialist society.

On February 27, 1957, Mao Tse-tung, in his speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,"⁴ reiterated his policy and the slogan, and extended an open invitation for public criticism of the regime's shortcomings. Although a directive of April 27 explicitly labeled the rectification campaign a party affair, minor parties and independent intellectuals were soon asked to assist in the rectification. Encouraged by what they took to be a display of liberalism, and in the absence of explicit rules defining the limits of public criticism,⁵ people within and outside the party began to voice their dissatisfaction. Between May 8 and June 3 the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee of the party staged a forum for this purpose. Li Wei-han, chairman of the forum and the top Communist in charge of united front work, urged all members of the forum to express their views frankly, and they did, to such an

extent that certain elements within the party became alarmed. By June 8th Mao had revised his statement to permit of a less liberal interpretation, the unfortunate critics had been labeled poisonous weeds rather than flowers, and the way was clear for the start of an Anti-Rightist campaign.

During this campaign the outspoken critics were criticized by their peers and, in many cases, forced by public pressure to recant. Meanwhile the minor parties, of which many of the critics were members, underwent a "rectification" process designed to correct their erring members and purge "rightists" from their ranks.

Finally, in March, 1958, the minor parties and other elements, under Communist pressure, launched a "dedication of hearts" campaign, pledging that they would henceforth completely "surrender their hearts" to the Communist party and to socialism. Meanwhile, intellectuals were told that it was not enough just to be trained specialists; they must be "both Red and expert" — that is, both politically orthodox and professionally competent.⁶

By retaining virtually complete control over all the media of communication, the Communists have had no difficulty in limiting or cutting off public debate almost at will. Their unwillingness to accommodate writers and performers aspiring to freedom of expression has spread a blight among intellectuals, even among those working in the propaganda and indoctrination agencies. Indeed, this is now one of the most annoying problems of the Peking regime.

COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

The frequent shifts in Communist propaganda policy should not obscure the underlying consistency and rigidity in the objectives of the leadership. In the view of the Communist leaders, propaganda policy flows directly from Marxist-Leninist doctrine which they claim fully to accept; if there have been slight modifications of this doctrine in word and in practice, they are not officially acknowledged — the tendency, rather, is to rationalize departures from orthodox doctrines as adaptations to the special conditions of the Chinese revolution.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of propaganda derives from the almost entirely deterministic position of its authors. According to this view, socialism realized through the dictatorship of the proletariat is the only solution to the social "contradictions" generated by traditional systems of class domination. Marxist-Leninist doctrine recognizes only one alternative to this solution: the complete destruction of modern civilization. This basic position implies that the dissemination of anti-socialist or anti-communist ideas — particularly among the laboring classes — will at the very least slow down the forward march of socialism while at the same time prolonging and increasing the suffering of the "masses"; beyond this, the spread of "bourgeois" thought might substantially increase the danger that human civilization will come to an end. These fatal alternatives to socialist control of the mind serve to justify the Communist view that all the intellectual resources of society must be given over to the realization of socialist purposes, to the exclusion of any other aims. Upon their seizure of power in 1949, the Communists accordingly decreed that all cultural and educational activities of the nation must henceforth be directed toward the development of socialist consciousness among the people and toward the construction of the socialist state.⁷

At the same time, they outlawed the expression and spread of ideas and views inconsistent with theirs or tending to undermine the so-called people's democratic dictatorship, for Communist conceptions also call for the concentration in the hands of the party of all responsibility for the control and conduct of propaganda and indoctrination. As the conscious vanguard of the working class, the Communist party alone among all possible associations is thought to possess the theoretical knowledge and determination needed for intellectual leadership in the revolutionary struggle. The party is thus engaged in a sacred mission in which it may neither falter nor allow itself to be hindered by rival beliefs. Having exclusive responsibility for the education and direction of the masses, the party believes that it must monopolize the media of mass communication. Without such control, it might find it impossible to direct the conduct of propaganda and indoctrination.

The more specific and immediate goals which the Communists seek to attain by their concentrated propaganda effort are defined by them in two ways: by the nature of the social groupings they must reach, and by the over-all social and political task they see before them. The principal audiences toward whom their propaganda must be directed may be classified as follows: (1) the masses of workers and peasants, who are regarded as natural supporters of the regime, (2) the remnants of formerly powerful social classes, most of whom are likely to remain enemies, (3) the youth in schools and armed forces who are relatively uncontaminated by the ideas of previous regimes and who can be educated in socialist doctrine, and (4) the Communist militants themselves, whose loyalty and techniques need constant strengthening. As for the tasks before them, the Communists view these as (1) eliminating internal dissension, (2) increasing production and the productive capacity of the country, and (3) carrying out the "socialist transformation" of society, i.e., the shift from a regime based on an alliance of social classes (workers, peasants, petit bourgeois, national bourgeois) to one supported by the new working classes in city and country.

Obtaining Mass Support

Communist doctrine tends to personify "the masses," i.e., the workers as well as other "oppressed" classes, as a powerful force in the historical process. It is difficult to say whether the Communist leadership genuinely maintains such populist views or whether it merely utilizes them for spurring Communist militants to redouble their agitation activities. Possibly the belief in the power of the "masses" is a mystique which serves both leaders and militants as a means of self-justification. Thus, Mao Tse-tung once wrote lyrically:

So long as we rely upon the people, firmly believe in the infinite creative power of the people, and therefore have confidence in them and unite as one with them, we will be able to overcome any difficulty, no matter how serious it may be; no enemy will be able to overwhelm us, but he will be overwhelmed by us.⁸

Liu Shao-ch'i, the foremost Chinese Communist theoretician, said in the same vein:

The masses of the people are the real makers of history, and on them the Communists depend for everything.⁹

Despite the professed creativity and invincibility of the masses, the Communists have taken on themselves the task of educating and organizing the people to become aware of their own needs and of their role in history. The Chinese Communist leaders agree with Lenin in thinking that the masses would never, through their own efforts, come to recognize the need for a revolutionary struggle, and that they will participate in revolutionary activity only if guided by the Communist party. Thus, in the jargon of the movement, the Communists must "awaken" the masses politically and develop their revolutionary consciousness. This task, Liu Shao-ch'i pointed out, "must be well done, no matter how difficult it is nor how much time it may take."¹⁰

Neutralizing Enemies

Since members of formerly influential classes are thought to be unlikely recruits for the Communist cause, the campaign directed at them tends to take the form of psychological warfare and "thought reform." The Communists try to discredit their enemies' ideas and actions so as to shake their confidence in their cause, and to sow dissension among their ranks.¹¹ The Communists differ somewhat from their Bolshevik prototypes in seeming to retain some small hope of converting their political opponents to their own cause. Thus, they direct a steady flow of propaganda at Nationalist officials now on Taiwan, and they make efforts to indoctrinate Nationalist officials who fall into their hands.

Indoctrination of Youth. The Communists regard young people, because of their malleable minds and lack of a fixed ideology, as the group most likely to accept Communism wholeheartedly and to work most faithfully for the cause. Thus they have always

considered the socialist and communist upbringing of young people one of their most important tasks. They educate the young person in the doctrine of communism, they exhort him to support their policies, and try to develop in him personal characteristics that will make him a trustworthy and useful citizen of the new society.

Among the principal instruments employed by the Communists for this indoctrination are the youth organizations. The formation of the first Communist-sponsored youth organization in China, the Chinese Socialist Youth Corps, actually antedated by a year the founding of the party itself. Serving as a recruiting and training ground for the party, this organization was renamed the Chinese Communist Youth Corps in 1925. In 1936 the Chinese Communist Youth Corps was disbanded after the party adopted the "united front" policy. Attempting to broaden its appeal, and in keeping with the changing political situations, the party, from 1936 to 1949, sponsored a variety of youth organizations to further its short-range policies at the time. Of these the most notable were the Vanguard of Chinese National Liberation, the National Salvation Association of Youth, the Vanguard of Anti-Japanese Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

Founded in North China in 1948 as an experiment, the last-mentioned group soon became the chief rallying point for young people on the Chinese Mainland. In line with the transition from a society of "New Democracy" to that of socialism, the New Democratic Youth Corps changed its name to the Chinese Communist Youth Corps in 1957. Formally defined as the party's "assistant," and charged with the responsibility of imbuing all its members with communist spirit and educating them in Marxist-Leninist theory, the corps is most closely tied to the party itself. As of May, 1957, the total membership of the corps was twenty-three million, all allegedly possessed of the right social background and the correct political outlook. These young men and women, ranging from fifteen to twenty-five years of age, were organized into 920,000 branches.¹²

Closely affiliated with the Communist Youth Corps is the Young Pioneers, which draws its membership from children below the age of fourteen and aims at the moulding of their minds

through education and training in various group activities. As of December, 1957 this organization had a membership of about thirty-five million.¹³

Serving as front organizations for the Communist party and enlisting adherents on a less discriminating basis are the All-China Federation of Youth and the All-China Federation of Students. According to the official statement, these two organizations are employed to consolidate and expand the "socialist united front" among the youth organizations, to educate young people from various walks of life, to exhort them to work heroically and to study diligently, to contribute to the construction of a socialist society, and to struggle, in cooperation with young people all over the world, for the preservation of world peace and the abolition of colonialism.¹⁴

Political Training of the Armed Forces. Unlike the armed forces of the Western democracies, which are kept out of politics, the armed forces of Communist China are not only a creature of the Communist party but form its most important instrument in the attainment of political objectives. The party has relied mainly upon its armed forces in seizing political control on the Mainland, and now relies on them to support its political power. The importance of armed forces or armed struggle to the Chinese Communist Party was attested by Mao Tse-tung: "We know that without the armed struggle in China there would be no place for the proletariat, no place for the people, no place for the Communist Party, and no victory for the revolution."¹⁵

The task of keeping the armed forces loyal is handled by a pyramid of political commissars built within the armed forces. At the top of this pyramid is the General Political Department of the People's Liberation Army which, in turn, is directed and supervised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party.¹⁶

Political Education Within the Party. Like all Marxist parties, the Chinese Communists stress greatly the need for political education within their own ranks. For the Chinese Communists this activity takes on particularly broad dimensions because of

the primarily agrarian background of the membership. As Table 1 indicates, only 13.5 per cent of the party's members have working-class backgrounds. The traditional and agrarian attitudes of the party's membership are reflected in the low proportion of women within the ranks of the organization (see Table 2). Since Marxist-Leninist doctrine has long insisted that the revolutionary party, in order to be equal to its task, must recruit its active militants from among the most class-conscious workers, the social composition of the movement has been a cause of frequent concern to the Communist leadership. At the same time, the rather rapid growth of the party's membership (see Table 3) has caused the party leaders to wonder how much cohesive action one can expect from so mixed and so recent a membership. Discussing these difficulties, Liu Shao-ch'i, the party's chief theoretician, stated at the Seventh National Congress of the party as early as 1945:

The social origin of the party membership alone cannot determine everything. The determining fact is our party's political struggles and political life, its ideological education, and its ideological and political leadership. . . . Experience shows that after joining our party on our terms most of them [i.e., petit bourgeois and peasants] did seriously study and accept the party's education of Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung, observe party discipline, and take part in the practical revolutionary struggles of the people. In so doing they have changed their original character and become Marxist-Leninists — fighters of the proletariat. Many of them have even sacrificed their lives for the party's cause, the cause of Communism in China.

The same view was expressed by P'eng Chen, a member of the party's Political Bureau. In 1951 he published an article in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of his party in which he said:

TABLE 1

SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (September, 1957)

Social Background	No. of Persons (approximate)	% of Total Membership (approximate)
Workers	1,740,000	13.5
Peasants	8,500,000	66.5
Intellectuals	1,880,000	15.0
Others	600,000	5.0
Total	12,720,000	100%

Source: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "A Report on the Rectification Campaign," [Kuan-yu Cheng-feng Yung-tung Ti Pao-kao] People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], October 19, 1957.

TABLE 2

BREAKDOWN OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY BY SEX (June, 1956)*

Sex	% of Total Membership (10,734,385)
Male	90
Female	10

* These are the latest Communist statistics on the breakdown of the membership of the party by sex.

Source: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "A Report on the Revision of the Constitution of the Party," [Kuan-yu Hsiu-kai Tang-ti Chang-ch'eng Ti Pao-kao]. A Chinese text of this report may be found in Ta-kung Pao She, compiler, People's Handbook, 1957 [Jen-min Shou-ts'e] (Peking: Ta-kung Pao-she, 1957), p. 263.

TABLE 3

THE GROWTH OF THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY: 1921-1956

YEAR		APPROXIMATE MEMBERSHIP (Unit: Person)	
1921			50
1924-1927	(The period during which the Chinese Communist Party was in alliance with the Kuomintang)		59,000
1927	(The months following the split between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang in the middle of the year)		10,000
1934	(Shortly before the Long March)		300,000
1937	(After the Long March but prior to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937)		40,000
1945	(On V-J Day)		1,210,000
1949	(When the Communist regime was formed in Peking)		4,500,000
1950	[December]		5,800,000
1954	[February]		6,500,000
1956	[February]		9,000,000
	(Prior to the completion of the so-called socialist transformation of industry, commerce, handicrafts, and agriculture)		
1956	[September]		10,734,385
	(After the completion of the "socialist transformation")		(or 1.74% of the total population of China)
1957	[September]		12,720,000
	(During the Rectification and Anti-Rightist Campaigns)		(or 2% of the total pop. of China)

Sources: Current Events Handbook [Shih-shih Shou-ts'e], No. 16 (June 5, 1951), p. 14.

Also Teng Hsiao-p'ing's reports cited in notes to Tables 1 and 2.

The Communist Party of China now has a membership of which 80 per cent are of peasant origin. As a result, some people often doubt whether a party of such a social origin can make itself into a pure and well-disciplined organization of the advanced elements of the working class. This skepticism is entirely unfounded. The skeptics do not understand that in the first place, ever since its inception, the Chinese Communist Party has been building itself in accordance with the sound and time-tested party-building principles of Lenin and Stalin. It has grown up in the course of prolonged, severe, and complicated struggles, especially the armed struggles waged against its enemies. It has a strictly disciplined collective life and a steel-like organizational discipline rarely found elsewhere in the world. It has a comprehensive program of ideological and political education or a class education of the proletariat. Its world outlook is based on dialectical materialism. It takes Marxism and Leninism as well as the thought of Mao Tse-tung — the thought that unites the theories of Marxism-Leninism with the realities of Chinese revolution — as the guiding principles for all its work and constantly educates its members with such ideas.¹⁸

This view of the Chinese Communist leaders amounts to a virtual revision of the traditional Communist theory which holds that a Communist party must draw its membership primarily from the most advanced and resolute section of the proletarian class, the class that is most fully aware of its social status in the class structure. While the Chinese Communist leaders have not admitted that any revisionism is actually involved, these and similar statements have provided a new theoretical basis for a more extensive use of propaganda and indoctrination in the furtherance of the Communist movement in China. 1

In addition to their role in the socialist transformation of the party members, propaganda and indoctrination also serve both the party and the regime in the orientation of the cadres

(the most active and militant party workers). Whenever new policies or programs are instituted, the cadres must be prepared to carry out their implementation intelligently, without the confusion likely to ensue if the new policy or program involves a major shift in "party line" or political strategy. Special orientation programs are therefore prepared for the cadres whenever the need for them arises, in order to preserve among these active workers the dedicated enthusiasm necessary if they are to carry out their task as the Communist goal requires.¹⁹

Combatting Internal Dissension

The China of today is a complex social structure. Survivals of old social systems with their own forms of organization and belief continue to exist alongside a modern working class and the farming communes recently organized by the government. Communist theory and practice, as a result, are constantly torn between the urge to impose new ways and the need to avoid social clashes which might endanger the regime. The Communists cannot, any more than any other political leadership, afford to treat all divergencies in views as treasonable; they need some formula for discriminating between ideas antagonistic to the regime and less serious deviations from Communist doctrine. Such a formula was propounded by Mao in his famous speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," delivered before the Supreme State Conference on February 27, 1957.²⁰

Starting from the premise that even in a socialist society there are still social "contradictions," Mao classified social and political conflicts into "contradictions between the people and their enemy" and "contradictions among the people."

Contradictions between the people and their enemy, arising from conflicts of class interest, are antagonistic in nature and must be solved by force and coercion, but contradictions among the people, including contradictions between the people and their government, are not antagonistic; they merely represent the existence of incorrect views. Mao therefore insisted that the problem of solving the contradictions among the people reduced

itself to rectifying the incorrect views of individuals; during the process of such rectification no methods other than discussion, criticism, persuasion, and education should be used. Mao added that political education, to handle contradictions among the people in a socialist society, was bound to be perpetual rather than transitory, for contradictions among the people will always arise and call for unremitting efforts toward resolution.

Mao thus appears to assign a fairly permanent function to the party's mass persuasion machinery — one that is likely to outlast the era of acute social and political conflicts. He clearly views the party as more than an army of socialist builders; it is likely to remain a political combat organization.

Stepping Up Production

The continuous drive toward technological and economic advancement furnishes a central theme for nearly all propaganda and indoctrination campaigns. Stepping up production is among the highest of Communist virtues. The campaigns are calculated to justify to the working people the production goals set by the regime and to arouse their zeal and enthusiasm. Labor discipline and the need for being content with poor working conditions require that the incentives offered for higher production be primarily psychological. The regime has not thus far provided adequate material stimuli to productivity; its emphasis upon the production of capital goods at the expense of consumer's goods has made this impossible, and hence appeals to the worker's loyalty and devotion are essential.

The building of a modern economy is predicated upon the existence of a modern labor force — new values and behavior patterns must be inculcated. One of the major aims of Communist propaganda is, thus, to discredit old modes of social organization and behavior. In preaching allegiance to the new political faith and to the working class the regime attempts to sever the bonds tying the worker to the institutions of traditional society — the extended family and the local community — and to the belief systems which support these institutions.

"Socialist Transformation." In 1955 the Communists set out to effect a "socialist transformation of society" — a process whereby the Chinese society was to pass from the stage of a "People's Democracy" to one of socialism.²¹ In the official jargon, the People's Democracy was a stage in socialist development marked by joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the working class or proletariat; the stage of socialism would witness the rise of a proletarian dictatorship, coupled with the disappearance from the socio-political scene of the nationalist capitalist and the petit bourgeois who had previously been regarded as allies of the working class. The elimination of these social classes was partially accomplished in 1955-1956 when private ownership gave way to outright nationalization in some sectors of the economy and to "joint state- and privately-owned" enterprises in others. In order to bring about such profound changes in the system of property ownership in a "voluntary" and "peaceful" way, the Communists engaged in an intensive campaign of persuasion, even though the capitalists' acceptance of the new policy was already a foregone conclusion as a result of the helpless situation they had found themselves in from the days of Communist terror during the "Five-Anti Campaign" in 1951-1952.²²

Besides calling upon the bourgeois elements to abandon private ownership of social wealth voluntarily, the Chinese Communists' program of socialist transformation also envisages a thoroughgoing reform of the ideas and political beliefs of these same groups. The remnants of their old class consciousness are to be expunged, and they are to be converted into full-fledged members of the working class. The need for changing the habits of mind of the bourgeoisie has been most clearly stated by Li Wei-han, Director of the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. Speaking before a group of leaders of the so-called democratic parties on September 17, 1957, Li first pointed out:

The fulfillment of China's socialist transformation requires a transformation not only on the economic but also on the political and ideological fronts. . . .

If we are unable to cause socialism eventually to triumph over capitalism on the political and ideological fronts, then the socialist base already built on the economic front will still not be stable and the danger of capitalist restoration will still exist. We must go a step further to solve politically and ideologically the problem of following the socialist road.²³

Further on, he declared:

Both the bourgeois elements and the bourgeois intellectuals are required to accept the socialist transformation politically and ideologically. To accept the socialist transformation means revolutionizing oneself. To accept the socialist transformation economically means abandoning one's social or economic position as a member of an exploiting class. To accept the socialist transformation politically and ideologically means changing one's class standpoint and class nature politically and ideologically. To get rid of one's mortal frame is a fitting phrase to describe such transformation.²⁴

The Chinese Communists' emphasis on the absorption by the working class of the economically displaced bourgeois through a metamorphosis in their beliefs and attitudes represents a departure from strict Leninism. The official aim of abolishing class distinctions peacefully forms a contrast to the Bolshevik preoccupation with the suppression of non-proletarian elements. This approach clearly entails the most vigorous propaganda and indoctrination work on the part of the Chinese Communist Party.

LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL

The official doctrine, according to which the current regime rests upon an alliance of various social classes, is reflected in the forms of law and policy that control communications. The language of the Constitution and the formally-announced policies toward intellectuals and non-Communist parties create an im-

pression that the government desires to tolerate and even to stimulate the expression of ideas originating everywhere in society. Yet neither a careful analysis of the relevant documents nor an examination of actual practice warrants the conclusion that the regime wishes at this time to foster genuine freedom of expression.

The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, adopted in September, 1954, by the National People's Congress, sets forth in Article 87 the citizen's right to freedom of speech and of the press. The language of this article must, however, be interpreted in the light of other sections of the same document. Thus, Article 19 states that no political rights or civil liberties shall be granted to those who do not subscribe to the "people's democratic system," who are anti-state, or who are counter-revolutionaries — designations that might be applied to all whose socio-political views are not in harmony with those of the Communists. Similarly, the Preamble and Article 1 of the same instrument place upon the Communist party the responsibility for leading the Chinese nation toward socialism and communism.

A seemingly more radical renunciation of control over communications by the Chinese Communists was contained in the party's proclamation on June 25, 1956, of a policy of "long-term co-existence and mutual supervision" between the Communist party and the so-called democratic parties.²⁵ The party, in this proclamation, seems to suggest that the non-Communist parties, in spite of their bourgeois character, may continue to function and preserve their identity though their economic base has long since been lost as a result of the socialist transformation of industry and commerce. But this privilege of continued existence hinges on an acceptance of Communist leadership and willingness to revise their political views and activities as well as those of their adherents; the ultimate aim of such revision is a complete change in the class nature of the parties, through which they would be transformed into a political force wholeheartedly dedicated to socialism and communism.²⁶ Thus it is clear that the proclamation of the long-term co-existence policy promised neither termination nor

even a slight liberalization of the Communists' control over thought or the flow of intellectual exchanges. Rather, it was part of a new drive for doctrinal conformity, as it called for the eventual assimilation of all the non-Communist parties and groups by the Communist party.

Party and Government Administration of Communications

Communist supervision of the propaganda and indoctrination network is exercised through a dual hierarchy of party and government organs. Government agencies in charge of cultural and educational affairs execute most of the policies formulated by the corresponding units of the party.²⁷ Since the adoption of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in September, 1954, the Second Administrative Office of the State Council²⁸ has virtually become the supreme agency in the government hierarchy, with prime responsibility for executing the propaganda and indoctrination policies of the party. As an agency under the Premier, this office is apparently devoted to supervising and co-ordinating the work of the various ministries and special agencies engaged in the day-to-day management of cultural and educational activities often inseparable from Communist propaganda and indoctrination. Other agencies of the State Council directly involved in the execution of propaganda and indoctrination policies are the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the New China [Hsin-hua] News Agency, the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs, and the Commission on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. These agencies translate party policies into governmental decrees and regulations for the press, radio stations, publishers, writers, dramatists, musicians, painters, cinema studios, and others whose work may affect public opinion.

Each level of local government has its own unit in charge of cultural and educational affairs. While these agencies work under the close supervision of the corresponding local party and governmental organizations in disseminating propaganda and conducting indoctrination locally, they are subject to the centralized direction and control of the corresponding agencies of the

national government. Thus, through their control of the cultural and educational agencies of the national government, the central authorities of the Communist party are able to make use of all the cultural and educational agencies on all levels of government.

Propaganda and Indoctrination Organs of the Party. The Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Communist party determines both general policy and specific action in all matters pertaining to propaganda and indoctrination under the guidance of the Political Bureau, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, and, presumably, the Central Secretariat. Like its Soviet counterpart, the Department gives central direction to the many activities whereby the party, the government, and other public agencies under the party's supervision influence public opinion. The scope of its interest is broad. It covers practically all realms of intellectual endeavor and all activities that bear upon people's minds, attitudes, or even scientific pursuits. The Department determines the content of propaganda and indoctrination, makes general plans for its conduct, trains and places personnel in this field, and controls the development of propaganda media and indoctrination facilities.

The Department of Propaganda is composed of a series of divisions. While information on the organizational details is unavailable, some divisions appear to be in charge of the formulation of basic theoretical lines for propaganda and indoctrination while others are media-oriented and control the press, the motion picture industry, the radio broadcasting system, and other cultural and educational institutions.

The Department is headed by a director who is assisted by five deputy-directors. All are appointed by the Central Committee. For more than a decade the directorship has been held by Lu Ting-i, a member of the Central Committee and an alternate member of the Political Bureau. The five deputy-directors are Hsu T'e-li, Ch'en Po-ta, Hu Chiao-mu, Chou Yang, and Chang Chi-chung. They are highly qualified by experience and political background to be mouthpieces of the regime and even of the Soviets.

A department of propaganda in each lower territorial division, from provincial to county and city, corresponds to the national department in the party hierarchy. In each primary party organization (or what the Communists call the "primary party branch") one militant is charged with responsibility for conducting propaganda and indoctrination on behalf of his organization. Local personnel are selected by the party committees on each level, with approval of the next higher party authorities needed in the case of the appointment of more responsible officials. Each local department of propaganda serves the same functions for its corresponding local party organization that the national department serves for the Central Committee and the party as a whole. Each of the local departments is supervised by the corresponding department immediately above it in the territorial hierarchy until the top of the pyramid is reached on the national level. In short, local departments of propaganda are under the absolute control and direction of the national department, whose chain of command descends to include the propaganda and indoctrination apparatus of the party in a work shop or a cooperative in some small town or isolated village.

Working Relationships Between Party and Government Agencies.

The relationship between the party and government is, in theory, somewhat confused and only partially delimited. Although the party is admittedly the formulator of all policy, and the government therefore presumably its administrative arm, the Constitution contains no clear definition of the party's function, nor even a clear admission that the party has a function within the government. There have consequently been arguments over the whole problem.

In actuality, however, the relationship gives no trouble on the practical level. The party does formulate policy and, by virtue of the trustworthy party members who head all government agencies, manages to have its policies carried out officially without difficulty. While the party is not supposed to issue orders directly, it is nevertheless not uncommon for party agencies to issue orders through government channels and have them followed just as if they were constitutional. This latter

circumstance was the target of much criticism during the contending and blooming period, but there had been no resolution of the problem.

Thus, the propaganda and indoctrination organs of the party do not in theory issue orders directly to government agencies; for the most part they rely on trusted party members employed in the agencies. Sometimes the so-called interlocking leadership device is used, by means of which senior officials of party propaganda and indoctrination organs hold responsible posts in the government agencies in charge of cultural and educational affairs. When the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the former State Administrative Council was in existence, key posts within it were at one time held by the four leading officials in the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the party.²⁹ In 1958 the Department's director was also a Deputy Premier of the State Council. The People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], for example, is in theory a government organ, but in actuality it is controlled by the Central Committee.

The party thus administers propaganda and indoctrination work largely through a dual system of formally independent hierarchies, as it administers other public affairs. This dual system, composed of the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Government, is merely a legal device for exercising political power. The propaganda organs of the party either create propaganda and indoctrination policies or supervise the execution of such policies by the government. While the responsibility of the party propaganda organs is great and the scope of their activities wide, they are not primarily operational agencies except for intra-party indoctrination. They do not control any major publishing company nor operate any radio station or motion picture studio. The execution of propaganda and indoctrination policies is the duty of governmental agencies — especially those in charge of cultural and educational affairs. Since the pyramidal arrangement of the party structure resembles the territorial tiers of the governmental hierarchy, a dual system for the administration of propaganda and indoctrination is found on all levels of both hierarchies.

The Chinese Communists have good reason for adopting this dual system. First of all, by having the governmental agencies carry out propaganda and indoctrination policies, they are able to give to these policies all the authority and dignity of the state, and thus make their propaganda and indoctrination more effective. At the same time, the Communists can make convenient use of the material resources of the state for the conduct of propaganda and indoctrination.

INDUSTRIALIZATION, DOCTRINE, AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

The policies which any regime applies in conducting political education — i.e., propaganda and indoctrination — result both from its doctrines and the social, economic, and external conditions under which it operates. The relationships between these two sets of factors are complicated and subtle; they are constant sources of scholarly debate.³⁰ Some trace policy decisions to their source in historical circumstance, others to the conscious will of the decision-makers. It is unlikely that this problem has an answer and it may be more useful to regard the doctrines of political leaders and the circumstances of their decisions as two aspects of the same underlying process.

The Communist regime acceded to power on the Chinese Mainland during a time of profound social and economic change not only in China but everywhere on the Asian continent. Industrialization of the "underdeveloped" countries appears to be an unavoidable outcome of the economic and political pressures of the modern world. This process involves not merely the introduction of modern machinery and production methods, but results in profound changes in living and working habits and in the personal orientations of untold millions of people. It also spells the breakup of traditional community and regional ties. There can be little doubt that communist doctrines and policies are in harmony with this general drift toward the modernization of traditional societies.

It may be argued that the social and economic changes which were impending in China could have been accomplished

more gradually and by more democratic means than those employed by the Communists. In particular, many losses to the cultural heritage of China might have been avoided under the less repressive policies of a more gradualist regime. The wholehearted cooperation of China's intellectual leadership — instead of their current grudging participation in the regime's economic efforts — might have benefited the country; a less capricious policy toward the men of letters and skill might have insured their enthusiastic support for a policy of modernization.

Still, the conditions that confronted and still confront the Chinese Communist leadership, and the requirements which flow from these, go a long way toward explaining the courses of action taken in the conduct of propaganda and indoctrination. In the descriptions which follow we will have occasion to refer frequently to these basic requirements, and it is therefore appropriate to state them here briefly, so that they may be kept in mind.

If industrialization and collectivization are to be realized, three basic requirements must be fulfilled: (1) a communications network sufficient to carry coordinated directives to all corners of the country must be established; (2) elites of science, letters, and skill must be put into the service of the regime's social and economic programs; and (3) the content of the communications media must be such as to induce rapid changes in the belief systems and behavior patterns of millions of people.

Communications Network

Before the Communist regime was founded in 1949 modern communications media in China were very much limited in quantity, capable of reaching only a small portion of the Chinese people. True, there were more newspapers than are found on the Mainland today, but their combined printing facilities and daily circulation fell far below those of the present Communist press, as will be noted later.

The Communist press in China antedated the establishment of the regime in 1949. During the early 1930's the Communists were publishing thirty-four newspapers in the Kiangsi Soviet district alone.³¹ The Red China [Hung-se Chung-hua], then an

official organ of the party's Central Committee, had a circulation of some 50,000 copies per issue — an impressive number for the size of the territory in which it was able to circulate. Shortly after the Long March the central authorities of the party launched another paper in North Shensi, the New China News [Hsin Chung-hua Pao] which was renamed the Liberation Daily [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao] in May of 1941. Upon their reconciliation with the Kuomintang following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Communists were allowed by the National Government to publish a newspaper in Wuhan and later in Chungking, wartime capital of the National Government. Meanwhile the Communists founded more than a hundred newspapers in the units of their armies and in the so-called border regions in North and Central China, then occupied by their guerilla forces behind the lines of the Japanese.

The motion picture studios also produced more feature pictures annually than the Communist studios have been able to do since 1949, but in pre-Communist days the Chinese studios were poorly equipped and depended on imported machinery and supplies. They could not make many copies of the films that they produced, and the shortage of projection facilities further limited the usefulness of the films as a mass communications medium; there were no more than a few hundred movie theaters in the entire nation. Moreover, films in those years were not used for the dissemination of political messages as intensively as they are today, which further limited their role as a medium of propaganda.

The publishing industry in China made tremendous progress in the early 1930's. Both the quality and quantity of output were impressive. Even after the war broke out in 1937, the publishing houses were still able to meet the demand for textbooks and other reading matter. But the publishing industry would have found itself unequal to the task if the reading public, including the entire student body in the schools at all levels, had not been so small. It was generally estimated that in the 1940's only about 20 per cent of the Chinese population was literate.³²

Nothing better illustrates the uneven geographical distribution of modern communications media before the founding of the

Communist regime than the radio broadcasting industry. Concentrated in a few metropolitan cities and seaports (in Shanghai alone there were seventeen privately-owned radio stations in 1949), radio broadcasting stations hardly existed at all in a number of provinces in the interior. There was a similarly uneven distribution of radio receiving sets. This state of affairs naturally set a limit on the usefulness of the radio as a nation-wide medium of mass communication.

Like any revolutionary party, the Communists have always laid great stress upon the development of their communications network. Yet the resources available to them even ten years after their accession to power are still insufficient for complete control of the country. They have therefore developed a great many techniques to increase the effectiveness of the network by reaching more people with each particular message, devices such as collective newspaper reading, wired radio speaker systems, radio monitoring teams, and mobile film projection units. Clearly, these devices serve political purposes as well as solving a technical problem; pressures toward conformity can more easily be generated where messages are collectively received by their audiences than through individual reading and listening.

The Intellectual in China

In traditional China the intellectual enjoyed the greatest prestige and respect, without regard to his social origin. According to an old saying, the Emperor should be "courteous to the worthy and condescending to the scholarly" and, according to Confucius, he might subdue an intellectual by force but must not humiliate him. Knowledge was a virtue in itself — a man of learning was on an equal basis with a man of authority.

The position of the scholar with respect to government was defined as it has never been in Western culture. Positions in the government were won by a qualifying examination in the Confucian classics; having once proved their learning in this official philosophy, however, the scholars were not restricted to that doctrine either publicly or privately; they were free to

express any other philosophy they chose. Essentially the government of the country was in their hands; they served not only as administrators but as advisors to the Emperor. As official censors appointed by the Emperor, they stood watch over the activities of the state and had the power of proposing corrective measures for any errors detected; the Emperor himself was not exempt from their admonishments.

If a scholar wanted to withdraw or abstain from government service, he suffered no loss of prestige and was free to write or teach as he pleased. Some even became hermits, refusing to acknowledge the sovereignty of the government at all; these scholarly recluses continued to be respected, and were often given honors for their work by that same government.

The twentieth-century intellectuals likewise taught and wrote, and their participation in political affairs was still considered right and proper. University professors were very active politically, and many became government officials of position and authority. They were as free to express their views as are intellectuals in the Western democracies, but tended to be more active in politics. As writers and editors they were influential in forming public opinion, and continued to receive the traditional respect for learning. Although the intellectuals split over the Kuomintang government, they were still respected and had great freedom of expression (unless they went too far and advocated the overthrow of the government). Novelists and playwrights were generally more radical in their views than the social and natural scientists, and many were influential in promoting the Communist cause.

With their centuries-old respect for learning, the Chinese intellectuals have consistently resisted the intrusion into government of the specialized politician or administrator. Firmly holding to their belief that only the expert is capable of proper administration of affairs in his field, they have been contemptuous of the professional politician. During the Kuomintang regime this attitude generated so strong a pressure that the government, in selecting heads for various agencies, was frequently compelled to emphasize professional knowledge at the expense of administrative ability. Under the present Communist regime this same

conviction that expert knowledge is the most important qualification for leadership underlies much of the friction between the intellectuals and the government; this was clearly shown during the 1957 period of "contending and blooming," when charges were made that the Communists did not "know the ropes," and that Communist leadership meant the "domination of the expert by the layman." It is the classic conflict between the intellectual and the non-intellectual — the idealist and the pragmatist — and since the Communists are not likely to place the man of learning on an equal basis with the man of authority, and since at the same time they need the services of the recalcitrant intellectuals, it is probable that they will have to continue their "thought reform" programs for a long time to come. Meanwhile, with their long history of prestige and respectful admiration behind them, the Chinese intellectuals naturally take the Communist policy of public criticism and deliberate effort to change their attitudes as a much more drastic interference than would their Western counterparts, who have never had a clearly-defined role in government.

Belief Systems and Behavior Patterns

Allowing for a certain amount of over-simplification and exaggeration, students of Chinese culture have often felt that certain value systems and behavior patterns of traditional China are a hindrance to, if not completely incompatible with, any thoroughgoing modernization program that the nation may wish to embark upon. When they speak of the Chinese intellectual they almost always refer to his contempt for labor and his preference for humanistic studies over scientific pursuits.³³ In their observations about the Chinese people they dwell, among other things, on their conservatism, their contentment, their reverence for the ancestor, the aged, and the learned, and on their lack of experience in corporate activities except for those within the family, the clan, or the village.

With these students the Chinese Communists agree; they feel they must not only change these patterns but also many other traditions and attitudes if their industrialization or moderniza-

tion programs are to be put into effect with maximum dispatch and minimum obstruction. For one thing, the idea of centralized planning and centrally-controlled administration is predicated upon the existence of a highly disciplined citizenry, ever ready to accept orders and willing to subordinate personal, family, group, or local interests to those of the state as defined by the top leadership of the bureaucracy. To bring such a citizenry into being, old traditions like family solidarity, provincialism, distrust of officialdom, and private ownership, as well as some recently acquired concepts including civil liberty and democracy, must give way to ideals more consistent with the new order. Another important change in the value system, which the present regime in Peking has done its best to bring about, is in the people's attitude toward military service. Unless the traditional contempt for the enlisted man can be abolished, no regime can hope to build up a military establishment without the undesirable features of a mercenary army that the Chinese have so fully experienced in the recent past.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Chou En-lai, "A Report on the Problem of Intellectuals" [Kuan-yu Chih-shih Fen-tsu Wen-t'i Ti Pao-kaol], People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], January 30, 1956.

2. For a Chinese text of Lu's speech, see ibid., May 26, 1956.

3. Kuo Mo-jo, "Long Live the Policy - 'Let Diverse Schools of Thought Contend'," Extracts from China Mainland Magazines [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 54 (September 22, 1956), pp. 3-9.

4. For an English version of the speech, see Current Background [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 458 (June 20, 1957), pp. 1-26.

5. Mao made the statement in his speech of February 27, 1957, as noted. Since the full text of the speech was not published until June 18th, and since the belatedly published text contains "certain additions" (words used by the New China News Agency which released it), Dr. Harold C. Hinton has questioned whether the original text of Mao's speech contained the six criteria for distinguishing admissible criticisms from the inadmissible ones, the six criteria being: 1) it helps unite the people of the various nationalities, and does not divide them; 2) it is beneficial, not harmful, to socialist transformation and socialist construction; 3) it helps consolidate, not undermine or weaken, the people's dictatorship; 4) it helps consolidate, not undermine or weaken, democratic centralism; 5) it tends to strengthen, not to cast off or weaken, the leadership of the Communist party; and 6) it is beneficial, not harmful, to international socialist solidarity and the solidarity of the peace-loving peoples of the world.

Dr. Hinton believes that Mao did not mention these criteria in his speech, but made them a later addition when the text was published - an addition designed to cover up his omission and to clinch the case against the outspoken critics during the "contending and blooming." If Mao did list those criteria in the course of his speech, contends Dr. Hinton, the People's Daily editorial of April 13, 1957 summarizing Mao's original speech would not have failed to mention them. He also argues that if those criteria had been included, the critics would have been far more circumspect. See Dr. Hinton's article: "China's Democratic Parties," Problems of Communism, VII, No. 3 (May-June, 1958), 45.

However, the present writer has obtained evidence to show that, while the original version of Mao's speech did not list the six criteria as such, it did contain a proviso limiting the scope of political criticism. According to

the proviso, no criticism or utterance should be in violation of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. The evidence is a passage from Professor Sun Hsiao-ts'un's article which appeared in the People's Daily on April 10, 1957. The passage reads: "At least this was what I thought. After studying Chairman Mao's speech recently, I have come to learn that we can enter into controversy about anything that is permitted by the Constitution."

It should be noted that since the scope of freedom of political expression prescribed in the Constitution substantially resembles what is delimited by the "six criteria," Mao's reference to the Constitution in his original speech had practically the same restrictive effect as did his enumeration of the six criteria in the belatedly published text. Admittedly, the enumeration of the six criteria had the merit of directness and clarity which the mere reference to constitutional limitations lacked. It is probable that the lack in Mao's original speech of a direct and explicit limitation on political expression was largely responsible for the outburst of what proved to be inadmissible criticisms of the party and the regime. Furthermore, Mao's use of the classical liberal slogan, "Let One Hundred Schools of Thought Contend and One Hundred Flowers Bloom" was misleading, being apparently designed more as a poetic metaphor than a statement of policy.

6. See "Marching Toward the Goal of 'Red and Expert'" [Hsiang Hung-tu Chuan-sheng Ti Mu-piao Chien-chin], editorial in People's Daily (Peking), March 23, 1958.

7. Arts. 41-49 of "The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference." For an English text of this document, see The Common Program and Other Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1950).

8. Mao Tse-tung, On Coalition Government (Yenan: The New China News Agency, 1945), p. 145.

9. Liu Shao-ch'i, On the Party (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1950), pp. 56-58.

10. Ibid., p. 58.

11. Hu Shih, "Communist Propaganda and the Fall of China," Columbia Law Review, LIV (June, 1954), 513-521.

12. People's Daily (Peking), May 15, 1957.

13. New China News Agency Release, August 22, 1958.

14. See Art. 2 of the Constitution of the All-China Federation of Youth. A Chinese text may be found in New China Fortnightly (Peking) [Hsin-hua Pan-yueh K'an], No. 131 (May 10, 1958), pp. 47-48.

15. Mao Tse-tung, "Introductory Remarks to the Communist," in Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1955), III, 61.

16. For further information see Charles H. Barber, "China's Political Officer System," Military Review, XXXIII (July, 1953), 10-21.

17. Liu Shao-ch'i, op. cit., pp. 18-20.

18. P'eng Chen, "The Victory of Marxism and Leninism in China," [Ma-k'o-szu Lieh-ning Chu-i Tsai Chung-kuo Ti Sheng-li], People's Daily (Peking), July 1, 1951.

19. For an account of the Chinese communist cadre policy, see W. E. Gourlay, Chinese Communist Cadre: Key to Political Power (Cambridge: Russian Research Center, Harvard University, 1952).

20. For an English version of the speech, see Current Background [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 458 (June 20, 1957), pp. 1-26.

21. For an excellent analysis of the Chinese Communist theory of the transition from a state of New Democracy to that of socialism, see Arthur H. Steiner, "The People's Democratic Dictatorship in China," Western Political Quarterly, III (March, 1950), 38-51; and his article, "Constitutionalism in Communist China," The American Political Science Review, XLIX (March, 1955), 1-20.

22. In 1952 the regime launched the Five-Anti Campaign to combat five alleged evils in business: bribery, tax-evasion, fraud, theft of state property, and theft of state economic information. Countless businessmen were fined, imprisoned, executed, or driven to suicide. This campaign so terrified the businessmen that they soon lost the courage to show any defiance at all.

It is pertinent to note that this campaign against the businessman was preceded by a Three-Anti Campaign (anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism) against the rank and file of bureaucracy.

For an account of these two campaigns, see Theodore H. E. Chen, and W. H. C. Chen, "Three-Anti and Five-Anti Movements in Communist China," Pacific Affairs, XXXI (March, 1953), 3-23.

23. Li Wei-han, "Democratic Parties and Groups Must Carry Out Self-Transformation Basically," Survey of China Mainland Press [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 1, 663 (December 3, 1957), p. 5.

24. Loc. cit.

25. For an English version of the announcement, see Li Wei-han, "The Democratic United Front in China," Current Background, No. 402 (July 24, 1956), pp. 1-10.

26. See Li Wei-han, article cited in Note 23, supra, pp. 4-18.

27. For a detailed description and analysis of the governmental system under the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, see Franklin W. Houn, "Communist China's New Constitution," Western Political Quarterly, VIII (June, 1955), 199-231.

28. The Office appears to have taken up most of the duties of the former Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs of the State Administrative Council.

29. Vice-chairmen of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs were Lu Ting-i, director, and Ch'en Po-ta, deputy-director of the Department of Propaganda. Another deputy-director of the Department of Propaganda, Hu Chiao-mu, served as secretary-general of the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs. Still another deputy-director of the Department of Propaganda, Hsu T'e-li, was a member of the same committee.

30. For a brilliant analysis of Chinese Communist politics see H. Arthur Steiner, "Ideology and Politics in Communist China," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 321 (January, 1959), 29-39.

31. Mao Tse-tung and others, Launching a Massive Cultural and Educational Movement Among the Masses [K'ai-chan Ta-kuei-mu Ti Ch'un-chung Wen-chiao Yun-tung] (Hong Kong: Chung-Kuo Ch'u-pan She, 1947), p. 3.

32. A few years ago the Nationalist government drew a more optimistic picture of the development of literacy in China. According to this source, at the end of 1945, 198,695,066 of China's estimated 373,905,966 persons of or above school age had received the basic course of learning. In other words, about 53.1% of the persons of or above school age were literate in 1945. The term "literate" included all those who had been enrolled in schools at one time or another, regardless of the length of attendance. See China Handbook 1950 (New York: Pockpart Press, 1950), p. 639.

33. See Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vols. I-II (London: Cambridge University Press, 1954 and 1956). Also Homer H. Dubs, China: The Land of Humanistic Scholarship (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949).

PROBLEMS AND GOALS

The Fight for Literacy

The problem of the Chinese communists is not merely the unification of a traditional society into a socialist one, but also a change from an agricultural to an industrial society. While it is far from easy to inculcate in the people the regime's socialist principles and aims without the written word, it is impossible to operate an industrial society without a reasonable level of literacy. The Chinese government has therefore set in motion an intense drive to combat illiteracy, and aims to eliminate it completely within the next decade.

In January, 1956 forty-five million adult peasants and about 65 per cent of the industrial workers already had some degree of literacy; twenty-two million of these persons had become literate between the time the Communists came to power and September, 1957. About 600,000 persons had acquired an educational standard equal to the senior grade-school level (in China the first four grades are considered junior grade-school level and the next two senior grade-school level).¹ It is reported that in 1958 1,100 counties in the various provinces of China had "basically"² eliminated illiteracy; six times as many people were said to be literate as there were in 1949, a total of some eighteen million.³

A major handicap in the fight against illiteracy is the non-phonetic system of writing Chinese, which takes years to master. The simplification of ideographs is not a new phenomenon in China, but has always been slow and sporadic. The present regime has already simplified some 1,500 ideographs for words most commonly used. These new characters are already in use in newspapers and books, and more simplifications are planned. The ultimate aim of the regime, however, is the eventual substitution of the Roman alphabet for the ideographs.⁴

Increase in Educational Facilities

The educational problem of the Chinese Communists revolves around two essentials — the industrial society must be literate if it is to function effectively, and the citizens of the socialist society must be well-grounded in socialist doctrine, history, and aims if a cohesive social and political system is to be built.

The problem of literacy is attacked on all levels: in the public schools in the case of children, and in various adult education programs and spare-time schools for adults. Wherever possible socialist training is given at the same time, and meanwhile every opportunity is taken to give a thorough grounding in Communist doctrine and principles both within and outside the school system.

The development of educational facilities has thus been a long-standing preoccupation of the Chinese Communists.⁵ Even before the Long March they set up schools in the region of the Kiangsi Soviet as part of their program for the sovietization of China, and afterwards, they promptly opened schools and universities in areas under their control. In Yen-an they operated the well-known Anti-Japanese university, the North Shensi College, and the Lo Hsun College of Arts. From 1937 to the end of World War II these and many other Communist schools attracted tens of thousands of students from all over the country who subsequently became faithful party workers and thus helped in the struggle for power. After establishing their regime in Peking, the Communists set out to develop all educational institutions of the nation and fit them into the indoctrination machinery;

professional training and political education were seen as equally important.

The Chinese government has consistently endeavored to increase school facilities. Table 4 shows the increase in enrollment in schools and colleges in the past decade. In addition there were 80,800,000 workers and peasants enrolled in spare-time schools as of June, 1958. The increase in high school and college enrollment in 1958-1959 over that in the elementary schools for the same period probably results from an increased capacity at the higher levels that reflects the effectiveness of the "Great Leap Forward" movement launched then.

Party Schools and Intra-Party Indoctrination

The active party workers constitute the core of the party's strength, and are the main links in the chain of communication between the party and the people. The most intensive educational efforts are therefore directed at these cadres (a term used to refer to the enthusiastic and politically dependable functionaries capable of assuming leadership), with the aim of deepening their party loyalty and familiarizing them with the ever-changing long- or short-range policies of the party and the government. Since 1944 the party has used three major devices of indoctrination: the study group program, the party schools, and the "rectification campaign."

Study Group Program. The study group program is organized in practically all agencies of the party and government. Held on a year-round basis, these study groups are usually classified into three grades: advanced, intermediate, and elementary. Individuals are assigned to the various grades according to their educational background and previous training in communist theory. Those in the advanced groups generally study at home by reading assigned books or documents on which they take notes and write comments. Meetings are held only occasionally for members of the group to discuss what they have studied. Elementary study groups carry on their studies

TABLE 4
ENROLLMENT IN SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES IN
COMMUNIST CHINA: 1949-1959

School Year	Elementary Schools	High Schools	Colleges and Universities
1949-1950	24,391,033	1,267,089	111,133
1950-1951	28,928,988	1,566,540	138,731
1951-1952	43,154,440	1,964,071	155,570
1952-1953	49,766,114	3,145,866	194,378
1953-1954	51,504,312	3,628,264	216,768
1954-1955	51,190,000	4,246,000	258,000
1955-1956	53,100,000	4,437,000	290,000
1956-1957	57,000,000	5,000,000	400,000
1957-1958	63,000,000	5,160,000	447,000
1958-1959	86,000,000	12,000,000	660,000

Sources: New China News Agency Release, September 15, 1954.

People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], July 10, 1955.

The China News Bulletin, June 17, 1956 and April 15, 1959.

China Daily News (New York) [Hua-chiao Jih-Pao], September 12 and 15, 1956.

People's Handbook, pp. 608-609.

mainly by listening to lectures. The intermediate study groups may follow either or both methods.

Those of all grades undertake two kinds of studies: political and theoretical. Political studies are designed to familiarize the cadres with current policies, laws, and regulations of the party and the government, and require, on the average, two hours a week. A student is expected to spend from three to six hours a week on theoretical studies — these include not only general communist doctrine, but also specific theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, and other top Communist leaders that have a special bearing on current problems or activities.⁶ For example, early in 1953 when the regime was accelerating the program of economic construction, the party decreed that study groups above the intermediate grade should study Chapters 9-12 of The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik) and other important Communist works on socialist economic construction, such as Lenin's Economics and Politics During the Period of Proletarian Dictatorship, his On Unified Economic Planning, and Stalin's The Economic Situation in the U. S. S. R. and the Policy of the Party.⁷

All study groups are organized and supervised by the study committees of the various agencies of the party and government. Normally each agency has such a study committee, composed of the party branch secretary and other senior Communist officials in that agency. The study committees of such agencies are in turn supervised by a study committee attached to the local party organization. Through the local party organizations all local study committees are ultimately controlled and directed by the central authorities of the party.

Party Schools. The second major device used by the Communist party in indoctrinating cadres is the party school. As of October, 1957, party committees above the provincial level maintained seventy senior, secondary, and junior party schools in addition to the party schools set up by administrative districts in twenty-two provinces, and the party schools of hsien or county committees set up in seventeen provinces.⁸ Besides these, the party committees

at different levels had also set up at different times more than 1,000 spare-time political schools.⁹

While attending the regular party schools, members are temporarily detached from the agencies in which they are employed. To avoid undue interference with the work of the employing agency, co-workers usually attend the party schools on a rotation basis. The system makes it possible to indoctrinate large numbers of students: from November, 1949 to March, 1950 party schools in the provinces of Hopei, Shansi, Chahar, and Pingyuan assembled some 200,000 village cadres in rotation to study the agricultural policy of the regime,¹⁰ and in 1953, party schools in Honan Province alone had a total enrollment of 250,000 rural officials.¹¹

Rectification Campaigns. The third major device for the indoctrination of cadres is the "rectification campaign" or "Cheng-feng Yun-tung." In the course of such a campaign party members study certain assigned documents, associate theory with practice, and engage in criticism and self-criticism. A rectification campaign differs from regular theoretical study in two major respects. First, a rectification campaign occurs sporadically, whereas the theoretical study goes on year in and year out. Secondly, during a rectification campaign the participants must make a thoroughgoing study of their own errors and attitudes — a process not required by the regular theoretical study. During a rectification campaign, each party member is called upon to examine his thinking and behavior, to criticize others constructively, to accept criticism made of him, and to acknowledge any errors of thought or action by public confession and pledges to reform. Anyone who remains silent during such a campaign only exposes himself to charges of being un-cooperative and to suspicions that he is harboring incorrect attitudes or covering up questionable deeds. Thus a rectification campaign gives the party leadership an opportunity to detect deviations, shortcomings, disloyalties, or misconduct among the rank and file, and to weed out undesirable or recalcitrant elements.

There were six rectification campaigns between 1942 and 1957. The important thing to note about these campaigns is that they

occur as a result of some special political situation or change in party policy; thus, the objectives of each differ with the kinds of situation that brought them into being, and range from an emphasis on general housecleaning in the administrative procedures, as in the campaign of 1952, to an attack on power-hungry higher officials, as in 1954. The stated objectives of each of the campaigns clearly indicate the situation that made them necessary. The campaigns are crisis-born, and in addition to their usefulness in educating the party members, furnish opportunity for a sporadic catharsis which the party finds a healthy safety-valve for its membership.

The party had its first rectification campaign in 1942-1943. This campaign had a stated aim of combating "subjectivism, doctrinairism, and sectarianism," and was primarily aimed at an accelerated reform of intellectuals of petit bourgeois origin who had entered the party without acquiring the necessary proletarian world view.¹²

The second rectification campaign occurred in 1947. By this time the membership of the party had reached 2,700,000 and included, it was said, a number of landlords, rich peasants, and other undesirables who had managed to gain control of local party organizations. The campaign was largely directed against them.

In June, 1950, following their full assumption of power, the Communists initiated another party-wide rectification campaign designed to raise the theoretical and political level of party members in general and new recruits in particular. It was also designed to put party members newly-transferred from country to urban districts through a special re-orientation program in which they would sum up their new experiences and study new policies and regulations.

Another rectification campaign took place in 1952. This turbulent campaign involved a general overhaul of all branch organizations as well as a complete re-examination of the qualifications of individual party members. Its targets were waste, corruption, and bureaucratism — three major evils that had plagued the party since it had seized power a couple of years before.

Following the purge of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, men who had made an unsuccessful attempt to gain greater power in the party hierarchy and the government, the party in 1954 launched a new rectification campaign aimed at complacency and personal empire-building among high-ranking officials.

The most recent rectification campaign was launched in 1957 in the midst of widespread popular discontent and dissatisfaction. It was felt that many party members, having been in power for eight years or so, had come to feel they belonged to a privileged class, and were, as a result, self-centered, conceited, and contemptuous of non-party people. Instead of dedicating themselves to the revolutionary cause, these Communists were said to have indulged in "bourgeois individualism to a serious degree, zealously craving for personal enjoyment and keeping their minds on honors and position,"¹³ to have formed cliques and carried on factional struggles, to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and to care nothing for the interests and aspirations of ordinary people. There were also reported to be Communists who took the law into their own hands, depriving innocent people of liberty, property, and even life without due process of law.¹⁴ The Central Committee of the party on April 27, 1957 issued a directive calling for another rectification campaign,¹⁵ feeling that there was danger of a serious loss of public confidence since some people had already gone on strike and stirred up other "disturbances,"¹⁶ and apprehensive of the possibility of an uprising like that in Hungary.

Singling out "bureaucratism, sectarianism, and subjectivism" as the chief evils for rectification, and equating them with what Mao Tse-tung called "contradictions among the people," the Central Committee of the party said that this campaign, unlike previous ones, "must be carried out seriously, yet as gently as a breeze or a mild rain."¹⁷ In other words persuasion, rather than coercion or disciplinary measures, was to be used. This policy was accompanied by a guarantee that no one would be held responsible for anything he might say in the course of the campaign; thus the call for a candid and thoroughgoing examination of the party's handling of public affairs led a considerable number

of party members to criticize the inadequacies and shortcomings of various functionaries and agencies. Some even questioned basic party policies such as thought control, the trade union movement, compulsory grain delivery, and economic collectivization.

This sort of "rectification" campaign obviously serves not only as an educational exercise for party members but as a valuable propaganda device for the country as a whole. Once the "evils" have been smoked out, the public confessions made by the wrongdoers, and corrective action promised, the general public tends once more to enjoy a feeling of confidence in its leaders, and the crisis is past. This particular campaign had wider ramifications than most, as will be seen later in this chapter in the discussion of the reform of minor parties.

MASS PROPAGANDA NETWORK (ORAL AGITATION)

While expanding the school system and organizing adult-education courses, the government has constantly endeavored to buttress its policies by political indoctrination programs outside the educational system. In these programs its major instruments have been the Mass Propaganda Network and the so-called mass organizations.

Unlike many of the other propaganda organs, most of which are government directed, the mass propaganda network operates under the sole control of the Communist Party of China and has no operational relationship to the government. This nation-wide network was established by a Central Committee directive, issued on January 1, 1951, "Decision Concerning the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses."¹⁸

By establishing this network the party aimed to intensify and broaden the work of agitation and propaganda, which thus became a task not only for the working personnel of propaganda agencies but for "every Communist." Sporadic dissemination of propaganda was thus replaced by a permanent and systematic program.

Propaganda and Reporting Officers

Selection and Appointment of the Propaganda Officer. Propaganda officers are selected by the party branch headquarters from party members, Youth Corps members, model workers, and other active "revolutionary" individuals willing to engage in propaganda work. The propaganda officer is chosen on the basis of his political enthusiasm, his demonstrated party loyalty, his ability to get along well with fellow workers and others, and his apparent aptitude for propaganda work. To insure his political reliability and professional competence, the candidate is subject to investigation and approval by the party branch committee as well as approval by the appropriate higher party organization.

In practice, propaganda officers are often chosen from active party members in factories, villages, or mass organizations where they have demonstrated their fitness for propaganda work during some political or production campaign. Such campaigns usually offer the best opportunity for the party to find out which men are politically most reliable and professionally most competent; by appointing the politically reliable and professionally competent, the party can use the selection as a public recognition of effort, and thus the very process of recruiting propaganda officers serves to give personal gratification and prestige to those who have most enthusiastically helped the regime in carrying out a given task.¹⁹

The Training and Duties of Propaganda Officers. Propaganda officers are trained in "propaganda officers' conferences," party schools, and propaganda officers' training centers. Propaganda officers' training centers are usually organized by the party authorities on a county or district level. At the centers the trainees take short-term courses which generally last a week or so. Ordinarily, the courses are designed to improve their general preparation in Communist theory and propaganda techniques. On occasion there are also courses on subjects of current importance as, for example, the agricultural cooperative movement. By September, 1951 there were 4,871 propaganda officers' training centers in Manchuria alone.²⁰

Wherever there are not enough propaganda officers' training centers, the regular party schools are called upon. These regular party schools conduct the training of propaganda officers according to the general methods of the training centers.

Propaganda officers' conferences are convened at least once a month by the party branch headquarters. At these conferences, propaganda officers review and discuss their experiences and obtain advice and instructions from officials of the party headquarters.

In addition to receiving training and instructions from party authorities, the propaganda officer also studies on his own initiative propaganda news handbooks, newspapers, official documents, pamphlets, and other reference materials relating to his future work.²¹

The propaganda officer has many duties: he publicizes and explains current domestic and international developments under the direction of the party branch secretaries, with especial emphasis on party and government policies as they affect the activities of the people in timely local matters. He passes on the typical experiences of industrial and other workers as good examples for the public. Furthermore, he must refute prevalent "reactionary rumors" and "mistaken ideas," encourage workers to study and profit by the experiences of others, do his assigned tasks conscientiously, and submit regular reports on public attitude and reaction to the party so as to assist in the choice of appropriate propaganda material and methods for different occasions.

The propaganda officer has various methods of performing his duties: he talks with people individually and in groups, listens to broadcasts and takes notes on them for use in the wall or blackboard newspaper he edits; he composes short articles and paints pictures; he organizes newspaper reading groups and amateur dramatic troupes.

Number and Distribution of Propaganda Officers. When the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to establish a nation-wide propaganda network was first announced at the beginning of 1951, only in Manchuria were there

many propaganda officers; in other regions the number was negligible,²² but by September, 1952 a partial statistical report showed an increase to 2,920,000,²³ distributed as follows:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Approximate Number of Propaganda Officers</u>
North China and Inner Mongolia	996,000
East China	555,000
Northeast China	448,000
South Central China	380,000
Southwest China	188,000
Northwest China	88,000

Apparently the number of propaganda officers in the country increased continuously from then on; a Communist newspaper reported in January, 1953 that on that date there were already 1,259,500 propaganda officers in East China alone.²⁴

Most of the propaganda officers operated in factories, towns, villages, cooperative farms, mutual aid teams, and other mass organizations, but they were not evenly distributed. As of December, 1952 a railway engineering plant in Hankow had one propaganda officer for every ten workers,²⁵ but this was high compared to most places. In July, 1952 it was reported that the party authorities in Honan Province hoped to develop their propaganda network by the end of the year to one propaganda officer for every 100 persons in the so-called general areas.²⁶ As of February, 1954 the total number of propaganda officers in Shansi Province accounted for 1.54 per cent of the total population.²⁷

The propaganda officers retain their original jobs while serving. For instance, in a factory the propaganda officer is invariably one of the workers. To the officer his propaganda and agitation work is a duty that he owes to the party, and he receives no special pay for it.

The "Non-Party Propaganda Army." The effectiveness of the propaganda officers cannot be gauged by their total number alone. Propaganda officers, referred to by the Communists as

the "propaganda army of the party," often enlist the assistance of volunteers, whom the Communists call the "non-party propaganda army." There are usually three to four volunteer propagandists in a unit to one propaganda officer. For instance, the Hsu Feng-ch'i Model Propaganda Team in Yung-hsiu Hsien of Kiangsi Province had, in December 1952, thirty-seven propaganda officers and 168 volunteer propagandists.²⁸

The propaganda officers give guidance and direction to the volunteers, while the volunteers assist the regular propaganda officers. Hence, the volunteer propagandists are called by the Communists "the reserve of the propaganda army of the party."²⁹

The Reporting Officer. The reporting officer is defined as "an advanced propaganda officer." It is his duty to give regular and systematic reports to the people about current developments, party policies, production goals, work experiences, and so on. The propaganda officer informs him regularly about the nature and frame of mind of his audience so that he can present his reports appropriately and effectively. When he gives a report, the assisting propaganda officer, having organized the meeting, informs him afterwards of the audience's reaction. If for any reason his report has not been fully understood, the assisting propaganda officer usually discusses its content informally with the people or holds group meetings with them in order to dispel doubt or clear up any misunderstandings.

Reporting officers are found in all provincial, municipal, county, and district party committees. As of September, 1952 an incomplete report showed that the country had approximately 68,000 reporting officers.³⁰ As is true of propaganda officers, the present number of reporting officers is believed to be much larger than that reported in 1952, an opinion supported by the 23,567 officers reported in Shantung Province alone in September, 1954.³¹

Most of these reporting officers are party members holding responsible positions in the party, the government, and other agencies on various levels. Mayor P'eng Chen of Peking, for example, is said to be a reporting officer.

The reporting officer is required to give at least one public political report in every two months. Although complete statistics on the total number of people in the country who hear such reports each year are lacking, fragmental information suggests that the number must be quite large. For example, the Communists reported that in July and August, 1954 some 2,245,000 persons, 91 per cent of the adult population in the Liao-ch'eng Administrative District, Shantung Province, heard reports on the nation's draft constitution from local reporting officers.³²

The topics and content of the reports are chosen or approved in advance by the secretary of the appropriate party committee. After the delivery of a report, the reporting officer is required to submit an account of his work to the party secretary. These routines enable the party authorities to maintain a close control over the activities of the reporting officer.

The Role of the Propaganda and Reporting Officers. The propaganda and reporting officers supplement the formal media of communication in the tasks set for them by the party. Verbal argument presented by the propaganda officer is convincing in a way that mass communication is not, by virtue of the personal contact of the officer with his audience. Furthermore, since the propaganda officer comes to the audience and not the other way around, the party can be sure that the most important messages will reach the auditors. Newspapers or radios, even when available, may not be read or listened to, and even when they are, the reader or listener can easily overlook information which the party is most interested in transmitting.

Further, the propaganda and reporting officers provide a real link between the party leadership and the people. The propaganda officer is in daily personal contact with small groups of people whose problems he knows at first hand and with whom he can converse informally and at great length; thus he can give the party leaders up-to-date information on popular opinion. When the party makes a decision that imposes additional burdens on the people, the propaganda officer can explain and justify the new policy to the individuals most affected. Unlike the press and the radio, which are essentially impersonal, the propaganda

officer can use the force of his personality to support party or government policy. In addition, he is easily available to individuals for consultation or guidance in public and private matters. Significantly, it is said that the reporting and propaganda officers are called variously "the information bureau," "the minister of thought," or "the messenger of Chairman Mao."³³

Unlike the relatively inflexible mass media, the propaganda and reporting officers can conveniently adapt their work to the precise composition of their audiences and to local problems, thus increasing the effectiveness of their propaganda and agitation work.

The propaganda officer serves as an agent through whom members of his group can register complaints and express their desires to the local authorities. This must often minimize popular reaction against the party or the general state of affairs.

Finally, the propaganda officer is much more effective in the agitation for higher productivity than are the radio and the press, since he gives concrete meaning to the party concept of "agitation by example." The propaganda officer is not expected simply to talk about the importance of higher production, but to set his group an example of industry, discipline, and sacrifice; in this way he can rally the other workers or farmers around him and bring them into the campaign for increased production.

According to the Communists, the reporting and propaganda officers have made great contributions in the education of the people, the mobilization of public opinion, and the enlistment of popular support during various nationwide campaigns including the Anti-America Aid-Korea Campaign, the Land Reform Campaign, the Campaign for the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, the Three-Anti Campaign, the Five-Anti Campaign, the Campaign for Increasing Production and Practicing Economy, the Drought and Flood Prevention Campaign, the Campaign for the Liberation of Taiwan, and the Campaign for the Socialist Transformation of Industry, Commerce, and Agriculture.

Nevertheless, the work of the reporting and propaganda officers is by no means completely successful. First of all, the effectiveness of the propaganda officers has been hampered by the presence in their ranks of persons whose educational attain-

ment is too low to enable them to meet the demands of their work. One Communist writer reported that during the Anti-America and Aid-Korea Campaign a good many propaganda officers in Northern Kiangsu did not even know what form of government North Korea had.³⁴ To be sure, the presence of incompetent propaganda officers is not due so much to the party branches' carelessness in selection as it is to the lack of properly qualified candidates.

Even a competent propaganda officer is likely to find it difficult to perform his propaganda and agitation duties as satisfactorily as the party would like. Often he finds himself too busy to perform these duties and still fulfil his responsibilities to his regular job and his family. Since giving up the propaganda and agitation duty would probably affect his party standing, he is likely to resort, at least temporarily, to what the party has labeled "the routinization of propaganda," formalizing his relations with people in his group, a course detrimental to his effectiveness as a propaganda officer.

Many propaganda officers have been charged with high-handedness and intimidation. For example, propaganda officers in the Ta-t'ung Coal Mine once compelled workers who did not meet the demands for higher productivity to wear black stripes on their sleeves to indicate their failure.³⁵ While trying to enforce the regime's agricultural cooperative policy, many officers, instead of emphasizing the merits of the plan, resorted to threats, telling farmers that only those who wanted to follow the path of Chiang Kai-shek would refuse to join the proposed cooperatives.³⁶ Such methods, though they may bring about outward conformity, probably generate a good deal of antagonism in the people.

Further, since one of the principal tasks of the propaganda officer is the exhortation of the workers or farmers to greater effort, his constant stressing of this theme is likely to arouse the displeasure of his fellow workers or farmers, and may even disrupt his personal relations with them. Fear of this possibility has led many propaganda officers to refrain from being persistent in their propaganda work.

The party branch secretaries' inability to give constant attention to the propaganda and reporting officers has also lessened their effectiveness. The party branch secretaries have difficult and widespread responsibilities in their territorial and production units; in many rural areas a party branch secretary is roughly equal to, if not synonymous with, the local government, and in industrial plants he has heavy quasi-managerial functions. Each role or function makes demands on his time and energy, and often it is impossible for him to find time to supervise the propaganda and reporting officers very closely. As a result, some of the propaganda and reporting officers perform their work improperly if they do it at all.³⁷

The Role of Mass Organizations in Propaganda and Indoctrination

The term mass organizations refers not only to trade unions, youth corps, women's associations and cultural organizations, but to the so-called democratic parties. There are several dozens of such mass organizations in Communist China, each having the responsibility for rallying a certain special group around it in support of the regime.

The value of mass organizations in the conduct of propaganda and indoctrination was seen by Mao Tse-tung as early as 1928 when he wrote his famous "Report of an Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Hunan."³⁸ Praising the amazing achievements of the peasant associations in his home province, Mao said, "If ten thousand schools of law and political science had been opened, could they have achieved in such a short time so much political education among men and women, young and old, all the way into the remote corners of the country as the peasant associations have now done? I think not."

Theoretically, mass organizations have at least three advantages in conducting propaganda and indoctrination on behalf of the Communist regime: to supplement the propaganda and indoctrination personnel and facilities of the regime; to tailor propaganda and indoctrination for use in special groups; and to conduct propaganda and indoctrination unofficially when desired.

While the mass organizations are outside the Communist party, they are nevertheless obliged to educate their members in Marxism, Leninism, and the policies of the People's Government. Thus the China Society for Promotion of Democracy resolved in 1952 that it would encourage its members to familiarize themselves with Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung.³⁹ The All-China Association of Industry and Commerce states in its charter that it will encourage thought reform and study among the bourgeois businessmen and industrialists and urge them to participate in various patriotic activities.⁴⁰ To accomplish such aims, the mass organizations sponsor short-term indoctrination classes, organize study groups, and follow the practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Besides educating their own members, many mass organizations help the regime to conduct propaganda and indoctrination among the general public. They publish newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets, organize mass meetings and demonstrations, and present pictorial exhibits, puppet shows, films, and slides.

An additional function of the mass organizations is to encourage propaganda and indoctrination specialists among their ranks to prepare appropriate material for the party. For example, one of the principal tasks of the All-China Association of Literary Writers (the Chinese Writers Union) is to see that its members produce a sufficient number of literary works in accordance with party policy and doctrine.

Key positions in the various mass organizations are held by Communists or their sympathizers, and the mass organizations themselves depend upon the government for financial support (a situation which amounts to virtual government control of the organizations).

Cultural Propaganda

In addition to the organized programs of courses and discussions, the regime also conducts more general "cultural" propaganda. Part of the Communists' program of popular education are the "Houses of Culture," workers' and peasants' clubs, and libraries. These are considered to be important agencies for the

indoctrination of the population; they provide books, magazines, and newspapers for people to read, hold pictorial exhibits, organize study groups, sponsor lectures, and project slides. As of December, 1956 there were over 370,000 peasants' clubs, 120,000 rural libraries, 10,000 workers' clubs, 17,000 workers' libraries, and some 6,000 "Houses of Culture."⁴¹

According to a survey made in 1952, the nation's "Houses of Culture" alone presented, during a three-month period, some 90,000 slide showings before an audience of fifty-six million and sponsored 148,000 lectures and forums which were attended by forty-six million persons. In the meantime, some twenty million people visited the exhibit room of the "Houses of Culture."⁴² While there is no way of knowing how many study groups have been organized by the "Houses of Culture" in the country at any particular time, fragmental information suggests that the total must be very large and the participants startlingly numerous. During the first three months of 1953, the 135 "Houses of Culture" in Szechuan Province organized some 7,200 study circles comprising 460,000 members, for example.⁴³

THOUGHT REFORM AND "IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION"

Thought Reform of Intellectuals

As early as 1945 Mao Tse-tung made it abundantly clear that if his party seized power it would have all non-Communist intellectuals undergo a process of ideological remoulding so that they might "acquire new viewpoints and new methods of serving the Chinese people."⁴⁴

Following their nation-wide military victory in 1949, the Communists quickly put this program into effect. The first group of non-Communist intellectuals to go through the thought reform process were college students, teachers of elementary and high schools, and Kuomintang officials who had failed to flee the Mainland when the Communists overran it. Most of the college professors were not affected until the summer of 1951.

Thought reform (popularly called "brainwashing") is a phenomenon unique to China, used primarily to establish political and

social conformity among groups normally resistant to the regime — the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie. It is essentially a process of re-education which is intensified as local situations demand. It is predicated on the belief that individuals can and should be politically and socially re-educated and that they must constantly pursue, through self-examination, a sort of political and doctrinal purification.

Robert J. Lifton, in his excellent article, "Thought Reform of Chinese Intellectuals: A Psychiatric Evaluation,"⁴⁵ describes the classic model of the process, the method used in the "revolutionary colleges" set up by the Communists after they came to power. Individuals take part in the thought reform program either voluntarily or under varying degrees of external coercion. In the revolutionary colleges students are assigned to small groups, usually of six to ten persons; each group stays together throughout the process.

Lifton divides the process into three phases: (1) "The Great Togetherness — Group Identification." During this phase lectures and discussions are held, designed to produce esprit de corps within the group and identification of the members with the national Communist movement — a feeling of working together towards a common goal. (2) "The Closing-In of the Milieu — The Period of Emotional Conflict," in which there is a shift of emphasis from the intellectual and ideological to the personal and emotional. There develops a pattern of criticism, self-criticism and confession, in which the individual is detached from his former social and political loyalties and learns to adhere to Communist patterns, and a break is made away from traditional family loyalties and cultural ties. (3) "Submission and 'Rebirth'." In this final phase, the culmination of the entire process, the individual must produce an over-all thought summary, a final confession which includes a detailed analysis of his class origin, and usually has for a central feature a denunciation of his father, both as symbol and as individual. When the process has been effective, the result of this final phase is a great emotional relief (it is often referred to, says Lifton, as "taking a bath"). It is a symbolic submission to the regime and an

expression of rebirth as a member of the Chinese Communist community.

Obviously, certain features of the thought reform process are antithetical to the traditional Chinese outlook — the open denunciation of the father in a culture dedicated to filial piety, the humiliation of "loss of face" before others entailed by the abject public confession of error, and the violation of traditional concepts of loyalty in the strongly encouraged practice of informing on and criticizing family and friends. Nevertheless, the program is effective most of the time, and the reason for its success lies in the traditional cultural pressure which inclines the individual to put a greater value on his group membership than his individuality. In the course of the thought reform process a new milieu is established, into which the individual feels impelled to fit. In the last analysis, although the student may have been coerced into submitting to the sessions, it is the internal pressure of his early conditioning that brings about his ability to shift his loyalty to the new milieu. Lifton observes, "The question of belief in abstract theoretical ideas is not the most important one; what counts psychologically is the individual's need to find an identity and a way of life under these existing pressures. He can do this only through some degree of 'reform,' whether from the depths of his soul, in mere outward compliance, or like most, somewhere in-between."⁴⁶

For college professors, thought reform proved a greater ordeal than for any other group. Their confessions were evaluated not only by their colleagues but by their students as well. Moreover, since many of their confessions were published in newspapers and magazines, they had also to satisfy the general public as to the sincerity of their convictions. It often happened that even after a professor had been approved by his colleagues and students, further self-scrutiny was necessary whenever a newspaper or magazine reader found any fault with his published confession. If he showed "uncooperative attitudes" at any stage of the process he was usually sent to witness some "revolutionary struggles" such as "mass trials of counterrevolutionaries" or "mass liquidation of 'oppressive' landlords." The Communists claim that such experiences enable the professor to see the

social realities more clearly and thus become more conscious of his mistaken ideology, but it is likely that they are also designed to inculcate fear and thus undermine his resistance.

Thoughts and attitudes to be confessed and "washed away" from the minds of the intellectuals include the following major varieties:

- (a) political — distrust of the Communist party, antagonism to the Soviet Union, subservience to the Kuomintang, worship of America, indifference to the people's revolutionary struggle, reformism, conservatism, and bureaucracy.
- (b) social — opportunism, lack of sense of duty, purely technical viewpoint, employer's viewpoint, contempt of labor, and desire to exploit fellow human beings.
- (c) academic — intellectual sectarianism, subjective dogmatism, formalism, liberalism, pragmatism, and pure professional interest.
- (d) personal — egotism, selfishness, arrogance, extravagance, and emotionalism.

In addition to forcing large groups of non-Communist intellectuals to go through the process of thought reform en masse, the Communists also, from time to time, single out one or two individuals for attack and use them as object lessons.

One such example is Professor Feng Yu-lan, who had himself once led a Communist campaign directed against another scholar, Liang Shu-ming. The attack against Feng was launched by his own students in the Department of Philosophy at Peking University early in 1958. In a jointly-written article, "Criticism Against Feng Yu-lan," the students stated that Feng disseminated revisionist views, taking advantage of Chairman Mao's policy of "letting one hundred schools of thought contend." Specifically, he was accused of having abandoned the principle of the class and partisan character of philosophy, of distorting Zhdanov's definition of the history of philosophy, and of revising the theory that there had been no materialistic interpretation of history

before Marx.⁴⁷ Feng was then relentlessly criticized at numerous forums held both within and without the University, at which demands were made that he abandon his bourgeois stand and reactionary viewpoint, and firmly raise the "red flag" in his academic pursuits.

On June 6, 1958, Feng published a confession in the magazine Contending [Cheng-ming]. He conceded that he had seen the party and the government as separate entities; the party, he had thought, could control its own members, but only the government could control the general population. As he was not a member of the party, Feng had felt that he was under no obligation to it. He confessed his strong objection to the party's interference with instruction and technical research, since he held the opinion that the party officials were unfamiliar with professional matters. He also conceded that he had once had serious misgivings about the intentions of the Soviet Union in its relations with China.

On the question of academic thought Feng regretted that after the Communist seizure of power in 1949 he had made only superficial criticisms of his own ideology, which was "feudalistic" and "reactionary." "Despite the lapse of nine years," said Feng, "I had not laid down my arms and surrendered to the people, but still remained the 'white flag' in the realm of philosophy as the 'white flag' symbolized Chang Po-chun and Lo Lung-chi in the political area." This eminent philosopher also denounced himself as a person. He said: "The individualist craving for fame and wealth is incompatible with socialism. However, I had a strongly individualistic craving for fame and wealth In my eagerness to make a name, I would have even chosen notoriety over obscurity." Feng then humbly expressed his appreciation for the "help" that the party had given him in the course of his self-examination. Finally, he stated: "I am determined to pull down the 'white flag,' lay down my arms and surrender, and be once more a 'common soldier' in the ranks of the Marxist-Leninist philosophers under the banner of the party and Marxism."

Questions will inevitably be raised as to the effectiveness of the thought reform that the Communist regime has conducted among the non-Communist intellectuals. Whether it has actually succeeded in converting them to Marxism and whether the intel-

lectuals have become advocates of Communism and willing supporters of the Peking regime are questions not easily answered.

In their study published in 1952, Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, three well-known American experts on Communist China, observed:

The fact is that nearly every leading citizen among the modern Chinese intelligentsia, with the exception of a certain number who had become identified with the Nationalist government, appears to have given a degree of moral support to the new Peking regime. The great body of modern Chinese professors and non-political administrators who were trained in the United States, Britain, and France must be included in this category — sociologists, philosophers, economists, and political scientists as well as industrial specialists, engineers, agronomists, and other technicians The most advanced stratum of the Chinese upper class, the people most like ourselves, appear to have gone over to Communism.⁴⁸

They said further, "The apparent Communist conversion of so many of them is, we suggest, a very important achievement in the ideological sphere."⁴⁹

However, no less an authority than Premier Chou En-lai testified early in 1956 that at least 60 per cent of Mainland China's "high-level" intellectuals still did not believe in Communism.⁵⁰ The short but turbulent period of "contending and blooming" in 1957 and the subsequent Communist demand that the intellectuals must "dedicate their hearts" to the party also attests to the continued existence of a large number of non-conformists within the ranks of the intelligentsia. Many top scholars were among the non-conformists who, according to Communist charges, even plotted to re-assert bourgeois ideology and to restore bourgeois rule.⁵¹

Many of these scholars had previously written "confessions" denouncing their past writings and activities, eulogizing Communism and the Communist regime, and expressing their will-

ingness and determination to reform themselves. It seems clear that many such confessions and pledges did not represent political conversion. As the late Professor Tsui Shu-chin said, "Behind the mental torture is the stark reality of the threat to the scholars' lives. It was not until their lives were at stake that they began to confess."⁵² In other words, many scholars never embraced Communism, but merely conformed to its demands. This has been suggested by Ch'en Yuan, a distinguished historian and former President of the Fu-jen University in Peking. Speaking at a forum held by the Communist party during the period of "contending and blooming" in 1957, Ch'en declared:

Veteran professors, who had for long years directed educational work, were time and again subjected to examination in public Because of this, most people were inclined, following an ideological campaign, to speak with reserve, being apparently of one accord but divided in heart, and being apparently one but differing widely in outlook.⁵³

Perhaps it was this outward conformity that made the three American experts mentioned above believe that the Chinese intelligentsia, especially its most advanced stratum, had "gone over to Communism."

Not only has the thought reform program failed to give the Chinese intellectuals a unified political outlook, but it has caused a considerable measure of ill feeling and, in some instances, a hatred of the party. Ch'en Yuan in his speech spoke of the existence of "walls and ditches" between the party and the intellectuals as a result of the bitter campaign.

During the "contending and blooming" period, Professor Fu Ying (formerly on the faculty of the University of Michigan and induced to return to Communist China in 1949 to become Chairman of the Department of Chemical Engineering at Peking University) was even more explicit in denouncing brainwashing — an ordeal he had experienced several times from 1950 on. Recalling his experiences, Fu said, "I find the term 'ideological transformation' rather repulsive. It makes one think of reform through labor. Up to the moment, I am not aware that there is

anything wrong with my thought."⁵⁴ Then he added, "I have never been able to feel happy in mind during these years."⁵⁵

At the same time, the well-known philosopher Feng Yu-lan also aired his grievances: "I felt most resentful about the Communist cadres' attitude, 'let me remould you'."⁵⁶ Unfortunately, Professor Feng had to undergo another "ideological remoulding" the next year. Ts'ui Chih-lan, a noted biologist, expressed similar views, feeling that the "ideological transformation" was a major cause of the breach between the intellectuals and the party.⁵⁷

The Communists have themselves attested to the adverse effects of thought reform. On January 14, 1956, Premier Chou En-lai made a special report on the problems of intellectuals to the Central Committee of the party.⁵⁸ He showed concern over the "passive attitude" of the bourgeois intellectuals, which he felt resulted from the "crude" method of ideological remoulding which they had undergone. In his famous speech on the correct handling of contradictions among the people delivered on February 27, 1957, Mao said that thought reform had been carried on in "a somewhat rough and ready way" and that "the feelings of some people were hurt."⁵⁹ Although both Mao and Chou promised to refine and improve the methods, the Communist reformers' handling of the "rightists" late in 1957 proved to be much the same as before.

More recent testimony on the adverse effects of ideological remoulding was given by the Communist writer Li Fan-fu. In an article published in the magazine Learning [Hsueh-hsi], Li said:

The fact, however, is that the various [thought reform] movements conducted in the past have had little or no effect on the rightists. They have not changed a bit, ideologically, but have instead become even more hostile to the party and the people.⁶⁰

It would appear that the Communists have not been able to convert the bulk of the Chinese intellectuals. However, the Peking regime's success with the brainwashing or thought reform program must not be underestimated. Further, as the more

objectionable features of the process are removed, additional success may be expected. The most important effect of the thought reform program, however, is that through it the Communists have destroyed the prestige of the non-Communist intellectuals and have eliminated them as a potential political threat.⁶¹ The significance of this result can be fully appreciated only in the light of the profound change in the social life of China: while traditionally intellectuals have had a great influence in many areas, including economic and administrative policies and moral education, they have now been reduced to the position of specialists subservient to the government. Both their role and their prestige have thus undergone a profound transformation.

Reform of Minor Parties

Minor parties are presumed to represent the "national bourgeois" and petit bourgeois (those with no entangling foreign interests) who want to support the development of an industrial China, and are thus in theory allies of the Communist party and the proletariat. They were therefore not felt to be in need of thoroughgoing "ideological transformation." However, since the progress towards state ownership of business and industry in 1956, the state has had no place left for a bourgeoisie whose economic base has been eliminated, and as a result attempts at reforming their outlook have been more urgent and intensive, especially since the "contending and blooming" of 1957.

The rectification campaign started by the directive of April 27, 1957 was initially the usual intra-party affair. Subsequently, however, minor parties and prominent independents were invited to assist the party in its internal house-cleaning. It must be remembered that the minor parties in China have served as a refuge for the old-time bourgeois intellectuals. It can probably be assumed that this campaign was, in part, an effort to retrieve some of these intellectuals for the party and to render harmless the recalcitrants among them.

Remembering Mao's request for assistance in his speech of February 27, 1957, and encouraged by his use of the classic

slogan, "Let one hundred schools of thought contend and one hundred flowers bloom," the intellectuals and minor parties came forth with blunt criticisms of the regime. Much of the criticism by representatives of minor parties seemed to focus upon the aloofness of the Communist bureaucracy and to reflect a sense of frustration, on the part of the former leadership group, over their exclusion from the conduct of public affairs.

A lecturer in industrial economics at China People's University, Wang Teh-chou, told a forum of professors that "the state of affairs in the country is worse than it was in the days of the Kuomintang" and that "the Chinese people begin to lose confidence in the Central Committee of the Communist party."⁶²

Yang Yu-ch'ing, associate editor of the magazine Studies in Political Science and Law [Fa-cheng Yen-chiu] and a one-time friend of the writer, told a forum of jurists that "many members of the party have been sitting in sedan-chairs, keeping themselves aloof from the masses." He said further that "since everything starts from Peking, recklessness also starts from Peking . . . [and that] some top-ranking Communists in Peking . . . should even be removed from office."⁶³

The fierceness of the attacks caused the party to launch a major campaign against its critics, said to be "rightists" seeking to overthrow the Communist party and socialism in general. Some of the critics were prominent party members, among them P'an Fu-sheng, First Secretary of the Honan Provincial Committee of the party, and Sun Tso-ping, Governor of Chinghai Province, who took particular exception to those policies regarding agricultural collectivization, grain purchase, and treatment of minority nationalities. As a result, the originally mild rectification campaign turned into a fierce nation-wide struggle against "rightists" both within and outside the party. For many weeks rightists were violently denounced at public meetings, especially at "struggle" meetings staged by their own professional groups, party organizations, and (where appropriate) by their fellow delegates to the National People's Congress, which held its annual meeting from June 26 to July 15. Some of the "guilty" were condemned by their own families. Ch'u An-

P'ing's eldest son, Ch'u Wang-ying, in a letter published on June 29, 1957 in the Wen-hui Daily, (Shanghai) [Wen-hui Pao], said:

Since the publication of his anti-socialist views, Ch'u An-p'ing has met with the stern reproach of the whole nation. I myself, a soldier of the revolutionary army and a socialist youth, resolutely stand on the side of the entire nation in opposition to his fallacious stand against the Communist party.

Many of his anti-party and anti-socialist views have been exposed by the press. It has been adequately proven that he has entertained such vicious ideas for a long time, that he has political ambitions and has exploited the Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao, of which Ch'u was editor-in-chief] as a medium for launching anti-socialist attacks. I am thus made aware of his anti-party face.

I wish to offer Mr. Ch'u An-p'ing one word of advice: 'I wish you to repent in time, listen to the opinions of the people, root out your own anti-socialist thought and render a complete account of yourself. You may thus find grace with the people.'

Subjected to intense psychological pressures, and fully aware of the consequences if they failed to repent promptly, most of the accused began to make public "confessions" or at least partial retractions. These, however, did not prevent them from being removed from their positions in the government, various public organizations, and their respective parties. For some time these writers dropped completely out of sight. In April, 1949 some of the leading writers were reinstated in their parties, but in a lesser capacity than before. Some were even appointed to the new National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. These restitutions were apparently made to salvage the United Front policy and to demonstrate the regime's toleration of political dissent.

The "Dedication of Hearts" Campaign

The banishment of the rightists was followed by a Communist demand that all minor parties and groups undergo a thorough remoulding so as to discard their bourgeois attitudes and acquire the socialist outlook. In a speech delivered on September 17, 1957 at a gathering of representatives of the minor parties and the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, Li Wei-han, Director of the Department of the United Front Work of the Chinese Communist party, said that the minor parties and groups in China were still bourgeois in character, in spite of the elimination of their original economic base that resulted from the socialist transformation of industry, commerce, and agriculture in 1955 and 1956. They must therefore effect a self-transformation in order to become a political force truly devoted to socialism.⁶⁴ Li said warningly:

Successful self-transformation means passing the test of socialism and laying the political foundations for long-term co-existence and mutual supervision between the democratic parties and the Communist party And all those who do not wish to renounce and change their bourgeois standpoint can hardly avoid falling into the anti-Communist and anti-socialist quagmire.

After a few months of preparation, all the minor parties and groups and many independents finally launched a self-reform campaign on February 27, 1958. In March there was a series of large-scale meetings at which spokesmen for the various groups vowed to transform their bourgeois viewpoint to that of socialism as speedily as possible. The China Democratic National Construction Association, composed mostly of industrialists and businessmen, even specified a time-limit of three years.⁶⁵ The demonstrations culminated on March 16th in a spectacular joint rally of over ten thousand prominent members of minor parties and independents.⁶⁶ It was held at the famous T'ien-an Square outside the ancient Forbidden City in Peking and presided over by the 85-year-old Shen Chun-ju, Chairman of the

China Democratic League. This much-publicized gathering was addressed by Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Academy of Sciences, Li Chi-shen, Chairman of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and Huang Yen-pei, Chairman of the China Democratic National Construction Association. Before starting a demonstration march amid fanfares, drums and gongs, the participants adopted a "Charter for the Socialist Re-Education of Democratic Parties and Non-Party Democrats" and a pledge to Chairman Mao Tse-tung.⁶⁷ The charter said:

People of our great motherland are forging ahead at full speed on the path to socialism, under the brilliant leadership of the Communist party and Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The great victory of the socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts has resulted in a big leap in socialist construction. This new situation has given us great encouragement and strength.

With the firmest determination we pledge to work hard to change ourselves as quickly as possible from bourgeois elements into working people living by their own labor, and from bourgeois intellectuals into working class intellectuals who are 'both red and expert.'

The charter gave the following as the minor parties' goals:

To reform our political standpoint, devotedly and resolutely take the path of socialism under the leadership of the Communist party; to be loyal to the socialist system, faithfully carrying out the state's policies and laws and wholeheartedly contributing our knowledge and strength to the nation's construction; to learn from the workers and peasants through practical work, establishing a proper attitude toward physical labor and actively developing the doctrine and sentiments of the working people; to study Marxism-Leninism and the advanced experience and technique of the Soviet Union; to carry through the policy of

letting one hundred flowers bloom, one hundred schools of thought contend; to accelerate self-re-education to provide conditions for long-term coexistence and mutual supervision, and firmly to carry out the United Front policy in the service of socialism.

The pledge to Mao Tse-tung reiterated the substance of the charter.

The public capitulation of the minor parties and groups to the Communist demand for thorough self-transformation was demonstrated again on April 10th when another giant meeting was held at the music hall of the Peking Central Park to launch a "dedication of hearts to the party" movement.⁶⁸

Wu Han, Director of the Peking Municipal Committee of the China Democratic League, pointed out in his opening speech that the most important duty of the bourgeois element was "to faithfully surrender their hearts to the Communist party and the people."

More than ten members of the minor parties also spoke at the meeting, and exposed the "erroneous ideology" which they had believed for many years. Chu Hsi-chun, Counselor of the State Council and a member of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, said that since the "liberation" of China he had never been a sincere adherent of socialism. Since he had felt that he had no share in the country he therefore had no feeling of being one of its leaders. After "exposing his own erroneous views" on land reform, the counterrevolutionary suppression campaign, the movement for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries, the Aid-Korea and Anti-America movement, and the anti-rightist struggle, he said that he would not only eliminate his "vicious" activities, but would continue his efforts in the future to undergo socialist transformation.⁶⁹

Chen Shih-hua, Vice-Chancellor of the Tsinghua University and a member of the China Democratic League, said that the ideology of bourgeois individualism had kept him from freely surrendering his heart to the party. He said that he accepted joyfully the tasks assigned to him by the party but carried them out passively. He had made no outward protests, but deep in

his heart he disagreed with the party. He said also that he was against the party's educational policy and the administration of the schools, and admitted to serious misgivings about the party's policy of transforming the attitudes of intellectuals. However, he pledged at the meeting that he would immediately eliminate all his unnecessary worries and make a clean sweep of his "undesirable beliefs" so as to march forward with the masses of people throughout the country.⁷⁰

Li Hsien-tsan, deputy chief of the water conservancy bureau of Peking and member of the China Democratic Construction Association, admitted at the meeting that he was a capitalist and had had mixed reactions to the party's policy of transforming capitalist industry and commerce and the tax revenue policy of the state. He pledged to eliminate thoroughly such "erroneous ideology inherited from the exploiting class as soon as possible."⁷¹

The "dedication of hearts" movement soon spread over the whole country, with minor parties and business men holding forums designed to allow them to "help and enlighten" one another in exposing their errors and acquiring acceptable views.

The Communists may have used the movement more as an object-lesson than as a real drive to enforce conformity, even though the conversion of such groups is one of their avowed goals. They may not have had too much faith in the new pledges of loyalty, but they accepted the outward submission as a suitable compromise for the time being. Presumably, after the letting off of steam in the "contending and blooming" period, the lid was now firmly back on.

CHANGES IN FORMAL EDUCATION

The driving necessity to develop new elites shows itself most clearly, of course, in education, and results in the regime's emphasis on quantity rather than quality in educational institutions at all levels. This policy has had the effect of inclining the student to take it easy while in school, since he knows that lack of effort will seldom endanger his academic career, nor prevent his having the opportunity to enter a college and earn a degree.⁷²

The fact that from 1953 to 1956 high school graduates had unlimited opportunities to enter schools of higher education unrestricted by standards of performance can best be illustrated by the following figures: in 1953, some 58,000 graduates left senior high schools (in this number, students from the "accelerated high schools" are included), while institutions of higher learning took in 81,000 new students; in 1955 the proportion was better, but still 98,000 graduated from senior high schools while upper schools took in 106,000. The presence of numerous careless and mediocre students in a school cannot but hinder the progress of the gifted and conscientious ones. The result is, of course, a general deterioration in the student body as a whole.

Added to this demoralizing factor is the Communist regime's placing of political reliability over scholastic attainment when making assignments for graduating students. This has encouraged many students to be more concerned with political activities on the campus than with academic excellence. An example of the regime's over-emphasis on the student's political reliability is the way in which students are selected for study in the Soviet Union. Recalling a personal experience, Professor Fu Ying of the Peking University said that once a group of such students, designated by the Academy of Sciences (the new name for the reconstructed Academia Sinica), was examined by him and by several other scientists for competence in the field; among the group there was one student whom the scientists unanimously refused to pass, yet in the end that student was the only one from the group to be sent abroad by the government.⁷³

The supreme importance ascribed to political training in the development of the new elites is reflected in the curricula for the training of journalists. Courses required include current events, historical and dialectical materialism, the history of the Russian Communist party as well as that of the Chinese Communist party, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung.

College and University Reorganization

The Communist regime effected, in 1951 and 1952, a reorganization of the formal educational system, the impact of which was most keenly felt by the institutions of higher education.

Prior to 1949 some of the famous Chinese universities such as National Peking University, the Tsinghua University, National Central University (now Nanking University), Wuhan University, and Chekiang University, had strong traditions of their own. As champions of liberalism and academic freedom, they functioned almost independently of the then existing government and in many cases actively promoted academic disputes between diverse schools of thought.

In reorganizing the universities, the Communists pursued two objectives: specialization and political control. There are now eleven different kinds of institutions of higher education: comprehensive education, polytechnic, teacher training, agriculture and forestry, medicine, finance and economics, political science and law, languages, arts, physical culture, and institutions for minority nationalities. For example, the National Peking University was transferred to the Tsinghua University which is now a polytechnical institution, while the latter's colleges of humanities and sciences were amalgamated with the corresponding units of the National Peking University which is now classified as a university of comprehensive education (i.e., a university which specializes in humanities and science).

It is quite clear that from the Communists' point of view these universities constituted a stronghold of intellectual resistance which had to be broken up. Then, in order to further specialization — an institution must now specialize in a particular field of academic endeavor — there was a thorough regrouping of departments and other units of the existing universities and independent colleges.

During the course of this regrouping, many universities and colleges were dissolved altogether. It is no surprise that all the institutions sponsored by foreign missionaries, including such reputable universities as Yenching University, Chinling (or Nanking) University, and West China Union University, suffered a similar fate.

Curriculum Revision

Course curricula themselves were changed, particularly in the fields of the social sciences and law. Although history,

geography, and philosophy were retained in some colleges, texts and subject matter for these courses were completely revised in accordance with the principles of dialectical and historical materialism, and for the promotion of patriotism and social consciousness, love of labor and science, and respect for public property. Teachers were encouraged to emphasize the present rather than the past, in order to discount the old traditions and clear the way for the Communist collectivist ideals.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, the government instructed colleges and schools to offer new courses designed to teach Communist theories and values. Thus, a pupil now has to attend two sessions of political orientation classes each week during his last year of elementary school; a junior high school student has to take a course on the "Chinese Revolution" for two hours per week during his third year of residence; a senior high school student is required to spend two hours weekly during his first two years of residence listening to lectures on the "essentials of the social sciences," and to take a course on the Chinese Constitution, taught for a total of seventy hours during the two semesters of his third year of residence.⁷⁵

The total number of courses directly related to social and political indoctrination that a student must take in college has not been established. As recently as December, 1957 all students, regardless of their major fields, were required to take courses in dialectical and historical materialism, the history of social development, the New Democracy, and political economy as well as any writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-tung that related to their respective fields of specialization. In December, 1957 much of this was temporarily suspended in order to make way for a new course called "Socialist Education," apparently an urgently-needed indoctrination course. According to the directive, Mao Tse-tung's "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" is the core of the course, while supplementary reading matter includes a long list of Marxist-Leninist classical works, party documents, and documents of other kinds.⁷⁶ The directive provisionally set the duration of the course at one school year, eight hours per week. As part of the regime's program to intensify political indoctrination, this course aims at rectification as well as instruction. Lecturers

or instructors are specifically required to link their lectures closely to the ideological level of the students, "employing the thought of the working class to criticize the thought of the bourgeoisie and the petit bourgeoisie" and "distinguishing right from wrong." The course is conducted under the direct supervision of the provincial and municipal committees concerned, and in many cases it is taught by responsible party officials. For example, the Director of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the party, Lu Ting-i, now lectures at Peking Normal University; K'o Ching-shih, member of the Political Bureau and First Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee of the party, teaches at Fu-tan University, and the First Secretary of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the party, T'ao Chu, conducts the course at the Canton Normal College.

Changes in curricula in elementary and high schools followed a similar pattern, one of the courses abolished being civics.

Problems in the Schools

In expanding the school system, the government has been faced with serious personnel problems. Young teachers are often inadequately prepared, and the old intellectual elite tends to be regarded as politically unreliable by the Communists. In 1956, 39 per cent of the elementary school teachers reportedly had an educational background lower than that of a junior high school graduate;⁷⁷ 90,000 high school teachers held no college degrees;⁷⁸ and 70 per cent of the faculty members of the institutions of higher learning had done no postgraduate work.⁷⁹ The teacher shortage is further complicated by low enrollments in teacher-training institutions. For example, the Communists have admitted that the shortage of elementary school teachers since 1955 resulted from the policy of drastic enrollment reduction in "junior normal schools" adopted by the regime from 1953 to 1955, a policy for which no public reasons seem to have been offered.

Permanently underlying the school personnel problem is the Communists' insistence upon political reliability. Intellectuals in China have always occupied high-status positions, and the

regime has the problem of utilizing them in its indoctrination program, while making sure at the same time that only the required social and political attitudes are being disseminated.

One way to control what is taught is to control the content of textbooks. Shortly after their assumption of power in 1949 the Communists banned all texts then in use, although many were considered to be standard works, and destroyed numerous scholarly reference books as well. Since the production of new texts is a slow process, the schools still suffer from a scarcity of books for students at all levels. The problem is that the regime does not have enough professionally proficient and politically trustworthy people to do the writing, and the few who are thus qualified find themselves severely hampered by the rigidly detailed regulations laid down by the authorities. Thus, after nine years of Communist rule, students in some instances have no textbooks for many courses, and the few texts that have been published are either poorly written or defective in the treatment of subject matter.

The lack of textbooks, since it makes it necessary for the instructor to fill the gap, gives the teaching staff more latitude in what it will teach, and provides the regime with an even more urgent necessity to demand political reliability.

The reorganization of the colleges and universities gave the Communist party the opportunity to control teaching in these institutions simply by placing party members or collaborators in strategic administrative positions. Although reputable and nonpartisan scholars were in some cases retained as presidents, deans, or departmental chairmen, it soon became clear that they had no real authority.⁸⁰ All decisions, academic or administrative, were made in their names by the party committees within the institutions. While this party committee system in the schools was much criticized by people within and without the educational circles during the "contending and blooming" of May, 1957, it remains one of the chief instruments with which the Communists maintain their control over education.⁸¹

The party committee in an institution of higher education is usually composed of proven Communists on the staff or faculty of the institution. Operating under the guidance and supervision

of the party committee are party cells attached to each department of the institution, each headed by a secretary. According to information disclosed by college professors during the period of "contending and blooming," the de facto power of the academic departments rests in the party cell or its secretary.⁸² In order to ensure effective control over instruction it is the rule that all faculty members must submit the texts of their lectures to the departmental party cell for scrutiny, and no one may deviate even slightly from the approved texts while lecturing in the classroom.⁸³ Moreover, faculty members whose political reliability is seriously questioned are forbidden to prepare their lectures at all; they are simply asked to read verbatim to the students lectures that have been prepared for them by their colleagues under the direction of the party cells.⁸⁴ Similar functions are performed by the party committees in elementary and secondary schools.⁸⁵

One way in which a teacher can demonstrate his reliability is to engage in a lot of outside political activity, a line of action encouraged by the party because of the severe shortage of trained personnel available for party work. The teacher is thus likely to find himself so driven by these pressures that he has little time for his proper activities. In 1956 Premier Chou En-lai noted that college professors were engaging in political activities and studies to the detriment of research in their respective disciplines,⁸⁶ and although he promised that henceforth professors and other intellectuals would be given sufficient time for professional pursuits, during the period of "contending and blooming" in 1957 college teachers and scientists still complained that their teaching and research were being adversely affected by the demands of political activity on their time.⁸⁷

Similar demands affected teachers in the secondary and elementary schools as well. Dr. Lo Lun-chi, Vice-Chairman of the China Democratic League, described the case of elementary teachers as follows:

. . . In spite of their extremely heavy teaching loads, teachers in many places are compelled by local party cadres to do numerous chores. Some-

times they are asked to copy documents for local government agencies, sometimes they are called upon to help sell publications for the state-owned bookstores, sometimes they are sent to dig wells or build dikes in the country, and at other times they have to serve as guards at granaries. Utterly weary in body and spirit, the poor teachers never dare to defy the local party authorities who can be unbelievably cruel to a recalcitrant person. There has been a widespread clamor: 'Please do something for the teachers of over 63,000,000 children.'⁸⁸

Hsu Kuang-p'ing, widow of the famous left-wing writer Lu Hsun, feels that the Communist treatment of teachers is the main reason so few young people are interested in entering the teaching profession. Speaking at a forum sponsored by the Department of United Front Work of the party on May 21, 1957, she gave many examples of mistreatment of teachers, of which the most startling was the case of the elementary school teacher in Mukden who was forced to wear a handcuff as an administrative disciplinary measure.⁸⁹ Such measures, even if rarely taken, would obviously have a discouraging effect on present and prospective teachers.

It is unfortunate that, since the regime's need for teachers is so great, the direct and indirect controls imposed on the members of the profession make it less attractive than it was formerly. To control the teacher and keep him from endangering the party's goals it has been necessary to curtail his former independence, which was considered a mark of high status. Inevitably, fewer people are willing to enter a profession whose status appears to be low. Furthermore, while the loss of status is distasteful enough, the penalties for resistance to the controls are severe indeed to a Chinese. Between the public humiliation of "ideological transformation" and the restrictive or punitive measures that may be imposed by school administrations, the profession is stripped of the social prestige it had in pre-Communist China. The teacher no longer derives his status simply from his position in society — the lowly tasks he is assigned and the embarrassingly

public restrictions placed on his professional activities indicate this clearly — but attains it in proportion to his success in identifying himself with the aims of the party and his acceptance by it. The party's efforts to modify the structure of society have already begun to be successful with the teacher: he must now re-establish his professional status within a changed social structure having new rules.

Combining Labor and Education

The pressures on teachers, referred to earlier, to engage in political and industrial or agricultural work in addition to their professional activities is a reflection of the basic Communist view of society. The intellectual is simply a specialized member of the proletariat, and he must never forget his basic role and function; his specialty alone can never justify his existence. Whereas the Chinese intellectual in the past considered manual labor beneath his dignity, the Communist intellectual must share in the work of his fellow members of the proletariat.

Since 1957 the Communists have conducted a campaign to revise curricula in the schools so as to combine labor and study. Teachers and students have spent one-third to one-half of their time working in factories or on farms. This unfortunately curtails the time available for study, but to the Communists it is not time lost, but time better spent.

The official view was expressed by Lu Ting-i, Director of the Department of Propaganda of the party, in an article contributed to the Red Flag [Hung-ch'i],⁹⁰ a magazine devoted to party doctrine. After giving extensive quotations from Communist classics including the Communist Manifesto of 1848, Das Kapital, and A Critique of the Gotha Programme, Lu said that in the future education and material production were to be combined; only through such a combination could the distinction between manual labor and mental labor be obliterated — a prerequisite for the emergence of a Communist society. Insisting that the combination of labor and education is necessary to the true evolution of humanity, Lu said:

. . . . This means that knowledge, however wide it may be, can produce only a learned man in the bourgeois sense, but not what we call a complete development of Man. In childhood the body and health, on the one hand, and Communist affections, manners, and the temper of collective heroism on the other, must be cultivated. This is the moral education of our age. These two must be combined with intellectual development. Therefore, the student should develop knowledge, health and Communist virtues.⁹¹

Insisting that participation in production is an indispensable way to acquire true knowledge, Lu went on to quote Mao Tse-tung:

'Truth is one, that which is drawn from objective reality and which is proved by being applied to objective reality Knowledge is of two kinds, sensory and intellectual These are two kinds of imperfect knowledge, one that comes from books alone, and one that comes from the senses alone. Only the combination of the two can produce relatively perfect knowledge. . . .'⁹²

Adult Education and Indoctrination

Winter and Spare-Time Schools. Formal education in Communist China is supplemented by spare-time schools for adult industrial workers and winter schools for those in agriculture. Since many of these adults have had little or no formal education, the schools have done a good deal to reduce illiteracy among them in addition to widening their acquaintance with basic Communist doctrine. The regime finds the schools especially useful in gaining support for specific policies or actions as the need arises, and therefore takes a considerable interest in the content of propaganda materials used.

The spare-time schools offer political courses which are taught either by party members who hold responsible positions in industry or trade unions, or by qualified high school teachers. In either case, the instruction is closely supervised and controlled

by a local board of spare-time schools composed of local trade unions, bureaus of labor and education, and the management of factories or other enterprises in the area. The local boards are supervised by the National Committee on Workers' Spare-Time Education, an agency jointly run by the Ministries of Education and Labor and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.

The spare-time schools are divided into three grades. Workers registered in the first grade are given courses in current events and the basic philosophies of Marx and Lenin. Those in the intermediate or senior grades are generally required to attend ninety-minute political-study sessions at least three times a week for two years. In these sessions workers are taught such subjects as "The History of Social Development," "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," "Short History of the World Revolution," "Socialist Construction in the Soviet Union," "Labor Policy," "Labor Legislation," and "Political Economy."⁹³

Some spare-time schools have also been established for agricultural workers, but the winter schools draw a far better attendance from among them.

The system of instruction is not a recent innovation among the Chinese Communists; even when they were still carrying on guerilla warfare in the "border regions," they assembled farmers in the winter season for political indoctrination. After gaining control in 1949 they decided that this method of educating the farmers in Communist doctrine should be applied on a nationwide scale, and on December 7, 1949 the Ministry of Education issued a directive calling upon the county, district, and village governments as well as the rural organizations of the Youth Corps to organize "Winter School Committees" to take charge of the formation, supervision, and administration of Winter Schools for Farmers.⁹⁴ Since then Winter Schools for Farmers have been organized yearly during the slack season. Financed partially by the peasants themselves and partially by the government, these schools carry on instruction throughout the winter session.

The winter school instructors are supervised by the County Committees on Winter Schools for Farmers, which usually give the instructors brief training courses before each term.

The schools draw their faculty members largely from the educated and "politically progressive" segment of the rural population.⁹⁵ However, the village cadres of the party, the government, and the Youth Corps also play a significant role.

Although statistics on the enrollment in winter schools are lacking, the Communists claim that the total number of peasants registered for study was twelve million in the winter of 1950 and forty-eight million in 1952.⁹⁶

Since 1949 the central authorities in Peking have issued annual directives to winter schools outlining the political indoctrination to be conducted during the coming session.⁹⁷ The kinds of instruction that the winter schools have been called upon to conduct during recent years have almost invariably been linked with the regime's "central tasks." During the first two years of the regime's existence, political indoctrination at winter schools was designed primarily to further the land reform movement. Since 1955 the indoctrination has been largely concerned with the collectivization of agriculture and with the government's policy regarding "unified purchase and marketing of basic agricultural products."

The Communists claim that the farmers registered at the winter schools have been very responsive to the lectures. The People's Daily (Peking) of January 30, 1955 reported that after a winter-school class in a village near Cheng-chou, Honan Province, had heard a lecture on the government's policy of "unified purchase and marketing of basic agricultural products," twenty-two of the twenty-eight class members were so deeply convinced of the merits of the policy that they immediately volunteered to sell all their surplus grain to the government.

On the other hand, since the end of 1955 when collectivization began in earnest, the Communist press has carried occasional reports of resistance to government policy that suggest an incomplete success of the indoctrination program. At such times an effort is made to correct matters through special programs in the winter and spare-time schools.

The People's Daily reported on November 26, 1955 that farmers in many regions, in anticipation of compulsory delivery of

products to the government under the unified purchase and marketing program, deliberately consumed their products wastefully. This, the paper stated, occurred not only among the "middle peasants," but also among the "poor peasants"⁹⁸ whom the regime regards as its staunch supporters. The farmers were said to have held lavish feasts on various pretexts after the harvest, entertaining relatives and friends or making offerings to gods and spirits. They were also accused of using excessive amounts of rice and wheat for wine- or candy-making, and of using rice and wheat as hog and chicken feed. To counter this reaction on the part of the farmers, the Communists launched in 1957 a special program of indoctrination to help "rectify certain erroneous and reactionary views" of the peasants concerning the regime's rural policies through group discussion.

It would appear that the regular propaganda and indoctrination programs conducted in winter schools and spare-time schools have not proved to be as effective as was hoped. It remains to be seen whether the new program in "socialist education" will yield better results.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. People's Handbook (Peking, 1958), pp. 605-606.

2. In this connection it is interesting to note some comments on Communist China, by an expert in the field, which recently appeared in a popular magazine: Frank A. Kierman, Jr., "The Blood Fluke that Saved Formosa," Harper's, April, 1959, pp. 47 ff. For example, "One need not be an expert in Communist semantics to recognize that 'the standard fixed by the government' and 'basically' are synonyms for 'not actually, if we were inclined to be perfectly honest'."

3. China Daily News (New York) [Hua-chiao Jih-Pao], October 16, 1958.

4. For further information on language reform see: Tao-tai Hsia, "Language Revolution in Communist China," Far Eastern Survey, XXV (October, 1956), 145-154; Harriet C. Mills, "Language Reform in China: Some Recent Developments," Far Eastern Quarterly, XV (August, 1956), 517-540.

5. For an account of the historical developments of Communist China's educational policy, see "Education in the People's Republic," China News Analysis, No. 273 (April 24, 1959), pp. 1-7.

6. In 1950, the party named the following books as basic readings on the general ideology of the Communist movement: The Communist Manifesto, by Marx and Engels; The Ideology and Methodology of Marx and Lenin, compiled by the Liberation Press; Socialism: Utopian and Scientific, by Engels; The State and Revolution, by Lenin; Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism, by Lenin; Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, by Lenin; Foundation of Leninism, by Stalin; Lenin, and Lenin on China, compiled by the Liberation Press; The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, edited by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; Political Economy, by Leontiev; The History of Social Development, and Lenin and Stalin on the Socialist Economy, compiled by the Liberation Press. On November 1, 1957, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party approved a new list of reading material on socialism for members in the party schools as well as for students in institutions of higher learning. An English version of the list can be found in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 115 (January 29, 1958), pp. 10-19.

7. People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], April 25, 1953.

8. New China News Agency Release, October 21, 1957.

9. Ibid.

10. People's Daily (Peking), May 25, 1950.
11. Ibid., December 13, 1953.
12. For translations of the most important documents in this campaign, see: Boyd Compton, translator, Mao's China: Party Reform Documents (Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1952).
13. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, "Report on the Rectification Campaign," Current Background [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 477 (October 25, 1957), p. 21.
14. Ibid., p. 25.
15. A Chinese text of the directive may be found in People's Daily (Peking), May 1, 1957.
16. See Mao Tse-tung's speech "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Current Background, No. 458 (June 20, 1957), pp. 1-26.
17. Also see: "Why Must We Carry Out the Rectification Campaign as Gently as a Breeze or a Mild Rain?" [Wei-shih-mo Yao-yung Ho-feng Hsi-yu Ti Fang-fan Lai Chen-feng], editorial in ibid., May 7, 1957. An English text of the editorial can be found in Survey of China Mainland Press [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 1,529 (May 14, 1957), pp. 1-6.
18. For its text, see People's Daily (Peking), January 1, 1951.
19. Liberation Daily (Shanghai) [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao], January 16, 1951.
20. People's Daily (Peking), December 19, 1951.
21. Wu Feng, Lectures on the Work of the Propaganda Officer [Hsuan-ch'uan-yuan Kung-tso Chiang-hua] (Canton: South China People's Press, 1952), p. 26.
22. As of January 18, 1951, there were 117,283 propaganda officers in the Northeast China region, but in South Central China there were only some 4,000 such officers. See Northeast Daily (Mukden) [Tung-pei Jih-Pao], January 18, 1951 and Yangtze Daily (Wuhan) [Ch'ang-chiang Jih-Pao], August 16, 1952.
23. Yangtze Daily (Wuhan), September 12, 1952.
24. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), January 3, 1953.
25. Yangtze Daily (Wuhan), December 25, 1952.
26. People's Daily (Peking), July 20, 1952.
27. Chang Chiu-cheng, "How the General Line Has Been Propagandized Among the Peasant Masses in Shansi Province" [Shansi Sheng Tui-nung-min

Ch'un-chung Chin-hsing Tsung-lu-hsien Hsuan-ch'uan Chiao-yu Ti Ching-yen], ibid., February 11, 1954.

28. Tan Ning and T'ien P'ai, "A Group of the Propaganda Army in March" [I-chih Ch'ien-chin Chung-ti Hsuan-ch'uan Tui-wu], Yangtze Daily (Wuhan), December 9, 1952.

29. "Resolutely Implementing the Decisions of the Central Authorities of the Party Concerning the Establishment of A Propaganda Network" [Chien-chueh Chih-hsing Tang-chung-yang Kuan-yu Chien-li Hsuan-ch'uan-wang Ti Chueh-ting], ibid., January 16, 1951.

30. Ibid., September 14, 1952.

31. People's Daily (Peking), September 7, 1954.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid., January 1, 1952.

34. Li Lun, "A Survey of the Development of the Propaganda Network During the Last Year" [I-nien-lai Ko-ti She-li Hsuan-ch'uan-yuan Ti Kai-k'uang], ibid., January 4, 1951.

35. Chang Tsung-ch'uan, "Correcting the Ruthless and Impatient Work-Style of the Propagandists" [Chiu-cheng Ch'un-chung Hsuan-ch'uan Kung-tso Chung-ti Chi-tsao Ts'u-pao Ti Tso-feng], ibid., January 13, 1953.

36. Ibid.

37. Hsia Cheng-nung, "We Must Make A Real Effort to Consolidate and Strengthen the Propaganda Network So As to Enable the Party to Conduct Propaganda Constantly Among the Masses" [Pi-hsu Jen-chen Cheng-li Kung-ku Hsuan-ch'uan Wang. Ch'ieh-shih Chien-li Tang-tui Jen-min Ch'un-chung Ti Ching-ch'ang Hsuan-ch'uan Kung-tso], Ta-chung Daily (Shantung) [Ta-chung Jih-Pao], January 1, 1955.

38. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1954), I, 49.

39. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), August 20, 1952.

40. People's Daily (Peking), November 14, 1953.

41. People's Handbook (Peking, 1958), p. 605.

42. "The Ministry of Cultural Affairs' Directive Concerning the Reorganization and Strengthening of the Cultural Houses" [Wen-hua Pu Kuan-yu Cheng-tung Ho Chia-chiang Wen-hua Kuan-chan Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih], People's Daily, (Peking), January 24, 1954. Since it is impossible to expand the nation's film projection facilities rapidly enough, the Communist regime has been striving to make maximum use of slides in the dissemination of political and ideological messages. From 1949 to 1953, the regime founded

nineteen slide projector factories. In 1952 the "China Slide Company" was organized by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. This company is engaged in the production of slides. By March, 1954 some forty thousand slide projectors were already in operation in the country. At that time these projectors were equipped with over six hundred thousand sets of slides. While some of these slides were designed to popularize basic knowledge on science and sanitation, most of them were of a purely propaganda nature. Some typical titles are: "On the Road to Happiness," "The Young Pioneer," "Chairman Mao's Litter Hero," "The New Face of the Chinese Countryside," "The Spark Collective Farm," "How the Soviet Union Carried Out Industrialization," and "The Alliance Between the Peasants and Workers." See Yen-fu, "Slide Project: An Effective Instrument for Popularizing Cultural Education and Science" [Huan-teng: Wen-chiao K'o-hsueh P'u-chi Kung-tso Ti-ch'ih], Ibid., March 19, 1954.

43. See the Ministry of Cultural Affairs' directive cited in the preceding note.

44. Mao Tse-tung, On Coalition Government (Yenan: The New China News Agency, 1945), p. 116.

45. Robert J. Lifton, "Thought Reform of Chinese Intellectuals: A Psychiatric Evaluation," The Journal of Asian Studies, XVI, No. 1 (November, 1956), 75-86.

46. Ibid., p. 86.

47. Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao], June 25, 1958.

48. Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1952), p. 476.

49. Ibid., p. 479.

50. Chou En-lai, "A Report on the Problems of Intellectuals" [Kuan-yu Chih-shih Fen-tzu Wen-t'i Ti Pao-kaol], People's Daily (Peking), January 30, 1956. In October, 1958 Chang Chih-i, Deputy Director of the Department of United Front Work of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, made the latest official pronouncement on the ideological and political problems of non-Communist intellectuals on Mainland China. He said: "... only a minority of the bourgeois intellectuals have come to the working people's side in their political standpoint, while the majority of them still are passive, harboring capitalist ideology." New China News Agency Release, (Home Service), October 12, 1958.

51. Among the leading scholars so accused were: Dr. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, an internationally known sociologist; Professor Feng Yu-lan of the Peking University; Dr. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, Chancellor of the Peking Institute of Political Science and Law and sometime visiting professor at Harvard

University; Professor Ch'ien Wei-ch'ang, noted authority on mechanical engineering and Vice-Chancellor of the Tsing-hua University; Dr. Ts'eng Chao-lun, former Chairman of the Department of Chemistry of the Peking University; Dr. Li Tsung-en, former President of the Peking Union Medical College; Dr. P'an Kuang-tan [Quentin Pan], former Dean of the Tsing-hua University; Dr. Wu Ching-chao, formerly on the sociology faculty at the Tsing-hua University; Dr. Wu Wen-tsao, former Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the now defunct Yenching University; Dr. Ch'en Ta, former Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the Tsing-hua University; Dr. Li Ching-han, former Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the now defunct Fu-jen (Catholic) University; Professor Lei Hai-tsung of the Nai-k'ai University.

52. Tsui Shu-chin, From Academic Freedom to Brainwashing: The Tragic Ordeal of Professors on the Chinese Mainland (Taipei, Taiwan: China Culture Publishing Foundation, 1953), p. 43.

53. New China News Agency Release, May 30, 1957.

54. New China News Agency Release, May 7, 1957.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid.

58. See Note 50 of this chapter.

59. See Mao's speech "On The Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," Note 16, supra.

60. An English version of Li Fan-fu's article may be found in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 115 (January 20, 1958), pp. 5-9.

61. During the period of "contending and blooming," the famous sociologist, Dr. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, made a statement attesting to the ruinous effect of ideological remoulding on intellectuals. If a person, said Dr. Fei, is accused of having bourgeois ideology, he will not only face professional degradation but will also encounter difficulties even in matrimonial affairs, for a member of the opposite sex will refrain from associating with a politically disgraced person who has no future in the society. See Dr. Fei's article "Early Spring Weather for Intellectuals" [Chih-shih Fen-tzu Ti Tsao-chun Tien-ch'ih], People's Daily (Peking), March 24, 1957.

62. Chinese Youth [Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao], June 10, 1957. An English version of Wang's statement can be found in Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1, 563 (July 5, 1957), p. 7.

63. People's Daily (Peking), June 5, 1957. An English version of Yang's statement can be found in ibid., No. 1, 557 (June 25, 1957), p. 17.

64. Li Wei-han, "Democratic Parties and Groups Must Carry Out Their Self-Transformation Basically," ibid., No. 1,663 (December 3, 1957), pp. 4-18.

65. New China News Agency Release, March 5, 1958.

66. New China News Agency Release, March 16, 1958.

67. Ibid.

68. New China News Agency Release, April 10, 1958.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. People's Handbook (Peking, 1957), pp. 585-586. During the last nine years practically all graduates of senior high schools entered colleges as a matter of course. From 1928 to 1949 Chinese colleges and universities admitted students through highly competitive examinations which only well-prepared high school graduates could pass. However, the regime decreed in the summer of 1958 that henceforth institutions of higher education must examine applications for admission with reference to the applicants' "ideological and political orientations." Should this policy be thoroughly carried out, many high school graduates in the future would no longer be able to pursue a college career automatically. The new policy of the regime was spelled out on July 3, 1958, by the People's Daily (Peking) in an editorial: "Strengthening the Party Leadership and Doing a Good Job of Matriculation at Institutions of Higher Learning" [Chia-ch'iang Tang-ti Ling-tao Tso-ho Kao-teng Hsueh-hsiao Chao-sheng Kung-tso].

73. New China News Agency Release, May 3, 1957.

74. Kuo Mo-jo, "On the Problem of Stressing the Past and Slighting the Present" [Kuan-yu Hou-ku Po-chih Wen-t'i], People's Daily (Peking), June 11, 1958.

75. The Sixth Department, Central Committee of the Kuomintang [Chung-kuo Kuo-min Tang Chung-yang Wei-yuan Hui Ti-liu Tso], Educational Work of the Communist Bandits During the Last Five Years [Wu-nien-lai Kung-fei Chiaoyu Kung-tso] (Taipei, Taiwan: Published by the author, 1955), pp. 14-17.

76. A list of such reading matter was issued on November 1, 1957 by the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. An English translation of the list is given in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 115 (January 20, 1958), pp. 10-19.

77. People's Handbook (Peking), p. 587.

78. Ibid.

79. Ts'eng Chao-lun, "Improving the Quality of Higher Education" [T'i-kao Kao-teng Chiao-yu Ti Chih-liang], People's Daily (Peking), March 18, 1957.

80. See Professor Hsueh P'ei-chen's statement during the period of "contending and blooming" in 1957. New China News Agency Release, May 16, 1957.

81. Major criticisms of the party committee system were as follows: (1) The party committee members are not professionally qualified to run schools; (2) The party committee members are arrogant, arbitrary, and politically-minded in dealing with faculty members; (3) The party committee system has bred doctrinairism and subjectivism in academic affairs with a resultant lowering of academic standards; (4) Activities carried on by the party committees have had the effect of estranging the party from the non-party faculty members and students alike. See People's Daily (Peking), May 25, 1957 and New China News Agency Release, May 7 and 29, 1957.

82. See Ch'en Ch'iu-fan's statement at a forum of writers held in Peking. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), June 14, 1956.

83. Fei Hsiao-t'ung, "Early Spring Weather for Intellectuals," Note 61, supra.

84. See Ch'en Ch'iu-fan's comment, Note 82, supra.

85. In many instances committees of the Chinese Communist Youth Corps, formerly known as the New Democratic Youth Corps, serve as agents of the party in running secondary and elementary schools.

86. Chou En-lai, "A Report on the Problems of Intellectuals" [Kuan-yu Chih-shih Fen-tzu Wen-t'i Ti Pao-Kaol], People's Daily (Peking), January 30, 1956.

87. New China News Agency Release, May 12, 1957.

88. Lo Lun-chi, "Strengthening the Unity of the Party and Non-Party Intellectuals" [Chia-chiang Tang-yu Fei-tang Chih-shih Fen-tzu Ti Tuan-chieh], People's Daily (Peking), March 23, 1957.

89. A text of Hsu Kuang-p'ing's statement may be found in New China Fortnightly (Peking) [Hsin-hua Pan-yueh K'an], No. 110 (June 25, 1957), pp. 5-6.

90. Lu Ting-i, "Education Must Be Combined With Productive Labor" [Chiao-yu Pi-hsu-yu Sheng-chan Lao-tung Hsiang-chieh-ho], The Red Flag [Hung-ch'i], No. 7 (September 1, 1958), pp. 1-12.

91. Ibid., p. 7.

92. These statements were taken from Mao's "Correcting Unorthodox Tendencies in Learning, the Party, and Literature and Art" (a speech de-

livered on February 1, 1942). An English version of it appears in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, op. cit., pp. 375-392.

93. "The Government Administrative Council's Directive Concerning the Stepping Up of Spare-Time Education for Workers" [Cheng-wu-yuan Kuan-yu K'ai-chan Chih-kung Yeh-yu Chiao-yu Ti Chih-shih], People's Daily (Peking), June 14, 1950.

94. "The Ministry of Education's Directive Concerning the Conduct of Winter Schools During the Current Year" [Chung-yang Jen-min Cheng-fu Chiao-yu Pu Kuan-yu K'ai-chan Chin-nien Tung-hsueh Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih], ibid., December 7, 1949.

95. This includes competent village elementary school teachers, high school students on winter vacation, and ordinary peasants who have an adequate educational and political background.

96. Ibid., September 28, 1954.

97. See Note 94 of this chapter and the following documents: "The Ministry of Education's Directive Concerning the Development of Farmers' Spare-Time Education" [Chiao-yu Pu Kuan-yu K'ai-chan Nung-min Yeh-yu Chiao-yu Ti Chih-shih], ibid., December 21, 1950; "The Ministry of Education's Directive Concerning the Strengthening of this Year's Winter School Education on Politics and Current Events" [Chiao-yu Pu Kuan-yu Chia-chiang Chin-nien Tung-hsueh Cheng-chih Shih-shih Chiao-yu Ti Chih-shih], ibid., November 13, 1951; "The Ministry of Education's Directive Concerning Winter School Education in 1952" [Chiao-yu Pu Kuan-yu 1952 Nien Tung-hsueh Yun-tung Ti T'ung-chih], ibid., November 27, 1952; "Joint Directive of the Ministry of Education and the Central Commission on the Elimination of Illiteracy Concerning Winter School Education in 1953" [Chung-yang Chiao-yu Pu Chung-yang Sao-ch'u Wen-mang Wei-yuan Hui Kuan-yu 1953 Nien Tung-hsueh Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih], ibid., December 11, 1953; "Joint Directive of the Ministry of Education and the Central Committee of the Youth Corps Concerning Winter School Education in 1954" [Chiao-yu Pu Ho Ching-nien-t'uan Chung-yang Kuan-yu 1954 Nien Tung-hsueh Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih], ibid., October 24, 1954; and "The State Council's Directive Concerning the Strengthening of Farmers' Spare-Time Cultural Education" [Kuo-wu-yuan Kuan-yu Chia-chiang Nung-min Yeh-yu Wen-hua Chiao-yu Ti Chih-shih], ibid., June 6, 1955.

98. The terms "poor peasant" and "middle peasant" are used to distinguish between those peasants who do not earn enough from the produce of their ownland and must therefore sell their labor in order to maintain their families and those peasants who are able, through their own labor, to produce sufficient crops with which to support their families.

PUBLICATION AS A PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT

The Press

The Chinese government, like that of the Soviet Union, maintains strict controls over the entire publications industry. The press, by its nature peculiarly responsive to changing events, appears to serve the following four functions: propaganda, agitation, public information, and "self-criticism."

(a) Propaganda. Propaganda is the attempt to develop a broad, over-all commitment to the regime. The press receives its material on important policy matters from the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the party or the New China News Agency, which has headquarters in Peking. According to a regulation of the Information Administration of the Government Administrative Council,¹ all newspapers must print in full important news releases and special articles distributed by the New China News Agency; supplementary local articles may appear as well. The newspapers thus contribute to a saturation campaign involving repetition of selected materials which appear simultaneously in other media as well. By control of subject-matter, presentation, and personnel, views contrary to the policy of the regime are denied access to the press, though non-

Communists are encouraged to write timely letters to the editor praising the actions of the government.

(b) Agitation. Agitation is here defined as the use of specific events to aid the comprehension of difficult concepts or the acceptance of complicated government policies. It is most effective as a technique for achieving popular support in an emergency, as when it was used to stress the importance of Sino-Soviet solidarity at the end of World War II.² "Exploitation of the workers" in non-Communist countries is a recurring theme, always pointing to unemployment and low standards of living as consequences of other forms of government. A useful device, borrowed from Soviet Russia, is the encouragement of high production by reference to model workers;³ the "Stakhanovites" provide a valuable example for workers to imitate.

(c) Public Information. The press, of course, also acts as an organ for disseminating information about current happenings, and publishes texts of speeches and important policy announcements. Emphasis is given, not to the "scoop," but to the political timeliness of the event — this policy was clearly stated by Lu Ting-i, Director of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the party, on September 19, 1957:

. . . Late or early release of a news item, or its total suppression, should be considered in the light of political significance. Editors and correspondents have two jobs — the scoop on the one hand, and suppression on the other. Some news items must be printed at once and others held back. The correspondents must thus have a good political background, and know what items should be published and what held back, what should be used and what must be killed. Consideration in this respect must be political⁴

This statement shows clearly the reason for the emphasis on political education in the training of journalists.

(d) Self-criticism. The control that the Communists have over the press has given them a strong instrument for public or mass manipulation, especially when it serves as a medium for official and popular criticism. Popular criticism is the rather

formalized activity exemplified by the part the newspapers played in the rectification campaigns. It is another evidence of the importance ascribed by the party to criticism and self-criticism — Mao's "one hundred flowers" doctrine was, it will be recalled, a move for internal improvement through self-criticism. In its "Decisions Concerning the Conduct of Criticism and Self-Criticism in Newspapers and Periodicals" of April 22, 1950⁵ the Central Committee demanded that the press "induce" the people to undertake "open criticism" of all shortcomings and mistakes in the work of the party and the regime.

Book Publishing Instrument

Whereas the brevity, low cost, and geographical adaptability of newspapers make them suitable vehicles for adjustment of public opinion to government policies, the book publishing industry serves best in the dissemination of basic Communist doctrine. From 1949 to 1956 there were 241 works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin translated and published, with twenty-seven million copies circulated. By May, 1958 some 630,000 copies of the Communist Manifesto and 430,000 copies of Das Kapital had been distributed.⁶ From the beginning of the Communist regime through March, 1953, Lenin and Stalin on Socialist Economic Construction was reprinted forty-four times while the History of the Communist [Bolshevik] Party went through thirty-nine printings.⁷ By the end of June, 1957, forty-nine of Mao Tse-tung's writings, totaling 73,339,000 copies, had been published.⁸ During a five-year period ending December 31, 1953, the Communist presses printed 4,240,000 copies of Hu Ch'iao-mu's Thirty Years of the Chinese Communist Party,⁹ and by December, 1956, 3,290,000 copies of Liu Shao-ch'i's work, On the Party, had been printed.¹⁰ Only one month following the adoption of the regime's new constitution, some 12,500,000 copies of its full text had come off the press.¹¹ Late in 1955, under the impulse of the agricultural cooperative movement, the Communist regime announced that it was going to blanket the nation with twenty million copies of Mao Tse-tung's Report on the Problem of the Agricultural Cooperative Movement and fifteen million

copies of the Communist party's resolution on the same problem, adopted by the Seventh Central Committee at its sixth plenary session.¹² Late in 1956 41,500,000 copies of the five major documents of the Eighth Congress of the party were printed.¹³ The drive for popularizing government regulations resulted in the printing during 1951 of 11,500,000 copies of a popular illustrated edition of the marriage law and 10,600,000 copies of a similar edition of the law on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries.¹⁴ These extremely large printings of government regulations contrast significantly with the general average of fourteen thousand copies per title of other kinds of works printed in 1953.

In addition to works on Communist doctrine and history, both international and national, translated works of Soviet authors have come from the presses in growing numbers. Soviet books accounted for 64.1 per cent of all translated works in the period between October, 1949, and the end of 1950; the ratio rose to 77.2 per cent in 1951, to 79.3 per cent in 1952, and to 87.1 per cent in 1953.¹⁵ Political theory and social science clearly predominate in these translations of Soviet writings, but during the past few years Soviet scientific and technical works have been increasingly published. Thus, by the fall of 1955, the number of Soviet titles on science and technology accounted for almost one-third of the total number of titles translated from Russian, then placed at approximately 8,400.¹⁶ This trend, if continued, will be of great significance. For the next generation, at any rate, when Communist China cannot expect to have achieved self-sufficiency in technical personnel and original research, there will be technical dependence on the Soviet Union; this will combine with Soviet material assistance which, despite the voluminous propaganda on the subject, has thus far been on a small scale.

The nature of the information and ideas contained in Chinese Communist publications can be discerned by an analysis of the types of books and periodicals published. The comparative data on books printed in 1950 and 1952 are indicative of the general pattern.

TABLE 5

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COMPOSITION
OF BOOKS PRINTED: 1950 and 1952

Classification	Number of Titles	
	1950	1952
Political Theory	459	110
Government Regulations and Policy	2,454	2,045
Intellectual and Artistic Expression	3,629	2,507
Education and School Texts	1,517	1,325
Sub Total	8,059	5,987
Natural Science and Technology	1,856	2,183
General	23	36
Non-Chinese Texts	69	604
Total	10,007	8,810

Sources: Compiled from the Chinese Communists' Annual List of Publications, 1950 and 1952.

In a broad sense, the first four groups of books bring to the reading public a greater understanding of, and conformity with, the Communistparty's doctrines, policies, and Weltanschauung, while the fifth group contains the raw material for training technicians and skilled workers. In 1952 there was a large increase over 1950 in the number of copies printed, but there was a decrease in the number of titles published in the same period. The decrease occurred in every group except works on natural science and technology and non-Chinese publications; it was greatest in books on political dogma per se. Publication of a greater number of copies of a smaller number of titles may have a variety of reasons — technological and economic as well as political; in any event, it results in wider dissemination of a smaller number of identical messages and thus achieves even

greater conformity and stricter control. It is also possible that the decrease in the number of new titles reflects a lack of manuscripts suitable for publication.

Foreign Language Publications

Another element of the Chinese Communist publication policy is the export of propaganda literature in foreign languages. Although the regime has not disclosed any figure on the total quantity produced and sent to other countries since 1949, fragmentary information suggests that its circulation abroad must be quite wide. For example, by the middle of 1955 Mao Tse-tung's works had been distributed in over fifty countries.¹⁷ In addition, the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and North Korea were then printing Mao's Selected Works in their respective languages.¹⁸ Ho Chi-ming, leader of Communist-dominated North Vietnam, personally translated Mao's On Practice and On Contradiction into Vietnamese and had them published by his government.¹⁹ Mao's Selected Works have also been published in English, French, Japanese, and Hebrew by local publishing houses in England, the United States, France, Japan, and Israel.²⁰ The same works have also been published in Italian, Persian, Burmese, Dutch, Spanish, and several Indian dialects;²¹ the translation and printing were done by local presses in Italy, Iran, Burma, Holland, Chile, and India, respectively.

In addition to translations destined for foreign readers, the Communists also distributed publications in the Chinese language among the overseas Chinese. While the regime has been conspicuously silent about this potentially significant operation, anyone who has been in east and southeast Asia can attest to the omnipresence of Chinese Communist bookstores selling well-printed books at very low prices. Some publications appear to be distributed for the special purpose of gaining allies. Thus, a few years ago the Chinese Communists printed a book of Sukarno's pictures and had it distributed by their bookstores in southeast Asia, though at a very high price, chiefly for the effect on the Indonesian leader.

STRUCTURE, OPERATION, AND CONTROL OF THE PUBLISHING INDUSTRY

The New China News Agency

Foremost in importance in any controlled public information industry is the agency that collects and selects the news and policy items for dissemination to the press. Only through such an agency can the regime control the uniform presentation of its attitudes and policies; the New China News Agency performs this function in Communist China.

The agency's predecessor was the Red China News Agency [Hung-se Chung-hua She], which came into existence in January, 1932 in the capital of the Central Soviet Zone — Juichin, Kiangsi Province.²² It was then a component of the Red China Newspaper Agency [Hung-se Chung-hua Pao-she]. In 1935 it followed the Communists' Long March to North Shensi, and on September 1, 1937 was renamed the New China News Agency. According to Communist sources, the agency then had only two three-tube radio receiving sets, one receiving the Kuomintang Central News Agency's broadcasts and the other intercepting some schedules of Domei and Havas. Little and sometimes no material came through from the Tass and Trans-Ocean agencies when receiving conditions were bad. Important items were sent to the Communist newspapers in the "border regions" and the rest to party officials for reference. For news distribution the agency used a 100-watt transmitter for domestic broadcasts of one thousand five hundred words per day, directing important foreign and domestic news items toward the so-called progressive groups, underground party organs, and united front organizations in the country. The coverage was, in the main, aimed at publicizing the policies and war efforts of the Communist party. Subsequently, the agency's newscasts rose from one thousand five hundred to five thousand words a day. It now had five three-tube receiving sets and its 100-watt transmitter was replaced by a 500-watt transmitter for domestic broadcasts. In 1942 the agency began its English broadcasts to foreign countries twice a day for one and a half to two hours each. In 1943 it built up a voice broadcast for listeners in China.

When the civil war broke out in 1946, the agency became an important instrument of the central party authorities in the propaganda warfare against the National Government in Nanking. To strengthen military coverage, the agency set up its own organizations with the field troops of the Liberation Army. At that time, it broadcast eight thousand to twelve thousand words per day on domestic and foreign news. In 1948 it was receiving broadcasts from thirty foreign radio stations, and in the same year established its first foreign bureau in Prague. Following the Communist seizure of power in 1949 it became the official news agency of the new regime, with exclusive rights to engage in nation-wide news gathering.

As of August, 1957 the New China News Agency had thirty-one sub-bureaus in the various provinces and the capitals of autonomous regions, as well as in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, Anshan, in the voluntary army in Korea, and on the sea fronts. These bureaus sent to the main office in Peking about fifty thousand words a day and had, since the last half of 1956, functioned as a news service to local newspapers. The agency then had in addition twenty-three foreign bureaus located mainly in the capitals of foreign countries, such as Pyongyang, Ulan Bator, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Rangoon, Yalta, New Delhi, Karachi, Kabul, Damascus, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Berlin, Sofia, Bucharest, Tirana, Budapest, Belgrade, Geneva, Paris, and London. These bureaus sent to the main office a daily total of ten thousand words. The office thus received sixty thousand words a day from its domestic and foreign bureaus combined, and photographers in the domestic bureaus sent an average of thirty to forty pictures to the home office every day.

The agency's broadcasts can be divided into five categories:

(1) To domestic papers on the national level and broadcasting stations all over the country, sixty-two thousand words per day (eighteen thousand words in 1949) in 100 to 120 news items, consisting of thirty-two thousand words of domestic and thirty thousand words of foreign news.

(2) To domestic provincial and municipal papers, thirty-five thousand words per day, transmitted as was the previous category by the copying method — Chinese characters are written

on a tape for facsimile transmission by machine, a method that obviates the ciphering and deciphering process — at 6,000 words per hour.

(3) To small papers below the provincial level about ten thousand words per day, comprising six thousand words for city papers and three thousand five hundred words for rural papers sent through Hellschreiber and voicecast.

(4) English broadcast at three thousand to twelve thousand words per day (two thousand words in 1949), in nine separate routes: by radioteletype to London, by Hellschreiber to Prague, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Karachi, and by Morse code to Southern Europe, Cairo, Pyongyang, Hanoi, and Yalta.

(5) Russian broadcast at eight thousand to ten thousand words per day to the Tass news agency in Moscow.

The agency's pictorial activity has developed notably. In 1956 it sent out a total of nineteen thousand negatives and produced three million two hundred and fifty thousand black-and-white and fifteen thousand color prints. It set up in the same year a film-plate workshop and began sending plates to administrative district and county papers. By August, 1957 the agency's photo department was issuing twenty to thirty pictures per day to four hundred subscribers in China and eighty-seven foreign countries.

The agency's tele-communications organization has been greatly improved over the past years. At the receiving end in Peking, the agency records the broadcasts of more than forty stations of thirty foreign news services, totalling about 300,000 words (English) and 281 hours per day in radioteletype, Hellschreiber, and Morse code, though there was only the Morse code until 1956. The use of Hellschreiber and radioteletype in foreign transmission more than doubled efficiency. It should be noted that, although the agency takes down broadcasts of news agencies in many non-Communist countries, it does so largely for reference purposes. The agency incorporates into its own domestic broadcasts only those dispatches from news services of the non-Communist world which can be exploited for its own purposes. On the other hand, the New China News Agency makes extensive use of Tass news bulletins on international affairs.

The agency now has 50-kilowatt transmitters for foreign broadcasts; before 1949 it had only one-kilowatt transmitters. Against the 500-watt transmitters which the agency had for domestic broadcasts before 1949, it now has 10-kilowatt transmitters.

Since all Chinese newspapers must rely on the agency for all but local news, and since the newspapers are not free to edit the items so received, a nation-wide conformity in content results. Herein lies the great importance of the New China News Agency in the government's propaganda program.²³

Changes in Newspaper Ownership Patterns

Outright banning of all privately-owned newspapers — a policy adopted by the Russian Communists after the October Revolution — has not been considered advisable or expedient by the Peking regime. On the other hand, the Chinese Communists do not allow unsupervised independence to any privately-owned newspaper. The first step taken by the regime towards regulation of privately-owned papers was the announcement that papers with "reactionary dispositions" would be outlawed at once, while "progressive" ones and those without definite political inclination might apply for new licenses under which they could continue publication.²⁴ Thus quite a number of privately-owned newspapers, including forty-three dailies, were able to carry on business alongside newspapers owned by the Communists, even though subject to strict control and supervision by the regime.²⁵

However, late in 1951 the regime began to put into effect a policy aimed both at reducing the number of privately-owned newspapers and changing the nature of those allowed to survive. Many privately-owned newspapers were closed, others amalgamated, and still others "reformed" and "reorganized." Since 1953 there have been only five privately-owned newspapers left in the country, none of which retain their former identity or independent status.²⁶

Besides having Communists and pro-Communists as staff members, these five newspapers have assigned responsibilities in the conduct of propaganda and indoctrination — evidence of the

regime's preference for specialization. The Ta-kung Daily (Peking) [Ta-kung Pao], once the most influential independent newspaper in China, now concentrates on news and comment on financial and economic matters. The Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao] specializes in cultural and educational affairs.²⁷ The Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai) [Wen-hui Pao], primarily serves school teachers and senior high school students in Shanghai, while the Hsin-min Daily (Shanghai) [Hsin-min Pao] devotes its space largely to sports and recreational activities in the same city. The fifth such newspaper is the Shanghai Daily News [Hsin-wen Jih-Pao], which caters to the bourgeois businessmen and industrialists in East China.²⁸ It is, therefore, quite clear that these papers have become in actuality a part of the official press apparatus, and that their continued private status is significant only as a gesture documenting the regime's ostensible adherence to the principle of private ownership.

From 1949 to 1956 private ownership of newspapers was necessitated by the Chinese Communist view of the nature of the state as a "people's democracy." In such a state "national capitalists" and "democratic parties" were presumed to be in alliance with the workers, peasants, and the Communist party. Aside from "enemies of the people" such as "bureaucratic capitalists," "feudal landlords" and "lackeys of foreign imperialism," all other classes were considered legitimate elements of the People's Republic of China and therefore entitled to the enjoyment of all political rights, including that of an individual to own his own newspaper.

Private ownership was not seen as inconsistent with the newspapers' function as an instrument of government, since those in the hands of the people's "allies" served the same purpose as those in the hands of the people's government itself. In practice, the regime controlled the private newspapers as effectively as it did the official press.

With the graduation of the Chinese state from the stage of "people's democracy" to that of socialism in 1955-1956, this justification for the existence of privately-owned papers underwent a slight change. The official doctrine now holds that while

the national bourgeois and the petit bourgeois have lost their economic base as a result of the socialist transformation of commerce, industry, and agriculture, they still retain their bourgeois ideology and old political outlook. Since, according to official dogma, the Chinese people are to bring about their own political transformation, the regime tolerates private ownership of the few papers still in the possession of, and operated by, persons whose conversion to the new political creed is still incomplete.

Newspaper Financing

Before 1950 Communist newspapers relied almost completely on party subsidies. As the number of newspapers increased, following the Communist conquest of the Mainland, the party found that continued subsidization of the press not only put a strain on the national budget but tended to relieve newspaper managers and editors of the economic pressure to improve their work and thus to insure the survival and growth of their papers.

Toward the end of 1949, therefore, the Information Administration called a national conference of newspaper managers to discuss possible changes in newspaper financing. The conference decided, among other things, that all newspapers must begin to operate on a businesslike basis with a view to attaining financial self-sufficiency.²⁹ Since then newspapers have taken the following steps toward this goal: (1) fixing subscription fees high enough to cover the cost of newsprint; (2) reducing the number of employees; (3) adopting cost accounting procedures; (4) enacting rules governing the upkeep of equipment; (5) rewarding employees for high productivity and for the elimination of waste; (6) using inexpensive, locally-made newsprint; (7) improving services to the reader by having papers delivered promptly every day; (8) strictly enforcing the rules of budgeting and auditing; (9) engaging in profitable sideline activities, such as using idle presses to print posters or handbills for commercial and governmental agencies; and (10) carrying advertisements for publishing houses, cultural organizations, and certain commercial enterprises.³⁰

The Communists report that as a result of these measures many newspapers, especially those above the provincial level, have been able to support themselves financially, and that some of them are even making a considerable profit.³¹

The achievement of financial self-sufficiency by the newspapers has not lessened their dependence upon the regime, however. The government still maintains a strict financial control over the newspapers by periodically reviewing their budgets and final accounts.

Horizontal and Vertical Organization of the Press

After they conquered the Mainland, the Communists expanded their press organization into a nation-wide one. The most important facet of this expansion is the direction exercised by the central authorities of the party in deciding not only when, where, and how many newspapers should be founded, but also what groups of people the various newspapers should seek to reach. Characterized by a high degree of specialization, the entire structure of the press in Communist China at present enables each component to reach a specific audience and serve a specific function.

The press organization of the nation is divided horizontally and vertically. The horizontal division follows very closely the territorial-administrative structure of the government and the Communist party. At each level of the territorial-administrative hierarchy there is an appropriate press to serve the party, government, and mass organization.

The most authoritative national newspaper is the People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao]. The chief organ of the central authorities of the party and the government, this newspaper usually sets the tone for the press of the nation as a whole on national and international issues. Its editorials and feature articles are frequently reproduced in full by other papers in the country.

Edited and published principally in Peking, the People's Daily now has editions printed in Shanghai, Canton, Sian, Mukden, Chungking, and Urumchi. These editions are made from stereotype plates supplied daily by air mail from the home office in

Peking. As of April, 1956, this paper with all its editions had a total circulation of 810,000 copies per issue, compared with less than 30,000 copies in March, 1949.³²

The paper currently publishes eight pages a day, Monday through Saturday; on Sundays and holidays it is reduced to four pages. The size of the page is 15" x 21" with the text printed horizontally in "new No. 5" type.³³

The masthead, occupying a space of approximately thirty square inches, takes up the upper left-hand portion of the front page. Originally the name of the paper appeared only in the traditional Chinese ideographs, but since February 11, 1958, when the National People's Congress adopted an alphabetic system of notation, the People's Daily, like other Chinese publications, has carried its name in both ideographs and the new alphabet. To the right of the masthead is the day's news summary and a small box containing reports on weather and temperature.

On the front page appear the most important news items of the day — dispatches, feature articles, and full texts of official documents or speeches. There is generally an editorial as well, though its location on the page may vary from day to day.

The second and third pages of the paper are devoted to items on industry, agriculture, commerce, construction, transportation, and communications. The fourth page of the paper is reserved for internal politics, such as activities of the various political parties and mass organizations both in the capital and the country at large.

The fifth and sixth pages of the paper carry international news. More often than not the fifth page reports events in the Soviet Union and "the other fraternal countries in the socialist camp." The sixth page covers the non-Communist world including the uncommitted states in Asia and Africa, and gives the staff writers scope for pointed editorializing.³⁴

The focus of the seventh page of the paper is on cultural and educational affairs. Essays expounding Communist doctrine or policies are usually found here; for example, a Chinese translation of a long article on "Anti-Revisionism in Modern Times," originally contributed by a Russian writer to Pravda, was printed in two installments in the People's Daily for March 1 and 2, 1958.

The last page of the paper is divided into two sections. The upper two-thirds of the page is essentially a literary supplement featuring short stories, poems, plays, and the like, generally written along "current ideological lines." Occasionally this section carries a question-and-answer column on scientific or medical problems. The lower section of this page is devoted to classified advertisements for publishing houses and recreational centers.³⁵

The People's Daily, like the other newspapers in Communist China, has no society column, although it covers such semi-official functions as rectification campaign meetings of one of the democratic parties, or the proceedings of a national conference of model workers. There is no sports page, since the Chinese have no tradition of organized sports; speeches by officials of the Commission of Physical Education or brief summaries of the scores of national tournaments are, however, given space. Crimes and murders are not reported, and fires and other disasters appear in the paper only as "sabotage cases," treated as evidence of the "anti-state" and "anti-people" activities of counterrevolutionaries or agents of the "Chiang Kai-shek clique."

The paper makes full use of graphic materials and photographs. In the March 1, 1958 issue, for example, in the eight pages there are eleven photographs and eleven cartoons, woodcuts, and other illustrations depicting for the most part the progress of the current campaign to build socialism "with greater, faster, better, and more numerous economic achievements."

Before the abolition of regional administrations in the Fall of 1954 there were regional newspapers in the press pyramid between the national and provincial newspapers. These regional newspapers did for their regions what the national newspapers do for the country at large. In addition to covering the political, economic, social, and cultural affairs of the nation and the world, they gave serious attention to regional problems, seeing that the decisions of the party and government were carried out, and guiding the regional cadres in matters of doctrine and policy. With the abolition of the regional administrations, however, the regional newspapers also ceased to exist.³⁶

Now, standing immediately below the national press within the press hierarchy, is the provincial press. At present each province, autonomous region, and municipality directly under the central authority has its own official newspaper. The functions of the provincial press are similar to those of the former regional press. They differ not so much in their function as in the smaller size of their territories and the audience to which they are directed.

Below the provincial level are newspapers on the administrative district level. At the base of the pyramid are newspapers on the county or city level. These are smaller in size than the others and have a more limited audience and function. They are not expected to deal with political doctrine or complicated economic questions. Like the district press in the Soviet Union, they concentrate on the concrete and practical problems of their particular localities — the building of schools, the construction of roads, the expansion of sanitary facilities, and the strengthening of local security measures. While local problems are their main concern, these newspapers also bring relevant high-level decisions of party and government authorities to the attention of the community, explaining and winning popular support for them.

The Communists' policy of specialization has led to a further division of the press along functional lines. At every level of the hierarchy — national, provincial, and local — there are newspapers addressing themselves to special audiences, such as workers, farmers, young people, and other population groups. Thus, one can speak of a horizontal or geographical, and a vertical or functional division of the Chinese press. The number of specialized papers appears to be fairly large. The most recent data reflecting the importance of the functional press were given by a Communist writer toward the end of 1956.³⁷ According to these figures, there were, in addition to 352 newspapers above the administrative district level and 1,049 county or hsien papers, "a large number" of papers published for industrial and mining enterprises. Among the provincial and administrative district papers, he says, 173 (49 per cent of the total) were published for workers and peasants, while county papers and those published in industrial and mining centers were exclusively

for workers and peasants. Of the 352 papers above the administrative district level, thirty-three were for young people and twenty-four were published in the languages of the minority nationalities, he says.

Printing and Publishing Houses

From the beginning the former Publications Administration was apparently concerned primarily with the conversion of the old Kuomintang publishing establishments into Communist-controlled companies, and gave little attention to the formal organization which its own publishing establishments should have. The specialization that has characterized the structure of the newspaper, radio, and film industries under the Communist regime since its inception was not imposed on the publishing industry until late in 1950. Up to that time the state-owned Hsin-hua Book Company, which then had 887 branch offices and thirty printing plants, was not only publisher but printer and book distributor.³⁸ The same situation prevailed among the privately-owned publishing firms.³⁹ The Publications Administration, originally established to supervise the incorporation of the publishing industry into the over-all propaganda machinery, had gradually assumed control of the editing, printing, and distribution of books and periodicals, even though the publishing firms had been given responsibility for these matters by policies of the Publications Administration itself. As a result, there was a good deal of confusion.

To clarify the situation, the Publications Administration convened the first National Conference on Publications in September, 1950. Resolutions adopted made it clear that henceforth the Publications Administration was to concern itself only with matters of policy, including the supervision and execution of such policies by the publishing firms. As far as possible, specialization was to be effected within the publishing industry.⁴⁰

When the conference spoke of specialization it had two distinct aims in mind. First, the publishing, printing, and distributing of books and periodicals were to be handled by three separate groups of organizations: publishers, printers, and distributors.

Second, each publishing company was to specialize in works in specified fields. These aims were designed to assure a concentrated use of publishing facilities, to strengthen coordination among the companies, and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.

According to the most recent Communist statistics, those for 1956, there were 101 publishing houses in the country by the end of that year.⁴¹ Of these, eighty-two were state-owned and nineteen jointly operated by state and private interests.⁴² The publishing houses operated on national and local levels. Those on the national level (fifty-four in 1956) can be further classified into two groups, according to the manner in which they are supervised. Some of the presses at this level are controlled and supervised exclusively by the Bureau of Publications of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, and are usually concerned with the publication of propaganda, indoctrination, and educational literature for the general public, such as the People's Press, the San-Lien Press, and the once-famous Commercial Press which, together with the Chung-hua Book Company, are now only allowed to publish the Chinese classics and linguistic studies. The other group on the national level consists of publishing houses operating under the joint supervision and direction of the Bureau of Publications and some other governmental agency or mass organization having a special interest in its type of publication. For example, the Geological Press is partially under the control of the Ministry of Geology, while the All-China Federation of Trade Unions shares responsibility with the Bureau of Publications for the supervision of the Workers' Press.

Generally, if a press is exclusively supervised by the Bureau of Publications, the Bureau has complete control over editorial policy, personnel administration, and financial management. When a press is under the dual control of the Bureau of Publications and some other governmental agency or mass organization, the Bureau sees to it that the publications are in accord with the over-all policy of the regime and that there is real coordination between that press and other presses. The press's editorial work, personnel administration, and financial management are under the direct control of the governmental agency or mass

organization with which the Bureau shares supervisory responsibility.

Publishing houses operating on the local level (forty-seven in 1956) are controlled and supervised by the national Bureau of Publications in Peking through local bureaus of publication organized within many local governments. Except for the so-called joint state- and privately-owned presses, most of the local publishing houses are official presses of local governments. At present almost every government on the provincial level has such a press. These local publishing houses primarily issue works dealing specifically with local politics, economy, and culture, but they also publish works on political doctrine, science, and other subjects of general interest. Written in simple language, these works usually supplement the publications of the Popular Readings Press in Peking.

In addition to receiving administrative guidance and specific instructions on editorial policy from the appropriate supervising authorities, publishing houses on both national and local levels operate under a number of standing codes. Contained in a government decree, "The Provisional Regulations on the Control of the Book Publishing, Printing, and Distributing Firms," promulgated by the former State Administrative Council on August 16, 1952, these codes require, among other things, that all members of the publishing industry, state-owned or otherwise, submit publication plans (including topic lists), work reports, and sample copies of publications periodically to the appropriate bureaus of publication, and that no publishing firm may print anything in contradiction to the basic laws, decrees, and orders of the government or that might disclose state secrets.⁴³ Under these regulations all publishing houses function as agents of the government, and all works published by them naturally conform to the regime's doctrinal and political requirements.⁴⁴

Formal Administrative Control of the Press

Since the press, in the people's democracy, is an instrument of the government — i.e., the people — the Kuomintang news-

papers on the Mainland were banned when the Communists came into power, as the Kuomintang was regarded as an enemy of the people. Since the personnel of the official Kuomintang papers knew of this attitude, most of them suspended publication as the Communist occupation spread to include their respective cities or towns. These official papers included the forty-four dailies (one with editions in ten major cities) published by the central and provincial headquarters of the Kuomintang.⁴⁵ The newly-arrived Communists had to do little more than confiscate the plants of the Kuomintang papers and, as part of the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries, to liquidate or send to forced-labor camps those Kuomintang newsmen who had not already fled. The decks thus cleared, the Communists were able to begin building up their own newspaper network as has been described.

Press control in Communist China does not take the form of direct censorship for two important reasons. First, there is need for a special agency to screen the content of the press only when the press is independent of the government and likely to be hostile or irresponsible. The press in Communist China is not independent, but an integral part of the government or of the Communist party; the problem is thus one of internal supervision rather than external control. Secondly, a conventional censorship system would not adequately control the press in Communist China, because it could not make positive contributions to the regime's goals. Censorship is normally an instrument of prevention, and while a government may use such an instrument to prevent the printing of material detrimental or hostile to its interests, it cannot rely upon that instrument to produce positively beneficial material. To insure a press that will actively serve the regime's interests, there must be a control that is both broader and more positive than direct censorship. The organizational and operational systems imposed on the press by the government effectively serve this end through control of policy and content.

Editorial Control. There are a number of standing rules that set forth fundamental policies for the guidance of newspaper

editors. The General Provisions of the Party Constitution say, in effect, that the press as part of the party organization must always report news and discuss problems from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and, conversely, must repudiate all tendencies toward idealism or "bourgeois objectivity."

Moreover, the constitution stipulates that newspapers, like individual party members, shall never make statements or express views on any issue relating to party policy without or in contravention of instructions from the appropriate authorities (Arts. 25-26). Article 27 of the same constitution states that editors must keep the content of their newspapers in line with the immediate and the long-range goals of the party organizations.

More rules governing editorial policy are stipulated in the government statutes. The Provisional Regulations on the Protection of State Secrets⁴⁶ and the Regulations of the Chinese People's Republic on the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries,⁴⁷ for example, outline news items that the press must not print. According to these regulations, no newspaper may carry material calculated to spread counterrevolutionary propaganda or rumors detrimental to the prestige of the People's Government, to encourage obstruction of laws and decrees, including those concerning grain requisition, taxation, military and labor conscriptions, or to disclose political, military, economic, financial, or diplomatic secrets. Penalties for violators range from three-year imprisonment to death.⁴⁸

In addition to the standing rules, agencies of the party and government issue, from time to time, directives laying down general lines of policy for the entire press or particular groups of papers to follow. These directives guide newspaper editors in adapting their papers to changed conditions and responsibilities; they are also used by the regime to correct errors and inadequacies of newspaper editors.

Newspapers are not given much freedom in news and feature stories gathered or prepared by their own staff members. Editors must make quarterly and monthly plans of editorial topics and feature articles, and submit them to the appropriate party organizations for approval.⁴⁹ Before a news story or a feature article is printed, its manuscript must have been examined by

the organization or individual prominently featured in it, so as to insure "completely accurate and responsible news reporting."⁵⁰ Moreover, after a paper has come off the press it is carefully scrutinized by the press section of the party committee on the appropriate level in the territorial-administrative hierarchy. Newspapers below the national level are also subject to periodic scrutiny by the higher level press sections and newspapers of the party organizations. Such review is designed to discover any doctrinal deviations or editorial shortcomings not prevented by the pre-publication control measures. This post-publication examination, therefore, results quite frequently in criticism of delinquent or offending papers or groups of papers. Sometimes the criticism is sent directly to the papers concerned, sometimes it may form the basis of a "press review" article in a higher level newspaper, and at other times the matter may be considered sufficiently important to justify the issuance of formal directives by the party organizations. At still other times the regime may call conferences of newspaper editors for direct discussion and instruction, and there have been occasions when officials of the party press sections have found it necessary to go so far in helping some newspaper editors "improve their work" as to write editorials or draw up editorial plans for them.⁵¹

Thus the Chinese Communist regime's control of the press is very strict. It is far more rigid than the Kuomintang regime's policy toward the press, which tolerated the existence of a large number of papers critical of its policies, and casually enforced its censorship.

Formal Administrative Control of the Publishing Houses

Among the Communists' earliest steps to gain control over the publishing industry was the destruction of certain books. Bookburning in China is not new. As far back as two thousand years ago, Ch'in-shih Huang-ti decreed that all undesirable books be burned when he unified the empire. Literature in China has always been considered to have a pragmatic as well as an aesthetic function, and the attempt to impose political and philosophical conformity by the destruction of books expounding

variant or contradictory doctrines has been repeated more than once in subsequent dynasties. The Chinese Communists have followed the old tradition.

While it is impossible to obtain an exact figure on the total number of books destroyed by the Communists since 1949, cases reported by the Communist press serve to indicate the quantity of "objectionable" books suppressed and destroyed. In 1951 the privately-owned Commercial Press, the largest publishing house in China before 1949, was forced to pulp more than 90 per cent of its stock, retaining only 1,354 of its more than 15,000 titles. The Chung-hua Book Company, the second largest publishing firm, was allowed to retain only 2,000 titles out of its more than 13,000.⁵² "Pernicious" books on the shelves of bookstores or in the hands of private citizens in Shanghai suffered the same fate. During the first twenty-three days of November, 1951, more than 28.4 metric tons of books were destroyed in Shanghai, a high figure in view of the light weight of Chinese books; the pulp obtained from these books was valued at around JMP \$229,400,000. A Communist newspaper in Peking reported that in 1952 books collected for destruction by the authorities in Chekiang Province "were piled up like a mountain,"⁵³ and said that many of the books so collected and destroyed were "precious editions of valuable books having no bearing on politics whatsoever."

Bookburnings were soon combined with positive publication policies applying to textbooks and other works of reference, as well as works of literature, art books, and comic strips. A Communist leader in the publishing industry once remarked, "Publications are expected to equip the people with Marxist-Leninist theories and other cultural and scientific knowledge, as well as to incite them to march forward."⁵⁴

In reorganizing the printing and publishing industry, the government followed much the same specialization policy as was applied to the press. Distribution was centralized, the Hsin-hua Book Company being designated the official agency for nation-wide distribution. Its printing plants were reorganized as one government company, the Hsin-hua Printing Company.

A number of official publishing houses were established to handle the editing and publishing of books in specific fields. For example, the People's Press became the publisher of works on political theory and political affairs; the Youth Press, the publisher of works for young people; the Popular Readings Press, the publisher of works for the general reader; and the People's Educational Press, the publisher of textbooks for elementary and middle schools.⁵⁵

The principle of specialization was also applied to privately-owned publishing houses, but in order to make full use of them for the production of propaganda literature drastic steps had to be taken. Dissatisfied by the inevitable inefficiency of supervising the large number of privately-owned presses, and adhering to its policy for the socialist transformation of industry, the government began in 1951 to work toward the formation of the so-called joint state- and privately-owned presses. This not only opened the way for greater governmental control over the management of the presses, but brought about the consolidation of many small publishing houses into a few large outfits. For example, five of the joint state- and privately-owned publishing houses now in Shanghai were formed during the period between 1951 and 1955 by the amalgamation of fifty-three presses originally owned by private interests.⁵⁶

This sweeping reorganization of the publishing business into a series of agencies has contributed to a deterioration of literary quality. Since the distributing agencies or bookstores — not the publishing houses — determine the quantity of publications and have the financial responsibility for sales, the responsibility for selection has been effectively taken from the publisher. The distributing agencies must often increase the output quotas of the publishing houses arbitrarily in order to meet the "planned increases" in wordage, titles, and volumes demanded by the five-year plans; the publishers, in order to meet the demands for quantity, must largely ignore literary quality. As one veteran publisher remarked, "The publishing houses often refrain from making plans to publish major works, but concentrate on the kind of pamphlets that yield 'quick results'."⁵⁷

Personnel Control: The Press

No administrative regulations and no conventional censorship can ever be as effective as control over the personnel of the media. With unquestionably loyal people as staff members, newspapers can be counted on to work positively as an instrument of the government. Some of these approved editors and staff members make up party committees within the newspapers or publishing houses and exercise an immediate control over policy without regard to the administrative staff nominally in charge of operations.

The regime enforces its personnel control largely through a party rule that the publishers and editors of the official newspapers on various levels shall be appointed by the corresponding party committees; approval of the next higher party unit is needed in the case of appointments made by party committees below the national level. Thus, while the Central Committee has full power to appoint publishers and editors of newspapers on the national level, appointments of publishers and editors of county newspapers by county committees require confirmation of the administrative district bureaus of the party. A similar control is exercised by the party committees over the dismissal and promotion of newspaper publishers and editors.

These personnel controls are imposed not only upon the official organs of the regime, but on all newspapers and journals in the country. The editor of a newspaper of a provincial women's association, for example, while appointed by the association, must first be approved by the provincial party authorities and then confirmed by the Central Committee of the party.

Immediately after the seizure of power in 1949, the party relied heavily upon Communists and pro-Communists who had worked for Communist newspapers in the border regions or for non-Communist papers in the territory then under the control of the Kuomintang regime. However, expansion of the press soon made the number of these men inadequate to meet the increasing demand. To cope with the situation, the party drafted its newspaper editors from among reliable party members who had had

experience in some kind of propaganda work. In the meantime party schools on various levels offered special short courses for the training of press cadres. Shortly thereafter the Peking College of Journalism was established, offering courses on both undergraduate and post-graduate levels. Today several regular universities, including the People's University in Peking and the Fudan University in Shanghai, also have departments of journalism.

QUANTITY AND NATURE OF COMMUNIST PUBLICATIONS

Books and Periodicals

With the publishing industry firmly in hand, the current regime has been able to increase steadily the annual output of books and periodicals during the period from 1950 to 1957 except for the two years 1953 and 1957.

The rate of increase was especially rapid during 1950-1951, which for the Communist regime was the initial period of political consolidation and was marked by the onset of the Korean war which necessitated an increase in the government's political indoctrination efforts. The interruption, in 1953, of the trend of continued increase in the production of books and periodicals was probably a reflection of the regime's economic retrenchment policy during that year. The big upsurge that took place in 1956 may be attributed to the regime's intensification of propaganda work at the time when the socialist transformation or collectivization of industry, commerce, and agriculture was being carried out. During the year that followed, the output of books dropped considerably, but was still higher than the planned figure. According to the first Five-Year Plan, a total of 1,211,650,000 books were to be printed in 1957.⁵⁸ As indicated in the Table, the actual output of books in that year was 1,485 million copies, and 351.4 million periodicals were printed in 1956.

This may be compared with the corresponding figures for 1936 (the year in which the largest number of books and periodicals was produced in China prior to the founding of the Communist regime), when 178 million books and 32.2 million periodicals

TABLE 6

ANNUAL OUTPUT OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS: 1950-1957

Year	BOOKS		PERIODICALS	
	No. of Titles*	No. of Copies Printed	No. of Titles	No. of Copies Printed
1950	12, 153	274,633,000	274	35,301,679
1951	18, 300	703,304,000	Not available	176,774,253
1952	13, 970	788,744,000	356	204,000,000
1953	18, 384	754,519,000	277	171,530,000
1954	19, 177	939,692,000	304	204,930,000
1955	22, 538	1,079,574,000	370	288,000,000
1956	30, 196	1,786,435,000	Not available	351,360,000
1957	28, 000	1,485,000,000	Not available	Not available
* The total number of book titles published annually includes reprintings and revised editions of previously published titles as well as new titles.				

Sources: New China Fortnightly (Peking) [Hsin-hua Pan-yueh K'an], No. 115 (September 10, 1957), p. 82.
Liberation Daily (Shanghai) [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao], September 25, 1952.
Enlightenment Daily (Peking), September 14, 1954 and September 23, 1955.
People's Daily (Peking), September 28, 1954 and August 2, 1957.
Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), September 30, 1957.

were printed in China proper, excluding Manchuria which was then under Japanese control.

As for periodical literature, apart from technical journals, the nature of the popular publications may be gleaned from a list of sixteen monthlies and semi-monthlies, each of which had a circulation of over 100,000 as of July, 1955.⁵⁹ Of these publications the following seven, Current Affairs Pocket Magazine [Shih-shih Shou-ts'e], Learning [Hsueh-hsi], Political Study [Cheng-chih Hsueh-hsi], The New Observer [Hsin Kuan-ch'a], World Affairs [Shih-chien Chih-shih], The People's Pictorial [Jen-min Hua-pao], and The Popular Illustrated [Lien-hua Hua-pao] accounted for 3.7 million copies per issue out of a total of 5.9 million copies. Two publications, Chinese Youth [Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao] and The High School Student [Chung-hsueh-sheng] accounted for 25 per cent of the total circulation. The remaining seven publications are addressed to such special groups as women, theatrical workers, movie goers, etc. A number of the periodicals in the first two groups were semi-monthlies; they emphasize current affairs and general political topics as well as the problems of important social groups such as young people and women.

In addition to these periodicals, the Chinese Communist Party early in 1958 decided to publish a series of "theoretical magazines." Following this decision the Central Committee launched a fortnightly journal known as the Hung-ch'i or Red Flag, with one of the party's leading theoreticians, Ch'en Po-ta, as its editor. The first issue of the journal came off the press on June 1st of the same year, stating in an introduction that the magazine made its appearance at a point when the development of the socially productive forces of China had entered an epoch of unprecedented acceleration. Its task, the introduction said, was to hold ever higher the revolutionary red flag of the proletariat, and that if there remained any flag of the bourgeoisie anywhere, it would undoubtedly be removed and replaced by the flag of the proletariat.

The importance attached by the party to this new magazine is indicated by the presence of Mao Tse-tung and other leading Communists among the contributors to its first issue. Its significance as a political weapon of the party is shown also by

its wide circulation. According to a Communist report, by the time the first issue came off the press subscriptions for 1,980,000 copies had already been received.⁶⁰ It should be added that subscription to this magazine, as to many others, is virtually compulsory for all government agencies, party branches, mass organizations, business offices, and schools.

The Red Flag was quickly followed by other "theoretical magazines" edited and published by the various provincial committees of the party. All of these magazines, said the Communists, were devoted to "raising still higher the banner of Marxism-Leninism, continuously carrying forward Marxist-Leninist theory in new circumstances, giving guidance and impetus to practical work, strengthening the struggle on the ideological front, propagating proletarian doctrine and raising the theoretical level of the functionaries and the masses."⁶¹

Publications for Minority Language Groups

In the course of the expansion of its publications industry, the Chinese government has not overlooked its non-Chinese-speaking citizens. At present twelve special publishing houses, including the Nationalities Languages Press in Peking, are engaged in publishing books mainly in minority languages. From 1952 to 1956, 4,988 titles, totaling 46,598,000 copies, had been issued in thirteen minority languages including Mongolian, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh, Korean, Sibo, and Chuang.⁶² During the same period the regime also published 110,800,000 copies of newspapers and 11,000,000 copies of periodicals in the same languages.⁶³ Such promotion, however, has been marked by frequent shifts of emphasis in the languages used. For example, during 1950 forty-eight titles were published in Mongolian and one in Uighur. Two years later, as a result of the Korean war, 230 titles were published in Korean — these were meant for consumption both in Korea and by the Korean population in China — while 162 titles were published in Mongolian, eighty-five in Uighur, thirty-four in Kazakh, six in Tibetan, and three in other tongues. This shift is symptomatic of a continually changing political situation to which official propaganda must adapt itself.

Foreign Works Translated into Chinese

Since 1953 a special bureau under the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party has been engaged in the systematic translation of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin into Chinese. Its translations are published by the People's Press. The Shih-tai Press also specializes in the publication of Chinese translations of Soviet and other foreign works on social, economic, and cultural affairs. Chinese translations of foreign works on technology and science are published by various specialized presses such as the Mechanical Engineering Press and the Chinese Forestry Press. Furthermore, the International Book Store, established by the regime in December, 1949, constantly imports large quantities of Chinese translations of Soviet works published by the Foreign Language Press in Moscow, which smuggled its publications into China before the founding of the present regime in Peking.⁶⁴ Any evaluation of Soviet influence in the reading material reaching the Chinese public must therefore take into account not only Chinese-printed translations of Soviet works but those imported from Moscow as well. In the cultural interchange of printed matter between China and the Soviet the traffic is essentially one-way — in the direction of China. Of the twenty works published in foreign languages in Communist China in 1950, only two were in Russian, while there were fourteen in English and four in French. Of the eighty-five foreign-language titles published in 1952 forty-nine were in Japanese, twenty-one in English, four in French, two in German, five in other languages — and only four in Russian.⁶⁵ These figures suggest that the Soviet Union prefers to regulate the nature and flow of propaganda on China within its own borders, or else that it is not considered necessary to propagandize Russia.

CIRCULATION AND READERSHIP

Efforts to Increase Newspaper Circulation

Prior to 1950 the average circulation of a Chinese newspaper was extremely small.⁶⁶ In 1950 a new policy adopted by the

regime called upon the post offices to handle newspaper subscriptions. This nation-wide subscription network has enabled most of the newspapers to increase their circulation.⁶⁷ For instance, the People's Daily doubled its circulation in eight months after the adoption of the new subscription method.⁶⁸

A most effective way of increasing the circulation of newspapers has been the organization of "newspaper reading groups" by the party branches. These groups make it virtually compulsory for literate people to read newspapers regularly, they give the illiterate access to newspapers by providing a means by which papers can be read to them, and they make it possible for party workers to control, to a great extent, what newspapers receive the widest circulation. According to the People's Daily (Peking) of January 20, 1955, in 1952 there were some 100,000 such groups, composed of more than 1,500,000 persons, in Shansi Province alone.

On July 22, 1955, Chu Hsueh-fan, Minister of Postal and Tele-Communications, was able to report to the Second Session of the National People's Congress that from 1950 on there had been a 408 per cent increase in the total number of newspaper subscriptions,⁶⁹ even though up to the summer of 1955 nearly one-fourth of the nation's administrative villages (an administrative village is comprised of several geographical villages) had no postal service. The remaining administrative villages' post offices had to ask private travelers to take newspapers to many subscribers, since the postal services did not extend beyond the geographical villages in which the governments of the administrative villages were situated. These limitations in postal services led the regime in April, 1956 to change its newspaper distribution policy.⁷⁰ Instead of relying exclusively upon the post offices, the regime now ordered the establishment of special agencies to help handle newspaper subscriptions. Meanwhile, party committees on various levels were instructed to enlist the aid of consumers' cooperatives and retail stores and to erect newsstands for selling newspapers in the street.

Shortly after the adoption of the new policy, some 15,000 newspaper sales agents were appointed to serve the metropolitan and industrial cities.⁷¹ In June, 1958 the People's Daily an-

nounced that the nation's press had already organized a nationwide newspaper distribution network employing over 300,000 people.⁷² The paper, however, did not indicate if the figure included postal workers handling newspaper subscriptions.

For nearly seven years newspapers distributed to staff members in government, the party, mass organizations, state enterprises, and the armed forces, as well as to teachers and students, were paid for out of the funds of the respective agencies or organizations. The newspapers thus distributed probably constituted a large proportion of the total subscriptions in the country as a whole. This policy was changed when, on August 9, 1956, the State Council issued a directive calling upon all public organizations except the village people's councils, rural elementary schools, and the armed forces to discontinue newspaper subscriptions for their employees on October 1st of that year.⁷³ Meanwhile leading officials and party secretaries of all public organizations were told to "urge and advise" their subordinates or colleagues to subscribe to newspapers with their own money.

On August 15, 1956 an editorial in the People's Daily gave the reasons for the adoption of the new policy. It was felt that public officials were now able to pay for their own newspaper subscriptions, since they were receiving regular salaries instead of the former meager rations of daily necessities, and it was hoped that once public officials subscribed to newspapers at their own expense, they would cherish them more and read them more carefully.

In a further effort to increase newspaper readership the government brought about a nation-wide reduction of subscription rates, although the prices of basic commodities showed no downward trend.⁷⁴ As a result of the rate reductions, the monthly subscription fee for the People's Daily, the chief organ of the central authorities of the party and the government, is now JMP \$2.00; the previous rate was JMP \$2.40. The retail price for a single issue of the same paper is now JMP \$0.07 instead of JMP \$0.10.⁷⁵ The Enlightenment Daily (Peking), regularly published in four pages only, has a current monthly subscription rate of JMP \$1.20 instead of JMP \$1.50, and the price for a single issue is JMP \$0.04 rather than JMP \$0.05.⁷⁶

In other words, the rate reductions generally ranged from approximately 16 to 30 per cent.

Present Circulation of Newspapers

At present, the average newspaper on the county level has a reported circulation of several hundred copies per issue,⁷⁷ although newspapers with wider geographical bases generally have a larger circulation. In fact, some of the nation's leading newspapers print more than 100,000 copies daily.⁷⁸ As of June, 1958 the total circulation of all newspapers printed in the country was 15 million copies per issue, almost a five-fold increase over the 3 million copies per issue in 1951.⁷⁹ There is now one newspaper for every forty persons, whereas the ratio in 1951 was one to every 274 persons.

In addition to the general attempt to increase newspaper circulation, the Communists have been making a special effort to develop newspaper subscriptions among industrial and agricultural workers. By the spring of 1950 workers' subscriptions were said to account for 47 per cent of the subscriptions to the Liberation Daily in Shanghai.⁸⁰ In 1952, while only one out of every eighty-four inhabitants in East China subscribed to a newspaper, one out of every nine workers in Shanghai had a copy of the Shanghai Daily Worker [Kung-jen Pao] delivered at his home every day.⁸¹

Problems in Book Distribution

The attention currently given to building up a national book distribution network is unprecedented in Chinese history.

The Hsin-hua Book Company, which performs this task for the whole nation, is regarded by some as an unwieldy organization clogged by red tape, inertia, and maladministration.⁸² According to one writer, the company has more administrative personnel than salesmen,⁸³ and it is claimed that most of the administrators and salesmen are incompetent. Another writer charges that the general educational level of most of the company's nearly 34,000 employees is that of the upper primary school; a small number

have attained the level of middle school graduates, a few are at undergraduate levels and fewer still at college-graduate level.⁸⁴

A more serious defect of the company, however, is said to be the attitude of its salesmen, who regard themselves as "officials." It is reported that the salesmen's arrogance, discourtesy, and impatience often make customers uncomfortable, and that consequently many people tend to shun the bookstores completely.⁸⁵ Such defects have, of course, hampered the regime's utilization of publications as a medium of propaganda and indoctrination.

Even so, as of July, 1957 the Hsin-hua Book Company had 3,450 branches, sub-branches, and book kiosks in cities and towns,⁸⁶ an astonishing number given the charges against it. Before 1956 there were several thousand privately-owned bookstores in the urban districts, but by now most of them have been converted into sales agencies of the Hsin-hua Book Company; the company is also trying to extend its influence to used-book stores and book rental stands, the number of which in Shanghai alone was over 2,500 in August, 1955.⁸⁷

By January, 1956 the Hsin-hua Book Company also had over 4,000 roving salesmen in the countryside.⁸⁸ In order to make it easier for rural readers to buy publications, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs and the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives issued a joint directive on January 30, 1956 calling upon the nation's 27,000 supply and marketing cooperatives and 200,000 dry goods retail stores to help sell books and periodicals.⁸⁹ In the meantime, the Hsin-hua Book Company was instructed to seek the cooperation of the Communist party branch secretaries, youth corps organizations, labor unions, peasant associations, Houses of Culture, and reading rooms in the distribution of publications.⁹⁰ Subscriptions to periodicals, like newspaper subscriptions, have been handled by the post offices since March, 1950.

The existence of such an extensive book distributing network, however, does not necessarily mean that the Communists are able to sell their publications easily. On the contrary, they seem to be having considerable trouble not only in selling books and periodicals but even in finding non-paying readers. For instance, an editorial in the People's Daily of December 12, 1956

said that in that year the Popular Readings Press had published 1,700,000 copies of The Agricultural Development Plan Illustrated, but had been able to sell only 200,000.

More information on the poor sales of the Communist publications was given by officials of the publishing industry who attended the symposia on publications held in Shanghai and Peking early in 1957. During 1956, according to Sun Li-kung, Deputy Manager of the Shanghai Branch of the Hsin-hua Book Company, the bookstores in the country failed to sell, among other items, 13,500,000 copies of Three Major Documents on the Agricultural Cooperative Movement, and 3,300,000 copies of Selected Readings on the Socialist Upsurge in the Countryside.⁹¹

As newspaper prices were lowered to increase circulation, the prices of books and periodicals have been repeatedly reduced to increase sales. Since 1952 there has been a price reduction every year and, as a result, prices of most books and periodicals are now more than 70 per cent lower than in 1952,⁹² although there has been no reduction at all in publishing costs. No similar price reductions have been made in any other merchandise except when production costs have been reduced.

The difficulty in marketing publications is indicated also by the distributing agents' use of compulsory selling methods for both books and periodicals. Since 1953 it has not been uncommon for local post offices to pressure people into magazine subscriptions, and the state-owned bookstores often resort to compulsory sales methods. For example, in February, 1956 the Wu-hsi branch office of the Hsin-hua Book Company caused the local bureau of education to require every elementary school pupil to buy from four to five copies of the so-called Supplementary Readings.⁹³ The education bureau suggested that pupils of well-to-do families should help their poor schoolmates buy the books when the latter could not afford to make such purchases themselves. In another county where there were less than 36,000 pupils, the local branch office of the Hsin-hua Book Company used the same method to sell more than 500,000 copies of similar readings.⁹⁴ Obviously such sales methods would not be needed if there were a sufficient natural demand for books and magazines.

The free use of Communist publications also seems to lag behind expectations; more people rent non-Communist books from used-book stores or sidewalk book stands than go to public libraries, Houses of Culture, and reading rooms where Communist publications can be borrowed without cost. In Peking, for example, the used-book stores and sidewalk book stands renting non-Communist books have over 15,000 customers a day whereas the public libraries, Houses of Culture, and reading rooms in the city have a daily readership of less than 5,000.⁹⁵ According to another report, books on the shelves of children's reading rooms throughout the country attract little attention from the youngsters, but in Shanghai alone over 50,000 children every day patronize the used-book stores or sidewalk book stands renting "reactionary, obscene and preposterous books" published during the "pre-liberation" days.⁹⁶ Most of the books sold in such stores or stalls are comics, stories of violent action, or romances; all are copiously illustrated, with a minimum of text, and require little reading ability. The preference for the non-Communist books is being combatted. In January, 1958 the Ministry of Cultural Affairs issued a directive instructing local governments to strengthen their influence over the book-renting trade, and announcing that those who chose to carry on with the printing, selling, and renting of "poisonous books" which have been banned would be punished in accordance with the "Regulations Concerning Punishment for Breach of Security Control."⁹⁷

It would not be accurate to infer, however, that the Communist publication policy is essentially a failure, or that Communist publications are not read by many people on the Mainland. Under the Communist regime millions of people, including party members, government officials, and persons belonging to various mass organizations, are regularly obliged to study Communist literature and often required to take notes and write comments on the material they read. In addition, over 85 million pupils and students in the schools of various levels use Communist-written textbooks daily. These facts, together with the regime's increasing efforts to prevent the reading of non-Communist publications, make it amply clear that any complacency about the Communists' effective use of publications as a political weapon would be a mistake.

Other Methods of Increasing Readership

In its effort to reach as many people as possible the regime has worked to establish and extend the habit of reading in various ways. One such quite effective method is the supplementing of printed newspapers by mimeographed newspapers, hand-written wall newspapers, and countless blackboard newspapers in small villages and settlements, factories, schools, public organizations, cooperative farms, and all the company units of the People's Liberation Army. Like the printed newspapers, these special newspapers are organs of the party, government, or other public organizations in their respective localities, and have regular editors, editorial boards, and correspondents. The local party branches keep a watchful eye on their operation and development, and from time to time issue new instructions and regulations to coordinate their efforts.

The importance of these special newspapers cannot be overlooked. Since by the middle of 1958 the printed newspapers in the country had a total circulation of approximately 15 million copies per issue only, the Communists have made maximum use of the special newspapers for propaganda and agitation. Like the oral agitators and propagandists, the wall and blackboard newspapers are both flexible and adaptable in mass communication. They are particularly well-suited to agitation work since they are responsive to immediate situations. For example, they can deal effectively with production problems by seizing upon the most appropriate opportunities to criticize indifferent workers and praise efficient ones.

By coordinating the drive to increase newspaper subscriptions with the campaign to increase literacy among the peasants, the regime seems to have achieved some success in rural areas. For example, while in 1954 there was only one newspaper subscription for each 325 rural residents,⁹⁸ in 1955 there was one subscription for each 210 persons.⁹⁹

Although there are no exact figures available on the current ratio of newspaper subscriptions in the rural population, the Communists announced that as of June, 1958 the office of every cooperative farm in the country was receiving newspapers

regularly, and every production team of the cooperative farms subscribed to at least one paper.¹⁰⁰ Computed on the number of rural inhabitants making up the average agricultural production team, the present ratio of newspaper subscriptions is probably one copy of a paper to every 130 people.

If every agricultural production team gets at least one daily copy of a paper, the newspapers today are more evenly circulated among the peasant population than they used to be. Earlier a Communist writer reported that in July, 1954 rural residents in Mi County, Honan Province, subscribed to over 4,000 copies of newspapers, whereas the peasants in Nan-yang County of the same province subscribed to only five copies, although Nan-yang County was more densely populated.¹⁰¹

TREATMENT OF PROFESSIONAL WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS

Supply of Trained Personnel in the Publishing Industry

A major problem in the publishing industry is the lack of competent personnel. In 1956, according to a Communist report, there were about 9,690 employees in the 101 publishing houses in the country, and of this figure about 3,730 were editors.¹⁰² The ratio between non-editorial and editorial staff in the business is roughly 3 to 1 (5 to 1 in Shanghai). These figures show the scarcity of editors in relation to non-editorial personnel, but a more serious problem is the quality of the editors. According to Shu Hsin-ch'eng, only one-fifth of the over 3,000 editors in the publishing industry "can work independently."¹⁰³ There are even fewer editors capable of preparing publication of classical works. The number of non-editorial staff workers in the publishing houses is large, but in general their quality is even lower than that of the editors. This personnel problem is one more complicating factor in the already troubled publishing industry.

Another cause of difficulty is the author-remuneration system. In 1949 the Communist regime abolished the copyright and royalty payment regulations. The publishing houses now pay lump sums for writings at rates for limited periods only. This has led to a reduction in the amount of good writing, for it fails to provide

sufficient incentive to authors of books with a wide circulation, and encourages money-minded writers to care more for immediate acceptability to the publishers than for the quality of their writing.

The book printing and distribution agencies also suffer from deficiencies attributable in large part to a lack of properly-qualified personnel: the printing works have been blamed for lack of concern with quality, and for not cooperating with the publishing houses. They have also been criticized for waste and inefficiency.¹⁰⁴ The complaints directed at the distributing houses stem, to some extent, from the same cause.

Supply of Trained Personnel in the Press

The Chinese Communist press has a number of special personnel problems. The literary style of the press as a whole is poor. Popular discontent with this state of affairs must have reached serious proportions, or Mao Tse-tung would not have found it necessary to tell editors of newspapers and periodicals that many of their articles and stories were "overloaded with party jargon, . . . trite, unimaginative, and unreadable," and that they should aim at immediate improvement.¹⁰⁵

Many newspapers are handicapped by a lack of well-trained editors and correspondents. As a tool for indoctrination, the press needs personnel with diversified knowledge. The task of disseminating information about advanced techniques in industry and agriculture requires writers and editors who are themselves possessed of adequate specialized training and experience. Lacking it, they may make serious errors: the People's Daily once noted that as a result of being told by newspapers it is always good to apply a large quantity of manure on their land, some farmers over-fertilized and the seeds of certain crops failed to sprout at all. The same article reported that many stories on industrial production were "laughable to the specialist and unintelligible to the layman."¹⁰⁶ Such errors and inadequacies can only be avoided by properly trained personnel.

The most serious problem facing the Chinese Mainland press today, however, is the demoralization that results from restric-

tions imposed upon the editorial staff, especially on those of newspapers on the provincial level and below. Hemmed in by regulations and fearful of committing political errors, editors are strongly inclined to play safe. They hesitate to take any initiative in writing editorials or editorial articles on the regime's policies or important events, even though this is part of their assigned duty. The People's Daily made a survey of twenty-seven newspapers on the lower levels in 1950 and reported that eighteen of them carried editorials no more often than once every two days.¹⁰⁷ On November 28, 1954 the same newspaper disclosed that in the first six months of that year the Chekiang Daily [Chekiang Jih-Pao], a provincial newspaper in Hangchow, carried only twelve editorials of its own, and that none touched upon anything of socio-political significance.¹⁰⁸

As a result of these and other problems, the Communist press of Mainland China is considerably handicapped in its effectiveness as a political instrument.

Political Pressures on Writers

In an atmosphere of political control even the disputes of literary people tend to degenerate into questions of political dogma or party discipline. Thus, in the fall of 1954, an interpretation of the Dream of the Red Chamber [Hung-low Meng], one of China's outstanding eighteenth-century novels, created considerable turmoil. The affair started as a simple question of literary criticism and historical research. The principal figure in the controversy was Professor Yu P'ing-po, long recognized as a leading authority on the Dream of the Red Chamber. In his numerous works he had interpreted the novel as "enigmatic, non-committal and naturalistic, and not primarily a criticism of [eighteenth-century] society." At this time, one of his earlier works was reissued with minor revisions,¹⁰⁹ and for a while the new edition was warmly received by readers and critics alike.

Then, in September and October of 1954, Professor Yu found himself under violent attack. Two young writers, Lin Hsi-fan and Lan Ling, reviewed his book and condemned Yu for his

concept of the nature of the novel. They contended that the Dream of the Red Chamber was a masterpiece of realism, an authentic reflection of eighteenth-century Chinese society.

They also objected to Yu's method of research, saying that he attached undue importance to textual criticism and made it an end in itself. His statement that "there is no objective standard in literary criticism" was taken as a device to "blur the class nature of literature": they asserted that literary criticism is a socio-political weapon and must be used as such. They charged further that Yu's "art for art's sake" approach led him to study the novel as a matter of personal interest, and to entangle himself in isolated incidents and details and ignore the social and historical background of the novel.

Shortly a stream of articles appeared in the People's Daily endorsing the views of the two young writers. Their criticisms were praised as the "first valuable shot fired against the ideology and methodology of the bourgeoisie in thirty years."¹¹⁰ There ensued a vigorous campaign against "bourgeois idealism" in literature, and for six months newspapers and literary magazines all over the country vied with one another in expressing righteous indignation over Yu's misinterpretations. They were joined by literary circles. On October 24th the classical literature department of the Chinese Writers Union held a forum in Peking that was attended by forty-nine writers and scores of newsmen and spectators. During the seven-hour session nineteen speakers criticized Yu's "idealistic" viewpoint and research methods. The presidium of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art and the presidium of the Writers Union held eight joint meetings during the last three months of 1954 to discuss the same matter.

The unfortunate Yu eventually "confessed":

I started from the standpoint of personal interest and failed to grasp fully the socio-political nature of the novel. I failed to stand on historical materialism . . . I am grateful for the various articles criticizing me.¹¹¹

The campaign against Yu had many ramifications. From the very beginning it involved the Wen-i Pao [Literary Gazette], an

official organ of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art. The Wen-i Pao had rejected the review of Yu's book when the two young writers submitted it, but reprinted it after it appeared in a Shantung University journal. When it reprinted the article, the Wen-i Pao prefaced it with derogatory remarks about the authors, saying that they were young men with obviously immature opinions. During the public condemnation of Yu's mistakes the Wen-i Pao was severely reprimanded; in a strongly-worded editorial the People's Daily charged it with an arrogant attitude toward young writers and "capitulation to bourgeois idealism." ¹¹² At a joint conference on December 8, 1954 the Federation and the Writers Union resolved, as a result of this incident, to reorganize the editorial board of the Wen-i Pao. ¹¹³

Also implicated in the case of Yu P'ing-po was Hu Shih, the foremost liberal scholar in modern China, who had played an important part in the so-called Chinese Renaissance early in this century. Identifying Hu as a mentor of Yu, those who attended the joint presidium of the two literary organizations said that "to criticize bourgeois idealism in the study of the Dream of the Red Chamber, we must further make all-out criticisms of the reactionary ideology of Hu Shih." ¹¹⁴ Soon the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Writers Union decided to hold joint forums to criticize Hu's political, philosophical, and historical views. From December, 1954 to February, 1955 fifteen such meetings were held, six devoted to the discussion of Hu's philosophy, one to his political views, one to his History of Chinese Philosophy, and seven to his interpretation of the Dream of the Red Chamber.

The anti-Hu Shih campaign soon spread to the institutions of higher learning and local literary organizations throughout the country, accompanied by a torrent of criticism in newspapers and periodicals. The critics attacked Hu as a salesman of idealism, a peddler of John Dewey's pragmatism, an anti-Communist, a protector of the interests of warlords, and a representative of the bourgeoisie serving the interests of imperialism. He was also condemned for his denial of the class nature of literature and for his bad influence on young people and

intellectuals who were taken in by his "reformism," his "formalism," and his individualism.

The next victim of the Dream of the Red Chamber was Hu Feng. A veteran Communist and a prominent figure in left-wing literary circles ever since the 1920's, he was at the time of his downfall a member of the National Committee of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art and a delegate to the National People's Congress. It is believed that for some time he had been on bad terms with Chou Yang, then Vice-Minister of Cultural Affairs and thus primarily responsible for the supervision of literary activities.¹¹⁵ In the course of the Dream of the Red Chamber controversy Hu Feng complained at a session of the Federation that the Wen-i Pao and the People's Daily were interfering with literary production by their policies. The attack on him started at once, led by Chou Yang, who accused him of rejecting Marxism under the guise of scholarship and of advocating "subjective fighting spirit and of assuming a nihilistic attitude toward China's literary heritage."¹¹⁶

The attack was taken up by writers and college professors, and accompanied by many articles and letters to the editor in the press. The Minister of Cultural Affairs, Shen Yen-ping, accused him of concealing bourgeois idealism under the cloak of Marxism and said his activities were aimed at forming factions within the literary front.¹¹⁷ Shen felt that his attitude was more deceptive and pernicious than that of Hu Shih because it was expressed in Marxist terminology.

The Hu Feng affair was, throughout, particularly bitter because it was in essence an intra-party conflict between the left-wing liberals in the organization and the more doctrinaire party-liners. This is shown clearly in the excerpts from Hu's letters published by the People's Daily.¹¹⁸ He had opposed party control of literary magazines as early as the Sino-Japanese War, and was against compulsory political study for writers. In direct opposition to Mao Tse-tung, he contended that a good writer could produce good works so long as he was faithful to the principles of his art, whether he held a reactionary world view or not, and that it was not necessary that he be a Marxist or serve a political function. Hu Feng had consistently encouraged his friends to

fight for their independence as writers and resist the political pressures exerted against them, showing scorn for both the party functionaries and writers who submitted. In letters written after the "liberation," Hu argued against the monopoly of mass media. He felt that people should not be restricted to hearing only one side of any argument, and that the controls were being used to maintain party functionaries in their positions of authority.

Despite his prestige, Hu Feng eventually yielded to the pressures against him, and on May 13, 1955 the People's Daily published his lengthy confession. He reversed his position completely, admitted his errors, and pledged to reform himself under the direction of the party with the continued aid of his comrades. The confession did not satisfy the People's Daily, however, which called for a continuation of the campaign. On May 18th it published articles by a formidable list of literary and scientific celebrities — Lao She, Ts'ao Yu, Ou-yang Yu-ching, Mao I-sheng — all expressing equal dissatisfaction. After a further flurry of letters to the editor, the joint presidium of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art and the Chinese Writers Union met on May 25th and expelled him from both organizations. They labeled him a counterrevolutionary and urged the Supreme People's Protectorate to bring proceedings against him.¹¹⁹ He was shortly arrested and imprisoned.

Another controversy which had its inception in the Dream of the Red Chamber affair concerned Ting Ling and Ch'en Ch'ih-sia. Ting had been a party member since 1932 and was the winner of a Stalin Prize for Literature in 1951, and Ch'en was associate editor of the Wen-i Pao when it defended the literary attitudes of Yu P'ing-po. Ting Ling had come forward in Ch'en's defense when he sided with Yu.¹²⁰ Although the Red Chamber incident occurred at the end of 1954, it was not until August, 1955 that the party committee in the Writers Union took definitive action against the two in the form of a condemnatory resolution. They were comprehensively charged with refusing to accept the party's guidance and violating its literary policies, of forming anti-party factions in defiance of party discipline, of causing dissension and being disloyal to their comrades, and of

promoting the "cult of the individual" and encouraging bourgeois individualism.¹²¹ Their case, like that of Hu Feng, was essentially one of intra-party conflict.

As a result of the Writers Union resolution Ting Ling was removed from her editorship of the literary journal Jen-min Wen-hsueh [People's Literature], and Ch'en was no longer associate editor of the Wen-i Pao, but there the disciplinary action stopped. Ch'en remained on the executive councils of the two publications, and Ting Ling remained a member of the National People's Congress, member of the presidium of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art, and vice-chairman of the Writers Union. Thus matters stood until the "contending and blooming" of 1957, when it would appear that Miss Ting and Ch'en led their group in a counterattack on the party faction in the Writers Union. They demanded withdrawal of the 1955 resolution against them, and criticized the Union's handling of cases of counterrevolutionaries in 1956, urging writers to act "boldly" and "settle accounts" with party functionaries in literary circles.¹²²

The party committee of the Writers Union, of course, struck back, this time with full publicity. From June 6 to September 17, 1956 it held twenty-seven "expanded conferences" in Peking which were attended by writers, artists, party representatives, and government officials in numbers up to 1,350.¹²³ Some 140 participants spoke out in defense of socialist literature and the preservation of unity among literary circles. The three major targets were Ting Ling, Ch'en Ch'i-hsia, and Feng Hsueh-feng. Feng, then vice-chairman of the Writers Union and editor-in-chief of the People's Literary Press, had taken part in the famous Long March, but had been editor of the Wen-i Pao at the time of the Dream of the Red Chamber incident.

The three were held accountable for anti-party activities dating back to their earliest participation in the Communist literary movement; their reactionary backgrounds and attitudes, it was felt, made them a serious threat to socialist literature, and they should be thoroughly exposed and shown the error of their ways for their own good and that of anyone to whom they had served as bad examples.¹²⁴

Ting Ling's history of error was traced chronologically. Her self-centeredness, arrogance, and pessimism were attributed to her "feudalistic family background."¹²⁵ An early novel, Sa-fei Nu-shih Ti Jen-chi [Miss Sophia's Diary], 1928, was presumed to show her an exponent of dishonesty, treachery, and deceit, and it was charged that she had never repudiated this evil philosophy.¹²⁶ She was accused of having defected to the Kuomintang after her arrest in May, 1933; she had continued to live with her husband, who had betrayed the party and joined the Kuomintang's secret service.¹²⁷ Though the party had taken her back when she arrived in Yen-an in 1936, and had repeatedly placed her in important positions and entrusted her with serious responsibilities, she had been too proud of her abilities as a writer to hold the party in proper respect, and had tended to be critical of it.¹²⁸ Thus, when she wrote an article in 1942 in celebration of Women's Day, she had said, "In the old society, when a girl got into trouble in a love affair she had at least the sympathy of some people, but in the new society she is usually told that she deserves the penalty."¹²⁹ In the same year she had published, in her capacity as editor of the literary supplement of the official party newspaper in Yen-an, articles written by Wang Shih-wei, a prominent writer on the staff of the Communist Central Academy. Wang's series, called "The White Wild Lily," had caused his subsequent expulsion from the party; according to the official charges they contained fabrications designed to discredit the party leadership in Yen-an. It was now said that Ting Ling must have agreed with Wang, or she would not have published the articles.¹³⁰ After the party came to power in 1949 Ting had been appointed to more important posts, including that of director of the party's Bureau of Literary Affairs, but she had spent her time forming personal factions, regarding the agencies under her direction as "independent kingdoms" that should not be interfered with. Here once more her bourgeois individualism was at fault, and she was attempting to become "the leader" in literary areas.¹³¹

The speakers showed particular feeling over Ting's remark during the "contending and blooming" that she was a "tenant farmer" — a remark implying that she was oppressed by the

party (the landlord).¹³² She showed, indeed, a remarkably vigorous defiance throughout the conferences, in contrast to the meek compliance of many of her male colleagues, and despite the penalties for resistance. According to the official reports, on the first few occasions when she was called on to confess at the conferences she continued her battle against the party leadership; when she finally did make a confession, it was said to be "ambiguous and evasive, . . . glossing over important issues and dwelling on trivial matters."¹³³ The "expanded conferences" were discontinued before she had made a suitable recantation, but the party faction vowed to continue the campaign against her until she had confessed all her "criminal activities." Meanwhile she was stripped of her positions in the government, the party, and the literary organizations.

The case against Ch'en Ch'i-hsia was closely linked to Ting Ling's. Essentially the charges centered on his support of the anti-party faction in literary affairs. As associate editor of the Wen-i Pao from 1949 to 1954 he had, it was said, slighted young writers and published "dogmatic and churlish" articles of literary criticism. When reprimanded he had made only vague confessions, had become increasingly resentful¹³⁴ and, like Ling, had "slandered" the literary party leaders, saying among other things that they had intended to destroy the Wen-i Pao. In April, 1955 he had allegedly sent anonymous letters to the central party headquarters, complaining that the disciplinary measures against him were based on one-sided reports made by informants with personal grudges, and saying that some functionaries were more belligerent toward party members than toward its enemies.¹³⁵ He had joined with Ting Ling in a statement that they would renounce their membership in the Writers Union if they did not get fair treatment at the expanded conferences.¹³⁶ Ch'en attempted to defend himself for awhile, but soon gave an account of his "criminal activities" and pledged to reform.

Feng Hsueh-feng, the third target of the expanded conferences, was mainly guilty, it would seem, of being consistently on the wrong side in intra-party battles. The immediate cause of the charges against him was his support of the Ting-Ch'en faction: as the alleged "idea man" for the clique he had been guilty of

anti-party activities, it was said, and during the "contending and blooming" he had attempted to stir up a "big storm" in the People's Literary Press.¹³⁷ Feng's long history in the party, however, gave the opposition a good deal of further ammunition.

In 1936 he had been sent from Yen-an to Shanghai, where he brought that "anti-party element," Hu Feng, into the underground party organization; thus, it was charged, he was disruptive of the Communist-led literary movement there. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Feng suddenly left Shanghai for Chekiang without permission because of strained relations with the party leader of the underground literary circle. This was held to be tantamount to desertion.¹³⁸ When he rejoined the party Feng continued his anti-party activities, said his accusers: in Chungking in 1944-1945 he once more allied himself with the rebellious Hu Feng,¹³⁹ sharing with him revisionist and anti-Marxist views. He questioned the necessity of compulsory Marxist training for writers and the advisability of combining "socialist content" with "national forms." He was quoted as saying that "the true socialist literature is invariably international in form as well as in content," and denied that there were any worthwhile literary works in the Communist-controlled areas either before or after the founding of the People's Republic.¹⁴⁰ Not content with sharing Hu Feng's literary views, Feng was charged with supporting him actively. In 1945 he defended him against the charges made by "revolutionary writers" in Chungking at secret meetings; he supported his views openly in an article when Hu objected to Mao's statement that literature should be at the service of politics. He defended Hu again when the Communist literary underground in Hong Kong criticized him, and was conspicuously silent during the anti-Hu Feng campaign in 1955.¹⁴¹

His non-literary attitudes were also criticized: he was said to be pessimistic and nihilistic. He had often described the Long March and the intra-party struggles to young people as dreadful events, and remarked to Ch'en Ch'i-hsia after the 1956 Hungarian revolt that mankind was hopeless.¹⁴² His sentimental attachment to personal friends and his pessimistic views had led him on the road to reaction, to bourgeois idealism, and bourgeois individualism; his trouble-making during the "contending and

blooming" and his attempts to shelter "rightists" in the subsequent anti-rightist campaign were felt to be the natural results of his heretical views. Feng eventually submitted to the pressures against him and accepted the indictments, promising to dedicate himself anew to socialist literature.

Although the faction headed by Ting Ling, Ch'en Ch'i-hsia, and Feng Hsueh-feng may have been the most integrated focus of opposition to party literary principles, other dissidents remained. From November 13, 1957 to February 12, 1958 the party committee in the General Political Department of the People's Army sponsored twenty-five public meetings to "expose and criticize" Ch'en I, noted writer and former director of the Cultural Division of the General Political Department.¹⁴³ Ch'en I was identified as "a right-winger within the party, guilty of the serious crime of opposing the party and socialism, a bourgeois individualist, a careerist of the meanest type, and a double-faced opportunist from beginning to end."

Next in line was Ch'in Chao-yang,¹⁴⁴ former editor-in-chief of the Jen-min Wen-hsueh in 1956-1957. The fight against him was led by the party committee of the Writers Union in 1958; he was the subject of an undisclosed number of "expanded conferences." The tenor of the charges against him makes it plain that, like Ting Ling and her faction, he had resisted the party policy on literature: he was said to have resisted party leadership and supervision, to have taken advantage of his editorship to propagate literary revisionism, and to have urged writers to "free themselves from the heavy shackles of dogmatism." He had said that writers, as a result of the party's policy, were "apprehensive, ill at ease and always cautious, lest someone grasp their queues from behind." The charges sum up, in a flurry of exasperated language, the extent to which he had offended the majority faction: he had "cast aspersions on party leadership and party functionaries," had committed "sabotage against harmony between the party and the masses, and between the new and old functionaries," and disseminated "words and arguments for disunity and dissension, with the intent of undermining socialist construction."

Shao Chuan-lin, secretary of the party committee of the Writers Union, presented at the final session of the conferences the

majority view of literature and the function of writers as the party sees it: since revisionist ideas had exerted influence in literary and artistic circles, especially among the young, it was very important to continue intensive and systematic criticism of all unorthodox views, and to defend the party policy and Marxist-Leninist principles in literature and the arts.

Effect of the Government Policy on Quality of Literary Output

The campaign against any erring writer is easily extended to other writers and intellectuals, and thus serves as a starting-point for a general house-cleaning. The writers not caught in such a campaign are forcibly reminded by such incidents of their own vulnerability. The over-all result of such a policy is conformity in publicly expressed political attitudes, and to the extent that individualism is lost, literary quality suffers. The many rules and taboos governing intellectual expression create a climate of insecurity made worse by their frequent changes and apparent caprice. An author's manuscript is, of necessity, submitted to a publisher who is also a censor, and any detected deviation is likely to result in a demand for doctrinal reform. Even a published work may later prove unacceptable in the light of changed official attitudes, and its author and publisher be held accountable for its errors of omission or commission. Thus, when Su Chi-ts'ang's work on public finance was denounced as an exposition of bourgeois economics, he was forced to confess his errors, and the Hsin-chao Press, who had published the book, had to go out of business.¹⁴⁵ Under these circumstances both authors and publishers have learned the wisdom of playing safe. The author resorts to the safe and familiar clichés or dogmas, and the publisher finds that accepting a manuscript loaded with party jargon is less risky than a work containing possibly dangerous originality of thought. Many authors have, in fact, given up writing entirely in recent years.

Statements made by writers and editors, all Communists of some stature, make clear the general reaction to the enforced restrictions of the regime. Liu Yen-ping, associate editor of Chinese Youth [Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao], said:

There are too many rules and taboos. This has made editorial writing an extremely painful task. Inhibited from expressing one's own views, and obliged to follow party lines and directives at every turn, an editor feels as if he were ghost-writing other people's speeches.¹⁴⁶

Yang Fan, a reporter on the Peking Daily [Peking Jih-pao], said "Editors and reporters are always cautious, even during private conversations, lest the activists record and report their words to higher authorities as a kitchen god supposedly does in a household."¹⁴⁷ Ai Ch'ing, a noted poet, remarked that "people in literary circles fall into two categories: those whose task it is to rectify others, and those who are targets for rectification."¹⁴⁸ The dismay with which the writers view the present situation was clearly shown by Liu Shao-t'ang, once called the "young genius" by the Communists:

The state of affairs in literary circles is much worse at present than it was in the past: writers now have no freedom of expression at all; old party functionaries are ferocious, dreadful, and nasty, behaving like local bullies, evil demons, or termagants.¹⁴⁹

A statement summing up the writer's present position was made by Yao Hsueh-yin, well-known novelist:

[The] policy toward literature and art is a deadly one. It has made writers over-cautious and over-timid in expressing themselves. While writing, they often feel as if they were on the brink of an abyss or treading on thin ice. They are always fearful of party functionaries, who have made themselves "defenders of the faith."¹⁵⁰

The dreariness of the conformist literature may account for considerable reader-resistance to the Chinese Communist publications. Undoubtedly various other factors, including the unsolved problems of distribution and sales methods, contribute to keep sales volume low. While these are gradually being

overcome, the rigid organization and supervision of the press and publishing industry, added to the intimidation of the authors, remain constant stumbling-blocks. They result in a determination never to step out of line and a willingness to turn out inoffensive hack-work.

As the People's Daily has indicated, a large proportion of what the publishing industry calls books are really not books at all, but small pamphlets, dogmatic in theme and mediocre in style.¹⁵¹ Actually, many of the pamphlets are simply crude compilations of articles, official speeches or official regulations that have already appeared in newspapers and periodicals.

It is reported by the Communists themselves that while there is an acute shortage of Chinese classical literature, school texts, scholarly works, and regular reference books, publications designed to publicize Communist ideology and policies are in excessive supply.¹⁵² Lack of good works in other fields of literary endeavor is also evident. In his report to the first plenary session of the Academic Council of Philosophy and the Social Sciences of the reconstructed Academia Sinica, the Council's vice-chairman, P'an Tzu-nien, said that the situation in philosophy and the social sciences is still worse, for "not a single text of high standard" has appeared in these fields since the "liberation."¹⁵³

While scientific and literary production in China is languishing, the government has lately authorized translations of foreign classics. A demand for significant reading materials exists, and translations of foreign authors are possibly less risky for publishers to handle than are contemporary Chinese works. Since 1956 the ban on Chinese translations of Western books has been partially lifted, even when the authors' views differ drastically from those of the Communists. According to a New China News Agency bulletin issued on April 30, 1957, certain publishing houses in Mainland China had been permitted to publish Chinese translations of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Spinoza's Ethics, Proudhon's What is Property, and Freud's General Introduction to Psychoanalysis; Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, and Mendel's Experiments in Plant Hybridization, both translated into Chinese, had already come

off the press. This acceptance of non-Marxist foreign authors is unlikely to indicate a basic change in the regime's policy. It is probably a measure of the necessary concessions to the demand for good literature, and may in addition reflect the world-wide Communist campaign to win the support of intellectuals by presenting themselves as heirs and upholders of world intellectual traditions, as was seen in meetings held under such auspices during the past three years in China celebrating Benjamin Franklin, Montesquieu, Shakespeare, and Tolstoi.

Conclusion

The developments in the Chinese publishing industry illustrate rather strikingly the intimate connection between political change and modernization. In some instances the Communist party appears to trigger technological and social and cultural change; in others it seizes upon an ongoing process of social reorganization and, by its intervention, exaggerates it.

Where the Communist movement is the prime initiator of a development, it has clearly the fullest control over it. Thus, the creation of a large newspaper-reading public is almost entirely the work of the Communists; their efforts grow out of their concern with communications in a period of industrialization and with political control over the emerging mass society. The reading public thus created by inducements and pressure has no traditions, no habits, no tastes formulated with respect to the press. Therefore, in shaping the content of press communications the Communists do not have to overcome the force of any habits except those present in the small group already accustomed to reading newspapers. Newspaper content thus reflects very closely the bureaucratic interests of those who exercise control over the industry, i.e., members of the party hierarchy. The papers serve as an advertising medium for organs of government, party organizations, and the many ancillary "mass organizations." Only a few individuals with intellectual appreciation register occasional protests against the dreariness of the press: characteristically, such protest comes from within the party, but there is no contest between the newspaper-

men as such and the communist bureaucracy. The newspaper profession is evidently so completely pliable because it is essentially a part of the bureaucracy and was created by fiat of the party.

The situation is somewhat different in book publishing. Here a literary tradition, a public hungry for good reading matter, and the presence of respected writers and critics with a classical background, provide some obstacles to the desires of the Communist bureaucracy. Moreover, Marxist doctrine commits the party to the position that the revolutionary classes are the legitimate heirs of the best in their country's literary and artistic past. Practical politics and traditional cultural orientations thus come into conflict, and lead to extended verbal battles and the eventual use of political and economic sanctions.

The case of the Dream of the Red Chamber illustrates this point rather neatly. The attack against Yu P'ing-po was launched by two young authors some time before the affair broke into the open as a subject of widespread national debate. Their article was suppressed by Communist literary magazines on the ground that it was unbecoming for two young, inexperienced authors to attack an established literary figure. In the subsequent debate, the same Communist magazines were accused of discriminating against young authors. Clearly the debate took place on more than one level: there was the question of social status, linked closely by Chinese tradition to considerations of age and reputation; there were questions of literary criticism in which the newer writers were pitted against the older ones; and there was the question of the significance of literary attitudes to political orientation. The Communist party was able to take advantage of the revolt of the younger writers to score points against the traditional literary leadership which it suspects — probably with good reason — of political disloyalty. At the same time, young writers, of little merit and ability yet firmly wedded to the party, have been able to take advantage of the party's fighting posture to advance their own careers. Literature, under such conditions, is bound to suffer.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. "The Information Administration's Regulations on the Use of News Releases of the New China News Agency by the Press" [Hsin-wen Tsung-shu Kuan-yu Pao-chih Ts'ai-yung Hsin-hua She Tien-hsin Ti Kuei-ting], People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], January 12, 1950.

2. Liao Kai-lung, "Newspapers and Magazines of the People's Republic of China" [Chung-hua Jen-min Kung-ho-kuo Ti Pao-k'an], Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao], May 20, 1955.

3. P'ang Chi-yun, "Some Problems Concerning the Reporting of Economic Construction Developments" [Ching-chi Chien-she Pao-tao Chung-ti Chi-ko Wen-t'i], People's Daily (Peking), March 24, 1954.

4. An English excerpt of Lu's speech may be found in Survey of China Mainland Press [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 1, 619 (September 27, 1957), pp. 3-6.

5. For its text, see People's Daily (Peking), April 22, 1950.

6. New China News Agency Release, May 4, 1958.

7. New China News Agency Release, March 19, 1954.

8. Ch'en Lu, "Our Cultural, Educational and Scientific Achievements Cannot Be Denied," Extracts from China Mainland Magazines [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 102 (October 7, 1957), p. 4.

9. People's Daily (Peking), May 3, 1954.

10. Yeh Sheng-t'ao, "Freedom of Publication Around the Time of Liberation," Extracts from China Mainland Magazines [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 111, (December 16, 1957), pp. 10-15.

11. People's Daily (Peking), October 26, 1954.

12. Ibid., November 29, 1955.

13. Yeh Sheng-t'ao, Note 10, supra.

14. Hu Yu-chih, "The Publishing Industry Serves the Broad Masses" [Ch'u-pan Kung-tso Wei Kuang-ta Jen-min Ch'un-chung Fu-wu], Liberation Daily (Shanghai) [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao], September 25, 1952.

15. People's Daily (Peking), May 6, 1954.

16. Hua1 Tzu, "Translating and Publishing More Standard Works of Foreign Authors" [Fan-1 Ch'u-pan Keng-to Ti Wai-kuo Yu-hsiu Chu-tsol, ibid., August 30, 1955.

17. Ibid., July 1, 1955.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., March 9, 1955.

22. The description of the New China News Agency is largely based upon information contained in Wang Chia-hua's "New China News Agency on the March: An Article in Commemoration of the Agency's 20th Anniversary," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1, 614 (September 20, 1957), pp. 3-7.

23. Another news agency, the China News Service [Chung-kuo Hsin-wen She] was established in October, 1952 with Chin Chung-hua, concurrently publisher of the Shanghai Daily News [Hsin-wen Jih-Pao], as its director. This agency provides Chinese language newspapers overseas with news bulletins on Chinese affairs.

24. See Fan Ch'ang-chiang's statement reported in the Liberation Daily (Shanghai), June 21, 1949.

25. See Kuo Mo-jo's report, "A Report on Cultural and Educational Affairs" [Kuan-yu Wen-hua Chiao-yu Kung-tso Ti Pao-kaol, People's Daily (Peking), June 20, 1950.

26. The inability of the privately-owned newspapers to follow an independent editorial policy was clearly demonstrated in 1957 by the abortive efforts of the non-Communist directors and editors of the Enlightenment Daily (Peking) and the Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai) [Wen-hui Pao] to use the two papers as forums for free discussion of public issues including the shortcomings and mistakes of the Communist regime. Although these non-Communist newsmen made the attempt only after Mao Tse-tung had delivered his famous speech of February 27, 1957, in which he invited public criticism of the party and government, they were denounced as rightists who were attempting to undermine the Communist leadership in order to restore bourgeois rule in China. Not only did the newsmen lose their newspaper positions, but they were expelled from all public organizations (including the National People's Congress, the State Council, and the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) in which some of them had served in one capacity or another. Though the Communist press has not given out any information on the present status of these people, it is generally believed that some are under house arrest, others are going

through the process of "reform through labor," and still others may have been liquidated.

When Yang Ming-hsuan of the Democratic League and Ch'en Tz'u-sheng of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee were appointed as the new director and editor-in-chief, respectively, of the Enlightenment Daily, they lost no time in pledging that "they would henceforth follow more closely the leadership of the Communist party." See New China News Agency Release, November 18, 1957.

27. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), December 25, 1952.

28. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), January 16, 1953.

29. People's Daily (Peking), January 1, 1950.

30. A newspaper is not allowed to carry ordinary commercial advertisements unless it has failed to achieve self-sufficiency through other means. Even in the latter case, a newspaper must still see to it that such advertising does not use up so much space as to affect adversely its propaganda and agitation functions. For further information of the businesslike management of newspapers, see Ma Chien-min, "How to Carry Out the Policy of Having Newspapers Managed on a Businesslike Basis" [Tsen-yang Kuan-ch'e Pao-chih Ching-ying Chi-yeh-hua Fang-chen], ibid., September 27, 1950.

31. Wang Chieh, "The Businesslike Management of the Tsingtao Daily" [Tsingtao Jih-Pao Ti Chi-yeh-hua Ching-ying], Liberation Daily (Shanghai), October 15, 1950.

32. People's Daily (Peking), March 16, 1949 and April 26, 1956.

33. Originally, Chinese newspapers set type vertically. As a preliminary step toward the replacement of the traditional characters by the Roman, the Communist regime decided in 1955 that all publications in the nation should be printed horizontally. On July 1, 1955, a limited number of newspapers, including the Enlightenment Daily (Peking), began to adopt the new typesetting practice. The People's Daily (Peking), the Ta-kung Daily (Tientsin) [Ta-kung Pao], and a host of other newspapers at the national and provincial levels abandoned the old style on January 1, 1956. It is believed that all the newspapers in Mainland China have adopted the new practice by now. See news item in People's Daily (Peking), December 23, 1955.

Since the adoption, in 1956, of simplified forms for some 600 Chinese characters, newspapers and other publications have been using such simplified characters along with those characters not yet simplified.

34. It appears that when there is no news from non-Communist countries that can be exploited for propaganda effect, a portion of this page is used for advertising the new products of the "socialist industry." See Note 54 of this chapter.

35. See Note 54, below.

36. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), September 23, 1955.

37. Kao Hsi, "On the Freedom of the Press," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1, 607 (September 11, 1957), p. 27.

38. Kuo Mo-jo, "A Report on Cultural and Educational Affairs" [Kuan-yu Wen-chiao Kung-tso Ti Pao-kaol], op. cit., Note 25, supra.

39. According to a survey made by the Publications Administration in the summer of 1950 in eleven principal cities there were 244 privately-owned publishing houses and six joint state- and privately-owned publishing houses. See Kuo's report cited above, Note 38.

40. People's Daily (Peking), November 1, 1950.

41. Yeh Sheng-t'ao, "Freedom of Publication Around the Time of Liberation," Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 111 (December 16, 1957), pp. 10-15.

42. Cf. Note 1, supra.

43. For its text, see People's Daily (Peking), August 19, 1952.

44. Hu Yu-chih, former head of the Publications Administration, once denied that there was any publication censorship system under the People's Government. See his report to the First National Conference on Publications, ibid., September 28, 1950.

45. China Handbook, 1950 (New York: Rockport Press, Inc., 1950), pp. 678-679.

46. For its Chinese text, see Chang Peng-chou, editor, People's Handbook, 1952 [Jen-min Shou-ts'e, 1952] (Shanghai: Ta-kung Pao She, 1952), pp. 235-237.

47. For its Chinese text, see ibid., pp. 39-40.

48. Art. 10 of the Regulations of the Chinese People's Republic on the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries.

49. "The Government Administrative Council's Provisional Regulations Concerning Unified Release of Important News Items by the Central People's Government and Its Subordinate Agencies" [Cheng-wu Yuan Kuan-yu T'ung-i Fa-pu Chung-yang Jen-min Cheng-fu Chi-ch'i So-shu Ko-chi-kuan Chung-yao Hsin-wen Ti Tsan-hsing Pan-fa, December 9, 1957], People's Daily (Peking), December 10, 1949.

50. "The Information Administration's Directive Concerning Examination of News Stories by Agencies or Individuals Principally Involved"

[Hsin-wen Tsung-shu Kuan-yu Hsin-wen Kao-chien Ying-chung Tang-shih-jen Shen-ho Ti Chih-shih], ibid., January 18, 1950.

51. Kao Kuang, "How Did the Chekiang Daily Strengthen Its Editorial Work?" [Chekiang Jih-Pao Shih Tsen-yang Chia-ch'iang P'ing-lun Kung-tso Ti], ibid., November 28, 1954.

52. Ta-kung Daily (Tientsin), June 1, 1952.

53. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), March 28, 1952.

54. As a temporary source of revenue, commercial advertising was carried by most Communist newspapers until 1951. Today commercial advertising is carried regularly by only a handful of papers specializing in commercial and industrial news. Newspapers intended for the general public merely carry classified advertisements for publishers, movie theaters, opera houses, and other recreational centers. Since publishing houses and recreational centers have become propaganda agencies, their advertisements are more political than commercial. Rather, such advertisements are designed to attract audiences or readers for the propaganda agencies concerned.

Newspapers intended for the general public also carry advertisements for industrial plants from time to time, but this, too, is done largely for political reasons. To advertise the new industrial products in the newspapers is an effective way for the regime to publicize its achievements in industrialization.

55. People's Daily (Peking), November 1, 1950.

56. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), August 20, 1955. The five jointly operated presses are: the New Literature Press, the New Knowledge Press, the Juvenile Press, the New Fine Art Press, and the Shanghai Pictorial Press.

57. Shu Hsin-ch'eng, "Current Problems of Publishing," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1, 587 (August 9, 1957), p. 17.

58. People's Daily (Peking), July 23, 1955.

59. China Daily News (New York) [Hua-chia Jih-Pao], September 7, 1955.

60. New China News Agency Release, June 1, 1958.

61. New China News Agency Release, July 1, 1958.

62. People's Daily (Peking), October 19, 1957.

63. Ibid.

64. Although there are no official figures on the total quantity of Chinese translations of Soviet books imported from Moscow since 1949, it must be quite large since Lenin's and Stalin's works alone accounted for over 7 million copies from 1949 to 1953. People's Daily (Peking), January 21, 1954.

65. Ch'u - pan Tsung - shu [Publications Administration], compiler, Annual List of Publications [Ch'uan-kuo Tu-shu Tsung-mu-lu] (Peking: Hsin-hua Book Company, 1950-1952).

66. As of June, 1950 the total circulation of all daily newspapers in Communist China was approximately 2,600,000 copies per issue. See Kuo Mo-jo, "A Report on Cultural and Educational Affairs" [Kuan-yu Wen-hua Chiao-yu Kung-tso Ti Pao-kaol, op. cit., Note 25, supra.

67. On February 3, 1953, the People's Daily (Peking) reported the following incidents: (a) the post office in Nanking once "compelled" 702 out of 718 pupils at an elementary school to subscribe to The Chinese Children [Chung-kuo Shao-nien Pao] (Peking); (b) the post office in Dairen "asked" the 163 workers in the dyeing shop of a textile company to subscribe to 441 copies of newspapers; (c) an agricultural cooperative in Lan-hsi, Heilungkiang Province, with seven illiterate members, was "requested" by the local post office to subscribe to three copies of the Heilungkiang Daily [Heilungkiang Jih-pao] (Harbin), three copies of the Peasant News [Nung-min Pao] (Hunan), and six copies of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Journal [Chung-so Yu-ho Pao] (Peking); (d) a postmaster in Kuei-lin, Kwangsi Province, declared publicly: "Since the Kwangsi Daily is an official organ of the Kwangsi Provincial Committee of the Communist party, failure to subscribe to the paper is certainly a manifestation of dissatisfaction with the party."; (e) in many places, when local post offices sent out mailmen to collect newspaper subscription fees, people usually remarked: "Here they are again to force us to pay the 'newspaper tax'."

In addition to using coercive methods, post offices were accused of being too slow in making newspaper deliveries. Post offices in rural districts were also blamed for frequently losing subscribers' newspapers. According to Communist authorities, these shortcomings on the part of the post offices have helped to alienate many potential newspaper subscribers and have thwarted the over-all plan for a systematic expansion of newspaper circulation. See People's Daily (Peking), February 3, 1953, March 13, 1955, and April 26, 1956.

68. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), March 13, 1951.

69. See the text of Chu's speech in People's Daily (Peking), July 24, 1955.

70. "Improving the Circulation Work of Newspapers" [Kai-chin Pao-chih Fa-hang Kung-tso], editorial in People's Daily (Peking), April 26, 1956.

71. Ibid.

72. China Daily News (New York), June 21, 1958.

73. For the Chinese text of the directive, see People's Daily (Peking), August 15, 1956.

74. Ibid., March 1-8, 1958.

75. Ibid., March 1, 1958.

76. Ibid., March 8, 1958.

77. A county newspaper is usually published in tabloid form, four pages a day. The size of the page is 13" x 9".

78. According to the latest available figures, daily circulations of such newspapers are as follows: People's Daily (Peking), 810,000 copies; Ta-kung Daily (Peking), 300,000 copies; Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), 180,000 copies; and Peking Daily Worker [Peking Kung-jen Jih-Pao], 150,000 copies. See Liao's article cited above (Note 2). Also see People's Daily (Peking), April 26, 1956 and October 1, 1956.

79. China Daily News (New York), June 21, 1958.

80. People's Daily (Peking), April 23, 1950.

81. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), September 6, 1952.

82. Fu Lei, "Providing Better Conditions for Writing and Publishing Good Books" [Wei-fan-jung Chuang-tso T'i-kao Ch'u-pan-wu Chih-liang T'i-kung Keng-ho-ti T'iao-chien], Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), May 14, 1957.

83. Ch'en Wen, "Strengthening the Book Circulation Work" [Chia-chiang Tu-shu Fa-hang Kung-tsol], People's Daily (Peking), July 4, 1954.

84. Shu Hsin-ch'eng, "Current Problems of Publishing," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1, 587 (August 9, 1957), p. 21.

85. Ch'en Wen's article cited in Note 83, supra.

86. Shu Hsin-ch'eng, "Current Problems of Publishing," Note 84, supra.

87. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), August 20, 1950.

88. Chin Ts'an-jan, "Supplying Publications to the Farmer" [Kung-ying Nung-min Wen-hua Shih-liang], People's Daily (Peking), February 17, 1956.

89. Ibid., February 3, 1956.

90. Ibid., January 24 and August 26, 1956.

91. See the minutes of the symposium on publications held in Shanghai on February 9, 1957 under the sponsorship of the Wen-hui Daily. The minutes appear in Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), February 17 and 18, 1957.

92. People's Daily (Peking), March 7, 1955; China Daily News (New York), April 11, 1956; and New China News Agency Release, July 9, 1958.

93. Ch'en Tao, "Do Not Aimlessly Market Books in the Rural Districts" [Po-yao Mang-mu Hsiang Nung-ts'un T'ui-hsiao Tu-shu], People's Daily (Peking), April 3, 1956.

94. Ibid.

95. Liang Ju-huai, "Rooting Out the Poisonous Effects of Publications with Absurd and Profligate Contents" [Ch'ing-ch'u Fan-tung Yin-kou Huang-tan Shu-k'an Ti Tu-hai], People's Daily (Peking), March 28, 1955.

96. Li Keng, "Publishing More Books for our Children" [Chieh Shao-nien Erh-t'ung Ch'u-pan Keng-to-ti Shu], ibid., September 29, 1955.

97. Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), January 24, 1958.

98. People's Daily (Peking), March 9, 1955.

99. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), March 10, 1956.

100. As of December, 1956 there were 7,560,000 cooperative farms in the country, comprising 96.3 per cent of the total peasant population of Mainland China. People's Daily (Peking), July 2, 1957.

101. Feng Lu-jen, "Newspaper Reading Groups Are the Best Device for Conducting Propaganda and Agitation Among the Peasants" [Tu-pao-tsu Ssu-tui Nung-min Chin-hsing Hsuan-ch'uan Ku-tung Ti Liang-ho Hsing-shih], ibid., October 19, 1954.

102. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1,587 (August 9, 1957), p. 20.

103. Ibid., p. 21

104. Fu Lei, "Providing Better Conditions for Writing and Publishing Good Books" [Wei-fan-jung Chuang-tso T'i-kao Ch'u-pan-wu Chih-liang T'i-kung Keng-ho-ti T'iao-chien], op. cit., Note 82, supra.

105. "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Instruction Concerning the Repudiation of Party Jargon and the Improvement of the Editorial Work of Newspapers and Periodicals" [Mao Tse-tung T'ung-chih Kuan-yu Fan-tui Tang-pa-ku Ho Kai-ching Pao-k'an Pien-chi Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih], Learning [Hsueh-hsi], No. 92 (February, 1956), p. 1.

106. Tung Ch'ien, "How to Sum Up the Experiences of Newspaper Workers" [Tsen-yang Tsung-chieh Pao-chih Ching-yen], People's Daily (Peking), October 3, 1952.

107. Ibid., May 10, 1950.

108. Ibid., November 28, 1954.

109. Li Hsi-fan and Lan Ling, "Which Way Should We Travel?" [Tsou-tsen-mo Yang-ti Lu], ibid., October 24, 1954.

110. Chung Lo, "We Should Stress the Importance of Criticizing Erroneous Viewpoints in the Study of the Dream of the Red Chamber" [Ying-kai Chung-shih Tui Hung-lo-meng Yen-chiu Chung-ti Ts'o-wu Kuan-tien Ti P'i-p'ing], ibid., October 23, 1954.

111. Yu made the preliminary confession at a forum in Peking on October 24, 1954. His speech was published in the Enlightenment Daily (Peking),

November 14, 1954. On March 15, 1955 Yu published a more extended confession in the Wen-i Pao, admitting his past errors in interpreting classical literature from the bourgeois point of view and pledging to "humbly correct" his methods.

112. Yuan Shui-po, "Interpellating the Editor of the Literary Gazette" [Chih-wen Wen-i Pao Pien-chi], People's Daily (Peking), October 28, 1954.

113. Enlightenment Daily, (Peking), December 9, 1954.

114. Ibid., December 19, 1954.

115. Chin Ta-k'ai, "On the Hu Feng Problem" [Lun Hu Feng Wen-t'i], Freedom Front (Hong Kong) [Tzu-yu Chen-hsien], 22, No. 1 (February 28, 1955), 9-11 and 19.

116. Enlightenment Daily (Peking), December 10, 1954.

117. People's Daily (Peking), March 8, 1955.

118. Ibid., May 13 and 24 and June 10, 1955.

119. Ibid., May 26, 1955.

120. New China Fortnightly (Peking) [Hsin-hua Pan-yueh K'an], No. 119 (November 10, 1957), p. 73.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid., No. 115 (September 10, 1957), pp. 178-180.

123. People's Daily (Peking), September 27, 1957.

124. Ibid.

125. Ch'ien Chun-jui, "Defend and Develop the Marxist Literature and Arts" [Pao-wei Ho Fa-chan Ma-k'o-ssu Chu-i Ti Wen-i Shih-yeh], ibid., August 30, 1957.

126. Ibid.

127. New China Fortnightly (Peking), No. 115 (September 10, 1957), p. 181.

128. Ibid., No. 116 (September 25, 1957), p. 166.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., No. 115 (September 10, 1957), p. 182.

134. Ibid., p. 178.

135. Ibid., p. 179.

136. Ibid., p. 181.

137. Ho Ch'i-fang, "Feng Hsueh-feng's Anti-Party and Anti-Marxist Literary and Social Thought" [Feng Hsueh-feng Ti Fan-tang Fan-ma-k'o-ssu Chu-i Ti Wen-i Ssu-hsiang Ho She-hui Ssu-hsiang], People's Daily (Peking), August 28, 1957.

138. Ibid., August 27, 1957.

139. Ho Ch'i-fang, loc. cit.

140. Ibid.

141. People's Daily (Peking), August 27, 1957.

142. Ibid.

143. Ibid., March 1, 1958.

144. All the statements on Ch'in's case here are based on a news item in New China News Agency Release (Home Service), July 11, 1958.

145. Ta-kung Daily (Peking), May 17, 1957.

146. Chinese Youth [Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao], July 18, 1957.

147. Peking Daily [Peking Jih-Pao], May 21, 1957.

148. New China Fortnightly (Peking), No. 115 (September 10, 1957), p. 182.

149. Chinese Youth, August 27, 1957.

150. Yangtze Daily (Wuhan) [Ch'ang-chiang Jih-Pao], August 31, 1957.

151. People's Daily editorial cited in Note 152, below.

152. "Why Some Publications Are Short While Others Are in Excessive Supply" [Wei-shih-ma Shu-chi Yu-ch'uan Yu-lan], editorial in People's Daily (Peking), December 12, 1956. Also see Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), February 17, 1957 and Shu Hsin-ch'eng's article cited in Note 86, supra.

153. For the text, see Science Bulletin [K'o-hsueh T'ung-Pao], July 1955, p. 41. Also see Ch'en K'o-han, "Some Problems Concerning the Work of the Publishing Industry" [Kuan-yu Ch'u-pan-she Kung-tso Ti Chi-ko Wen-t'i], People's Daily (Peking), June 12, 1954.

TECHNICAL FACILITIES

Communist broadcasting in China began on September 5, 1945 with the establishment of a radio station at a small temple in Yen-an.¹ Poorly equipped, it had a power strength of only 300 watts and was on the air just two hours daily. Its programs, intended mainly for listeners in Kuomintang-ruled territory, were confined to news broadcasts, political commentaries, and feature stories on conditions in the Communist-controlled areas. One year later the station extended its daily broadcasting time by thirty minutes and slightly enriched its programs. On its second anniversary, the daily broadcasting time was increased by another thirty minutes, and later certain English-language programs were added.

The establishment of the Yen-an station was quickly followed by the founding of another Communist broadcasting station in Kalgan. Before long stations were also set up in Manchuria, southern Hopei, and northern Kiangsu. By the end of 1948 some sixteen stations were broadcasting in the so-called liberated areas.²

After they conquered the Mainland, the Communists took over all stations left intact by the Kuomintang regime and converted them into "people's broadcasting stations," owned and operated by the government. In April, 1950 there were eighty-three radio

broadcasting stations in Communist China, of which fifty were people's broadcasting stations and thirty-three were privately-owned and operated.³

The thirty-three privately-owned stations, with a combined strength of 13,000 kilowatts, were distributed as follows: Shanghai, twenty-two; Canton, three; Chungking, three; Ningpo, two; Peking, one; Tientsin, one; and Tsingtao, one. The fate of these stations was, ultimately, absorption into the government network. Soon after the capture of Shanghai in 1949 the Communists imposed rigid controls on the private stations in that city, and followed that pattern as they extended their power. The controls, which involved close supervision of all material broadcast and prohibition of any broadcasting of a political nature except that rebroadcast from Communist-owned stations,⁵ had the effect of transforming the private stations into what were virtually transmitting stations for the official network of the regime.

When it was felt that sufficient experience and trained personnel had been accumulated, the regime in 1951-1953 undertook to nationalize some of the privately-owned stations and give others the status of joint state and private enterprises.⁶ There are now, under this policy, virtually no privately-owned and operated broadcasting stations in China. The existing stations are, for all practical purposes, a part of the regime's indoctrination system.

The radio network has been expanded since 1950, though more by increase in number of frequencies used and in power strength than in number of stations, as the following figures indicate. In 1950 there were forty-nine people's broadcasting stations in the whole country; by January, 1956 there were fifty-four, and by the end of 1957 there were fifty-eight — an increase of only nine stations in seven years.⁷ During the same period the number of frequencies used for domestic broadcasting went up from eighty-nine in 1950 to 142 in 1956,⁸ while the combined strength of the stations rose from 107.9 kilowatts in 1949 to 475.2 kilowatts in 1952, and by 1954 was nine times that of 1952. In 1956 the government announced that the total power strength of all stations in 1957 would be 460 per cent of the 1954 figure.⁹

There are several possible explanations for the very moderate increase in the number of stations as compared to the great increase in combined power strength: the shortage of trained personnel and technical equipment, the greater ease of controlling programming by means of centralization, and the likelihood that it is more economical to increase the range and facilities of an existing station than to set up a new one. The use of radio-diffusion exchanges and the promotion of wide-scale collective listening tends further to supplement present broadcasting facilities, and stations have been established in Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and other strategic areas formerly without facilities of their own.

In the fall of 1954 during the campaign for the liberation of Taiwan, the Central People's Broadcasting Station added to its domestic broadcasts a special program beamed at the people on Taiwan. At the outset, this program was on the air four hours daily, but since May, 1955 it has been lengthened to twelve hours. In addition to reports on the happy and prosperous life of the Mainlanders under the regime of Chairman Mao, "talks" and "letters" to Kuomintang officials now on Taiwan given by relatives, friends, or former colleagues are designed to undermine the morale of the anti-Communist government of Chiang Kai-shek and bring about its eventual disintegration or capitulation, with the hope of thus effecting the Communists' "peaceful liberation of Taiwan."

More recently, the Chinese Communist authorities have started to use the Central People's Broadcasting Station and other official stations throughout the country to popularize the Mandarin dialect and the simplified characters of the Chinese language. Special lectures on these subjects are now given.

Originally, the department for foreign broadcasts of the Central People's Broadcasting Station (known in foreign countries as Radio Peking) presented its programs for eleven hours a day. After January, 1956 it increased them to fourteen hours daily. It then sent out programs in seven foreign languages: English, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, Burmese, Siamese, and Vietnamese. Soon Spanish, Russian, Laotian, and Cambodian were added to the list. On November 4, 1957 Radio Peking expanded

its foreign broadcasts still further by initiating programs in Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, and on June 5, 1958 it started a program in French, thus boosting the total time of its foreign-language broadcasts to twenty-two hours a day. It has since been announced that before long Radio Peking will also feature programs in German and in the Indian languages. The continuing expansion of foreign-language broadcasts is a clear indication of Peking's fast-growing influence in the world-wide Communist movement.

Radio Peking also puts on the air special broadcasts in dialects of Canton, T'ai-shan, Amoy, Hakka, and Ch'ao-chou for overseas Chinese and, since May 1, 1957, there has been a program in Mandarin aimed at Chinese nationals residing in North America.¹⁰

FORMAL ADMINISTRATION

The broadcasting system has the same pyramidal structure as the press. At the apex of the pyramid, the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking is supervised by the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs of the State Council. This station is the core of the entire radio network; it plays a role in the Chinese radio system similar to that served by the central Moscow broadcasting stations in the Soviet radio system.¹¹

Since 1950 this station has used two separate installations for domestic and foreign broadcasts. At first the installation for domestic broadcasts could issue only one program at a time and was on the air just seven and a half hours daily. In 1950 it began to issue two programs simultaneously, and at present it is on the air for slightly over twenty-two hours per day, sending out programs in all the major languages and dialects spoken by the Han Chinese and other ethnic groups of the nation. The domestic programs are directed toward the entire Chinese listening public throughout the country, either directly or by means of network hookups.

Local people's broadcasting stations currently operate on two levels, provincial and municipal. A provincial station is

found in each of the provincial capitals, while municipal stations exist in some important cities.

Provincial radio stations are used primarily to announce decrees and regulations and to broadcast news relevant to their own provinces. The main task of municipal stations is to conduct "social education," essentially a form of propaganda and agitation. For other programs, as well as for national or international news, these stations transmit the programs emanating from the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking.

For administrative purposes each local station is under the dual supervision of the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs and the appropriate station on the next higher level. Daily activities of the provincial and municipal stations are also controlled by the party and government agencies on corresponding levels.

RADIO RECEPTION FACILITIES

A radio listener in Communist China may hear programs either on an ordinary radio receiving set or over wired speakers located in his home, office, dormitory, school, recreation center, on a street corner, or elsewhere. The average citizen will generally do most of his listening in public or in a group, because of the relatively small number of receiving sets per capita in the nation.

Under the Kuomintang regime radio receiving sets were, for the most part, owned only by the well-to-do. This situation has not greatly changed, but radio sets are now being acquired for collective listening by business enterprises, mines, schools, government agencies, cooperative farms, mutual aid teams, the armed forces, and other mass organizations.¹²

According to Communist figures, in 1950 almost a million of the nation's receiving sets were concentrated in East China, Manchuria, and North China, especially in such large cities as Shanghai, Mukden, Peking, and Tientsin.¹³ In the vast areas of Northwest, South-Central, and Southwest China there were only an estimated 100,000 sets. Although there has been no statement made as to current distribution, there are indications

that efforts have been made to increase sets in the areas where there were previously the smallest number.

There has been a considerable increase in the number of sets in the past few years. In 1950 there were reportedly only 1,000,000 to 1,100,000 sets receiving programs from medium-wave stations,¹⁴ but by January, 1956 a Communist writer was able to claim an increase to about 1,500,000, not counting some 80,000 crystal sets.¹⁵ Since several Chinese factories can now produce receiving sets in fair quantity, the increase can be expected to continue. However, the relatively high cost of radio sets in proportion to the low income of the majority of the Chinese people makes a rapid increase in the foreseeable future somewhat unlikely. The export of receiving sets from Communist China in recent years seems to have resulted, at least in part, from insufficient domestic demand.

METHODS OF INCREASING AUDIENCES

Collective Listening

Organized efforts to promote collective listening were first made in April, 1950 when the now defunct Information Administration issued its "Decisions on the Establishment of Radio Broadcast Monitoring Teams."¹⁶ The Political Department of the former People's Revolutionary Military Council put out in April, 1951 a "Directive Relating to the Establishment of Radio Broadcast Monitoring Teams in the Armed Forces,"¹⁷ and in September, 1951 the "Decisions Concerning the Establishment of Radio Broadcast Monitoring Teams in the Factories, Mining Plants, and Enterprises Throughout the Nation" was issued jointly by the Information Administration and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.¹⁸ As a result of these directives radio monitoring teams have become a part of the plan to establish collective listening and extend the audience for material already broadcast. The teams work under the supervision of local units of mass organizations (such as trade union locals in factories) or of party cells; some are appointed while others consist of voluntary workers. They are equipped either with

loudspeakers or with headsets, and can thus make use of the limited number of available radio sets to increase the listening audience. By summarizing broadcast material and using it for distribution in mimeographed form or in local wall newspapers they expand the audience for radio messages.

Two provisions of the "Regulations on the Work of Monitors" issued on April 29, 1950 by the Central People's Broadcasting Station¹⁹ further extend the usefulness of the system. Monitors are instructed to be selective in the materials they disseminate, concentrating on speeches of government leaders, social science lectures by famous scholars, reports of official decrees and news events, and any other items that might improve the political and cultural levels of the listeners. Also, they are a valuable adjunct to the radio system itself. They must report to the responsible station what materials were chosen for dissemination and how the listeners have reacted to them. The station can thus readjust its programs when necessary in the light of audience response. The radio network thus benefits from more audience feedback than do similar systems in other countries.

The formation of these teams has increased since 1955 as the demand for a greater propaganda and indoctrination effort has kept pace with the acceleration of the socialist transformation programs in agriculture and industry.

As of January, 1956 there were some 11,000 monitoring teams operating in the offices of county, district, and hsiang (administrative village) governments; there were another 17,700 teams in industrial, fishing, pastoral, and agricultural cooperatives, and still another 20,000 teams in the units of the armed forces.²⁰ It was reported that by the end of 1956 there would be 13,376 more radio broadcast monitoring teams in rural areas of the interior and remote regions of the country.²¹

Information is lacking on the total number of monitors currently operating in teams, but since in 1953 the then-existing 33,000 monitoring teams were said to consist of approximately 100,000 monitors, the 50,000 to 60,000 or more teams now in existence must comprise several tens of thousands of additional monitors.

Radio-Diffusion Exchanges

The use of wired radio speakers is an important part of the collective listening movement. The wired speakers are organized into nets, each of which is called a radio-diffusion exchange. An exchange receives programs from the central and local radio stations by a powerful aerial receiver or through inter-city telephone lines. The programs are then relayed over a system of wires radiating from the exchange to speakers placed in factories, communal dwellings, and dormitories, and in other public gathering places such as club rooms, reading rooms, recreation halls, public squares, street corners, and railway trains.

"In a general way," one writer has said, "the radio-diffusion exchange is very much like an automatic telephone exchange whose wires go out to the homes of subscribers and to public phone booths, except that radio programs substitute for telephone messages, all subscribers receive the same message, and only one-way communication is possible."²²

The construction of radio-diffusion exchanges in Communist China was begun in the fall of 1950. Because of technical limitations and political considerations, construction progressed very slowly. On September 13, 1951, the People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao] reported that there were approximately 1,000 radio-diffusion exchanges operating in large cities, business offices, industrial and mining plants, there were 200 at railroad stations, and some 800 in railway trains and other places.²³ Most of these were said to be small exchanges.

Construction of radio-diffusion exchanges in rural districts and in medium- and small-sized towns did not take place until 1952. Even then most exchanges developed in industrial and mining plants, in schools, and in units of the armed forces. This is shown by Communist statistics of November, 1955 on the distribution of radio-diffusion exchanges at that time, shown in Table 7.

Before this, however, Communist authorities had been busy for months studying methods to increase the expansion of rural radio-diffusion exchanges so as to allow the regime closer

communication with the peasants during the agricultural cooperative movement, greatly intensified late in the summer of 1955.

TABLE 7
DISTRIBUTION OF RADIO-DIFFUSION EXCHANGES
IN COMMUNIST CHINA, NOVEMBER, 1955

Location of Exchange	No. of Exchanges
Rural Districts	104
Medium- & Small-Sized Cities & Towns	719
Business Offices, Industrial & Mining Plants, Railroad Stations, & Railway Trains.	8,200
Schools & Units of the Armed Forces	2,500

Source: Lu Yeh, "People's Broadcasting in the New China" [Hsin-chung-kuo Jen-min Ti Kuang-po Shih-yeh], Radio [Wu-hsien-tien], No. 13 (January 19, 1956), pp. 6-8.

In August, 1955 the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs held an informal conference between technical experts and administrative officials of radio stations on the expansion of radio-diffusion exchanges in villages. Following the conference, the construction of radio-diffusion exchanges was noticeably speeded up. It was reported that by the end of 1955 a total of 175 new radio-diffusion exchanges, with some 36,900 speakers, had been installed in rural districts;²⁴ the total number of radio-diffusion exchanges in the countryside in December, 1955 was thus 150 per cent higher than that reported a month earlier, and the increase in the total number of wired speakers during the same period was 250 per cent higher. Meanwhile, existing radio-diffusion exchanges were improved or strengthened in power.

In December, 1955 the Bureau of Broadcasting Affairs called the Third All-China Conference on Radio Broadcasting. Among

other matters, this conference addressed itself to the problem of developing rural networks of radio-diffusion exchanges. Before it adjourned it agreed on a set of target figures for the construction of such exchanges. The schedule called for 1,169 radio-diffusion exchanges, with 781,942 speakers to be installed in villages during 1956, and by the end of 1957 there were to be some 1,800 radio-diffusion exchanges with 1,360,000 speakers.²⁵ The Communists said that fulfillment of the 1956 quota would mean at least one radio-diffusion exchange for every county in the nation and several wired speakers for each *hsiang*.

Wired radio speakers were to be installed primarily on cooperative farms and at other "strategic places" for collective listening.

The conference also worked out a preliminary long-range plan for the development of rural diffusion exchanges, by which there would be 5,400 radio-diffusion exchanges in rural areas with some 6,700,000 speakers installed at most cooperative farms and at one of every three peasant homes by the end of China's second five-year plan (i.e., 1962). By that time radio-diffusion exchanges would be the chief means of radio reception in the country.

It is, however, doubtful that the Communist regime can accomplish this aim in the time allotted, since it has already failed to reach the goals set for the first two years of the plan. At the end of 1956 the number of radio-diffusion exchanges in the nation was 400 short of the projected 1,800, and the total number of speakers connected with the exchanges was 510,000 instead of the hoped-for 1,360,000.²⁶ As late as March, 1958 the total number of radio-diffusion exchanges was still 210 short of the target originally set for 1956.²⁷

The Chinese Communists feel, on the basis of their experience, that radio-diffusion exchanges are valuable instruments of agitation for higher labor productivity, and of socialist education among workers and peasants, including the news distribution on national and international affairs. They also see its great value in transmitting and explaining policies and decrees of the party and government, popularizing advanced methods in agriculture and industry, disseminating scientific knowledge

and guidance on sanitation, giving weather reports, enriching the cultural life of the nation, and mobilizing the population to undertake emergency works.²⁸

They cite instances of useful services performed by radio-diffusion exchanges. For example, early in September, 1954 frost, predicted for the entire county of Chiu-t'ai, Kirin Province, threatened late-ripening crops. County officials, through the radio-diffusion exchanges, called upon the more than 400 scattered village party workers to take precautionary measures, and as a result the crops were saved.²⁹

They also stress the usefulness of radio-diffusion exchanges in transmitting or publicizing government or party decisions or orders. In November, 1955 the Chiu-t'ai county committee of the Communist party rebroadcast over the exchanges the full texts of Mao Tse-tung's speech on the problem of agricultural cooperatives and the decisions of the sixth plenum of the 7th Central Committee of the party concerning them to some 20,000 cadres and residents in the county.³⁰

Although the decision to construct radio-diffusion exchanges may have been due largely to the scarcity of broadcasting stations and regular radio receiving sets, the Communists assert that the system has an inherent superiority over individual listening by means of regular radio receiving sets.³¹ The wired system is more economical, and thus allows more speakers to be installed for the same expenditure. The present cost of building a radio-diffusion exchange with 150 wired speakers is about JMP \$7,000, and monthly operating expenses do not exceed JMP \$90. It costs at least JMP \$20,000 to purchase 150 regular radio receiving sets of average quality, and maintenance costs amount to JMP \$1,500 to \$2,000 monthly.

Another advantage claimed for the wired net is its ability to carry programs that originate at the exchange. This makes possible utilization of the radio for mass communication of a purely local nature or for conducting agitation in industrial and mining plants or on cooperative farms.

Further, the authorities can make special announcements to the population on matters they want to keep secret from foreign listeners. This is possible because the exchange can transmit

through its network without going on the air. The Communists feel that this would be especially valuable in time of war, since the local exchange could maintain contact between the authorities and the people without the risk of giving enemy aviators radio signals to guide them to a target.

The wired net is especially valued for its adaptability to propaganda control. The listener of a radio-diffusion exchange can hear only the programs carried by the wired net; it is thus possible to exercise complete control over the material heard, since it is not possible for the audience to tune in on enemy or foreign radio propaganda.

Nevertheless, at present the average Chinese is still beyond the reach of radio unless he visits some public gathering place such as the reading room of a plant, a communal mess hall, or housing community. While the radio's ability to reach audiences will be immensely increased if the Communists' plans for the development of radio-diffusion exchanges are fulfilled by 1962, until then the radio in Communist China will remain limited in its usefulness as a medium of propaganda and indoctrination.³²

CONTENT OF PROGRAMS

In the past few years there have been changes in the composition of the programs of the Central People's Broadcasting Station intended for domestic consumption. The nature of these changes will be seen from a comparison of two typical broadcasting schedules, one from the year 1950, the other from 1955. The following program schedule of the Tientsin Municipal People's Broadcasting Station for October 1, 1950 is typical of the output of municipal stations at that time.³³

- 6:30 Music and announcements of the day's program highlights.
- 6:40 Army Band (Marches): "Defending World Peace," "Military March," "Cavalry March," "New China March," "The Enjoyable Drill," "The Red Flag Song," "A Eulogy of Heroism."

- 7:00 News (rebroadcast of the newscast of the Central People's Broadcasting Station).
- 7:15 Songs: "Plenty of Food and Clothing," "Embroidering A Banner for a Hero," "Thanks to Chairman Mao," "Let Us be United and March Forward," "The Unforgettable Benefactor — The Communist Party."
- 7:30 Special program for the National Day: "The Tientsin Municipal People's Representative Conference During the Past Year."
- 7:45 Cultural program: chorus by student groups; violin played by Yen Feng-hua; instrumental music by the Oriental Band.
- 9:30 Model Workers' Talks: (1) Model Worker Li Yung-lao, operator of the "Mao Tse-tung Locomotive." (2) Model Engineer Hsueh Fan-jung.
- 9:50 Singing for the Model Workers.
- 12:00 Mid-day intermission.
- 15:30 Reports on the celebration of the National Day in Tientsin.
- 18:50 Speech: Pi Ming-ch'i, Vice-Chairman of the Tientsin Municipal Association of Industry and Commerce, "How the Privately-Owned Industries and Commercial Firms in Tientsin Can Best Serve the Interests of the People."
- 19:30 Comic Programs.
- 20:00 News (rebroadcast of the newscast of the Central People's Broadcasting Station).
- 20:15 Political speeches: (1) "Public Finance and the National Economy During the Past Year." (2) "Social Reforms in the Countryside During the Past Year."
- 20:30 Report on the celebration of the National Day in Tientsin.
- 20:45 Peking Opera (featuring Mei Lan-fang).

The following highlights of home programs broadcast by the Central People's Broadcasting Station on December 23, 1955³⁴ indicate the changes which have taken place since 1950:

- 7:30 Lectures on political economy: Chapter III, The Feudalist Mode of Production in a Feudal Society.
- 8:30 Reports on the progress of the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture.
- 17:00 Farmer's Hour: Lin T'ieh, First Secretary of the Hopei Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, "How We Reorganized and Consolidated the More Than 10,000 Cooperative Farms."
- 18:30 Chinese Language Program of Radio Moscow.
- 19:15 Industrial Hour: (1) Correspondence, "Numerous Ways to Economize on the Use of Coal." (2) Li Hao, Manager of the Electric Power Plant of Chungking, "How the Electric Power Plant of Chungking Economized on the Use of Coal."
- 20:30 Reports on the life of the peoples in the fraternal socialist countries.
- 20:45 Music, Opera, and Comic Monologues.

In 1950 the distribution of time between the various programs was as follows: news and political broadcasts, 50 per cent; social education, 25 per cent; and cultural and recreational programs, 25 per cent.³⁵ Currently, news and political broadcasts account for 30 per cent of the total broadcasting time, scientific, musical, literary, and dramatic programs for 60 per cent, and other miscellaneous materials for 10 per cent.³⁶

Since cultural, musical, and dramatic programs are weighted with political content, the reduced time allotted to news and political broadcasts does not necessarily mean that the radio is now less of a propaganda and indoctrination medium. Possibly the government prefers to use a more indirect approach. At

the same time the news and political programs are designed to indoctrinate the people directly in Communist theory. The station presents series of lectures by leading Communist theoreticians on the history of social development, imperialism, the theory of the state, the people's dictatorship, political economy, and dialectical and historical materialism. A series usually lasts for several months, and some segments of the population are virtually compelled to listen collectively in the so-called radio auditoriums.

News broadcasts feature news commentaries and stories on factory, mine, and farm production, on the regime's plans and achievements in diplomatic, cultural, and other fields, and on the affairs of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies in Eastern Europe. Reports on the domestic affairs of the Western nations, which are seldom covered, tend to contain criticisms or exposés of the seamy side of Capitalist life.

Scientific programs, in the form of lectures, questions and answers, or "special dispatches," are designed to be educational. The regime's view of science is pragmatic: it is a weapon in the battle for socialist industrialization and the construction of a communist society, and as such is more valuable in its applied form than as theory. Consequently, most of the science broadcasts so far have dealt with technical problems confronting the nation's industry, agriculture, and transportation system, or with water conservation projects and the like. Much of the scientific information and production techniques discussed have been of Soviet origin, stressing "the socialist state's superior environment for scientific development."

Literary programs of the Central People's Broadcasting Station consist of readings, discussions, and lectures. Readings may be prose or poetry selections or an entire work from contemporary or ancient literature, usually works by Chinese authors or Chinese translations of Russian works. The main consideration in the choice of reading material is its political and philosophical content: if a literary work contains acceptable doctrine and is in keeping with current political views, it is suitable for radio reading, while a work with "objectionable" or

"pernicious" content contrary to the current political doctrine will not be selected, whatever its literary merit.

Literary discussions and lectures are usually conducted or delivered by noted Chinese writers on topics relating to the methodology of literary composition, the merits or defects of a selected work, or literary theory and policy. These programs are mainly intended for listeners in literary circles or those who have a particular interest in literature. They invariably have a marked political orientation, and are intended to help the regime promote "desirable" or "good" literary works while criticizing shortcomings or mistakes committed by writers.

Musical selections are dominated by marches and songs and operas with revolutionary or political themes. Occasional symphonic concerts and other music programs are expected to foster "a good musical education or to develop among the masses a love of music." Most symphonic and orchestral performances emphasize works of Russian and Chinese composers, although Western composers are not excluded.

Most dramatic broadcasts are "live" transmissions of actual performances in the major theaters in Peking or recorded performances of various local operas or Peking operas. Like the Soviet Union, Communist China still has no group of performers specializing in acting on the radio. Another variety of spoken performance is the comic monologue, featured regularly on the Central People's Broadcasting Station. It tends to be heavily political, the comic and amusing style serving as a vehicle for slogans.

Children's programs have less political content than do other offerings. They are designed to arouse the children's scientific interest and creative fancy, develop their patriotism and love of the people, convey a certain amount of historic and literary knowledge, and provide pleasant and sensible recreation. Much of the material for these programs is prepared by specialists in child education who draw heavily on folk tales, adventure stories, and elementary science books. Selections from the children's own writings are frequently included. The common characteristic of these programs is their positive tone and purity of language.

The Central People's Broadcasting Station also rebroadcasts the daily Chinese-language programs of Radio Moscow. Broadcasts from radio stations in capitals of satellite states are transmitted only occasionally; most of those used are feature stories on the social life and economic development of the countries of origin. These broadcasts are designed to build a closer tie between the Chinese and the people of other countries within the Soviet orbit.

Audience Resistance

It is probably too early to come to any conclusions about the over-all audience reaction to the fare offered by the People's Broadcasting Stations and the radio-diffusion exchanges, because the medium itself is a novelty in many parts of China. Whenever radio receiving facilities are extended to an area for the first time, the residents display considerable enthusiasm about the broadcasts, and residents of areas still without reception facilities are understandably eager for the opportunity to listen. A Communist publication has quoted some farmers as saying, "If we can have wired radio speakers installed in our villages or our homes, we will no longer mind how much work the government wants us to do every day on the farm."³⁷ On the other hand, where there is no charm of novelty there have been complaints about the content of the programs. One Communist writer has said:

The subjects of a great deal of our radio broadcast scripts are utterly devoid of interest to a large segment of the population. Their contents are dull, without fresh ideas, and incapable of educating and influencing people. People also find it difficult to get timely and comprehensive reports over the radio on current international events or the development of the nation's construction programs. Some local radio stations unduly neglect news programs in their broadcasting. They misinterpret the policy of "placing the radio at the service of production" and over-

look the role of political and news broadcasts in the acceleration of production. As a result, workers' reaction is that they can hear from the broadcasts nothing but machines and screws, while farmers complain that they are tired of hearing on the radio constant calls for accumulating manure or for catching insects.

The lecture series on social sciences are not conducted in a manner intelligible to the average listener. Many broadcast scripts are written in an old-fashioned style and with unpopular vocabulary. In some instances they are even unreadable. Some of the scripts give the listener an impression that they are just compilations of slogans. Some local stations also impose too frequently on the listening audience tediously long speeches and lectures. As for literary programs of the radio stations, they are equally defective because of formalistic, monotonous, and dogmatic expressions.³⁸

Even with its drawbacks the radio in Communist China is heard by a large audience, particularly since much of it reaches, through the device of collective listening, large segments of the population whose attitudes the authorities wish to influence and who are virtually compelled to attend the "radio auditoriums." In 1950 some 60,000 workers in Tientsin were organized in groups to listen regularly to broadcasts made by trade union leaders over the Tientsin Municipal People's Broadcasting Station,³⁹ and in Shanghai approximately 100,000 students and government officials were organized to hear radio lectures on the history of social development and some 50,000 children heard "children's summer vacation programs" broadcast by the Shanghai Municipal People's Broadcasting Station.⁴⁰

Efforts to Improve Programs

Leaders of the Communist regime and officials of the radio stations appear to have spared no effort to make the radio

broadcasts more interesting, insofar as is consistent with radio's fulfillment of its supreme task in the political and cultural education of the population. Directive after directive has been issued by the party and government, and the press has devoted much space to ways of making programs more attractive.

One device adopted by radio authorities is to establish a closer relationship between the stations and the listening public by frequent invitations to listeners to appear on programs. During the last two months of 1949 and the first four months of 1950, it was reported, some 15,000 radio listeners made guest appearances on the Shanghai Municipal People's Broadcasting Station, and approximately 17,000 listeners did the same during the last few months of 1949 on the Tientsin Municipal People's Broadcasting Station.⁴¹

The Voice of America

Given the regime's general attitude toward the function of radio broadcasting, and the emphasis it places upon rigid control of content, it is not surprising that steps have been taken to prevent any listening to the Voice of America broadcasts. Even though few Chinese have radio sets capable of picking up the frequency, a move to suppress any such listening was first made in November, 1950. American-trained college professors (including those at the famous Tsing-hua and Yen-ching Universities) and other inhabitants in Shanghai, Peking, Tientsin, Hangchow, and other metropolitan cities, wrote, under Communist inspiration, letters to newspaper editors denouncing the "pernicious" Voice of America and called upon the government to forbid radio owners to listen to it.

Acting on this "popular demand" and in co-ordination with the Anti-America and Aid-Korea Movement which began at about the same time, local police offices began to issue orders outlawing listening to the Voice of America. Relatives, friends, and neighbors were encouraged not only to inform the authorities if radio owners violated the police order, but to spy upon them.

Although there is no sure way of knowing how successful this suppression has been during the past few years, we must assume that the impact of the Voice of America on Chinese listeners on the Mainland has not been so great as Washington had hoped. It is too risky for a Chinese radio owner, under such surveillance, to dial the Voice of America and, even if the Voice is heard in Communist China, its audience must be very limited since only a few well-to-do Chinese have shortwave radio receivers capable of picking up the programs. There is no possibility at all for the Voice of America to be heard by the huge masses on whose support any future anti-Communist movement inside that country must ultimately depend for success.

TABLE 8 | RADIO BROADCASTING STATIONS IN COMMUNIST CHINA, MARCH, 1958

CENTRAL PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING STATION PEKING

Domestic Broadcasts: 570*, 600, 640, 700, 726, 800, 1040, 3915, 3960, 5960, 5968, 6015, 6100, 6154, 6170, 6200, 6743, 7100, 7170, 7500, 9040, 9555, 9735, 10260, 11835, 11900, 11935, 15255

Foreign Broadcasts (or Radio Peking): 9510, 11940, 11975, 15060, 15115, 17745, 17860

REGIONAL PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING STATIONS

Inner Mongolia, Hohehot	Tibet, Lhasa
Kwangsi Chuang, Nanning	Uigur, Urumchi (Tihwa): 7050

PROVINCIAL PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING STATIONS

Anhwei, Hefei	Kiangsu, Nanking
Chekiang, Hangchow	Kirin, Changchung
Chinghai, Hsining: 9900	Kwantung, Canton: 913, 1073, 1203
Fukien, Fuchow	Kweichow, Kueiyang
Heilungkiang, Harbin	Liaoning, Mukden: 1313
Honan, Chengchow	Shansi, Taiyuan
Hopei, Tientsin	Shantung, Chinan
Hunan, Changsha	Shensi, Sian: 1300
Hupei, Wuhan	Szechuan, Chengtu
Kansu, Lanchow: 1400, 7313	Yunnan, Kunming
Kiangsi, Nanchang	

MUNICIPAL PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING STATIONS

Amoy, Fukien Province	Nant'ung, Kiangsu Province
Anshan, Liaoning Province	Paotow, Inner Mongolia
Antung, Liaoning Province	Peking: 670, 750, 850, 920
Ch'ang-chou, Kiangsu Province	Shanghai: 900, 1020, 1280
Chengteh, Hopei Province	Soochow, Kiangsu Province
Chinchow, Liaoning Province	Tangshan, Hopei Province
Chungking, Szechuan Province	Tientsin: 620, 670, 920, 1110
Dairen, Liaoning Province	Tsingtao, Shantung Province
Fushun, Liaoning Province	Tsitsihar, Heilungkiang Province
Hsinhsiang, Hopei Province	Yangchow, Kiangsu Province
Hsuehchow, Kiangsu Province	Yenchi, Kirin Province
Kalgan, Hopei Province: 920, 1260	Yingk'ou, Liaoning Province
Liuchow, Kwangsi Chuang People's Autonomous Region	Yungchi, Kirin Province
	Wenchow, Chekiang Province
	Wuhsi, Kiangsu Province

[Locations of four newly-established stations cannot be determined.]

*Channel frequencies, where available, are given in kilocycles.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. Wen Chi-tse, "A Survey of the People's Broadcasting Affairs in China" [Mu-ch'ien Wo-kuo Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang], People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], February 1, 1950.

2. Wen Chi-tse, "People's Broadcasting During the Last Ten Years" [Shih-nien Lai-ti Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh], New China Monthly [Hsin-hua Yueh-Pao], No. 72 (October, 1955), pp. 232-233.

3. Mei I, "People's Broadcasting in China" [Wo-kuo Jen-min Kuang-po Shih-yeh Kai-k'uang], People's Daily (Peking), April 25, 1950.

4. Ibid.

5. "The Shanghai Military Control Committee's Provisional Regulations on the Operation of Privately-Owned Radio Broadcasting Stations" [Shanghai Chun-kuan-hui Kuan-yu Shanghai Szu-ying Kuang-po Tien-t'ai Tsan-hsing Tiao-li], Liberation Daily (Shanghai) [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao], June 14, 1949.

6. Chin Ta-k'ai, "Communist China's Radio Network" [Chung-kung Ti Kuang-po Wang], Fatherland Weekly (Hong Kong) [Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an], No. 65 (March 29, 1954), p. 10.

7. Lu Yen, "People's Broadcasting in New China" [Hsin Chung-kuo Jen-min Ti Kuang-po Shih-yeh], Radio [Wu-hsien-tien], No. 13 (January 19, 1956), pp. 6-8.

8. See Lu's article, Note 7, supra.

9. Ibid.

10. This program is transmitted daily, the first broadcast from 11:30 to 12:00 Peking time, the second from 23:30 to 24:00 hours. They are on frequencies of 15115, 11975, and 17745 kilocycles short wave on the 19.85, 16.91, and 25.05 meter bands. China Daily News (New York) [Hua-chiao Jih-Pao], May 14, 1957.

11. The latter part of 1958 saw the completion of a new building for the Central People's Broadcasting Station. Situated at the western outskirts of Peking, this eleven-story structure has all the modern facilities and equipment for radio broadcasting and televising. Of its twenty-four broadcasting rooms the largest one can accommodate 250 performers and 650 spectators. With a total space of 170,000 cubic meters, this giant mansion houses so many transmitters that it can simultaneously issue seventeen different programs.

The Communists claim that once the Central People's Broadcasting Station begins televising, people living at places not more than fifteen miles away from the station will be able to watch the programs on their television sets. A trial program was televised by the station the evening of March 17, 1958, marking the first television show in China. The result was said to be "excellent." However, at the time of this writing, Communist China has not formally launched a regular television program. This is probably due to technical difficulties and shortage of television sets. According to Communist sources, in March, 1958 electrical appliance factories in Peking and Tientsin succeeded in making television transmitters and receiving sets. See China Daily News (New York), March 19 and 28, 1958, and April 3, 1958.

12. See Mei's article, Note 3, supra.

13. The approximate distribution of radio receiving sets was as follows: East China, 400,000; Manchuria, 300,000; North China, 200,000; and other regions, 100,000. In 1950, the Communist authorities also claimed that there were about 200,000 damaged radio receiving sets in the country which, after repair, could be used again. See Mei's article cited above.

14. See Mei's article, Note 3, supra.

15. Chou Hsin-wu, "The New Role of the Mandarin Language Broadcasts" [P'u-t'ung-hua Chieh-mu Tseng-chia-liao Hsin-ti I-i], Radio Listener [Kuang-po Ai-ho-che], No. 7 (January, 1956), pp. 8-9.

16. For a Chinese text of the document, see New China Monthly, No. 7 (May 15, 1950), pp. 155-156.

17. For a Chinese text of the document, see ibid., No. 24 (October 25, 1951), p. 381.

18. No text of this document is available.

19. "Regulations on the Work of Monitors" [Shou-yin-yuan T'iao-li], People's Daily (Peking), April 30, 1950.

20. See Lu's article, Note 7, supra.

21. News item in Radio Listener, No. 8 (February, 1956), p. 8.

22. Alex Inkeles, Public Opinion in the Soviet Union: A Study in Mass Persuasion (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1950), pp. 242-243.

23. People's Daily (Peking), September 13, 1951.

24. Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao], December 26, 1955.

25. Ibid., and news item in Radio Listener, No. 8 (February, 1956), p. 8.

26. People's Daily (Peking), August 2, 1957.

27. China Daily News (New York), April 3, 1958.

28. Wang Chan-yeh, "Strengthening Propaganda Work for an Earlier Fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan" [Wei-t'i-tsao Wan-ch'eng Wu-nien Chihua Erh Chia-chin Hsuan-ch'uan], People's Daily (Peking), February 22, 1956. "Developing Rural Broadcasting Networks" [Ta-li Chan-k'ai Nung-ts'un Kuang-pao Wang], editorial in Radio, No. 14 (February 19, 1956), pp. 4-5.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. As of March, 1958 nearly 850 of the more than 2,400 counties and municipalities on the Mainland still did not have radio-diffusion exchanges. Eighty per cent of the existing 1,590 exchanges are said to be in rural areas. China Daily News (New York), April 3, 1958.

33. Source: Tientsin Daily [Tientsin Jih-Pao], October 1, 1950.

34. Source: People's Daily (Peking), December 23, 1955.

35. See Mei's article, Note 3, supra.

36. See Wen's article in New China Monthly, Note 2, supra.

37. See Wang's article, Note 28, supra.

38. I Meng-ch'un, "Improving the Quality of Radio Broadcasts by Strengthening the Tie Between Radio Stations and the Listening Public" [Mich'ieh Lien-hsi Ch'un-chung T'i-kao Kuang-po Hsuan-ch'uan Ti Chih-liang], People's Daily (Peking), February 6, 1954.

39. P'an Shih, "Some Problems of the Public Information Work in North China" [Hua-pei Hsin-wen Kung-tso Chung-ti Chi-ko Wen-t'i], People's Daily (Peking), January 4, 1950.

40. Chou Hsin-wu, "Overcoming the Aimless Work-Style in People's Broadcasting" [K'o-fu Jen-min Kuang-po Kung-tso Chung-ti Mang-mu Hsing], Liberation Daily (Shanghai), October 15, 1950.

41. See Mei's article, Note 3, supra.

Following their usual principle that any public activity designed to attract an audience is properly a concern of the government, the Chinese Communists have not overlooked the possibilities of the opera, spoken drama, and film as components of their propaganda and indoctrination system. The over-all problem is the same in each: content must be controlled somehow, whether formally or informally, so as to present the necessary messages in the most palatable and popularly acceptable manner. This problem has been attacked variously by methods ranging from official directives and government supervision through training of directors, actors, playwrights, and technical personnel.

To be effective, each medium must reach the widest possible audience. It has therefore been necessary, especially in the spoken drama and the film industry, to expand production facilities as well as distribution. Control of content is inevitably affected by audience reaction; if the audience reacts to the new productions by indifference or rejection, the control structure must be reexamined and adjusted to give better results. As has been seen in the discussions of the press and publishing, it is never a simple matter to persuade a creative artist to change his ways, nor to persuade an audience to accept new ways of presentation. Aside from the purely technical problems of physical expansion, the major difficulties of the regime in

utilizing the opera, drama, and film have lain in the personal reactions of writers, actors, and audiences to new methods of presentation and changed subject-matter.

In the discussion of the three art forms — opera, spoken drama, and films — we shall be mainly concerned with the problems of expansion, methods of formal control and manipulation of content, and the resistance of writers, performers, and audiences.

THE OPERA

Background

The stage is a traditional form of entertainment in China. Opera is understood and enjoyed by literate and illiterate alike, and is attended by members of all classes.

The drama first flourished during the Yuan Dynasty, when the Mongols ruled China. From that time on, local dramatic techniques developed, became popular, fused with one another, until finally what could be called a national drama came into being. The Ching-hsi, or Peking opera, evolved toward the middle of the nineteenth century, and quickly became the most popular formal entertainment in the nation in the large cities, especially in North China. It is a sophisticated form of the genre — its operas, written in poetic Mandarin by scholars, are highly formalized as to structure, presentation, gesture, action, and music. There are, throughout China, many varieties of local opera which draw a wider and less critical or sophisticated audience. The local operas may, in many cases, use the same stories found in the Peking opera, but in more colloquial forms of local dialects. Presentation is less formalized, more casual, and requires no prior knowledge of the genre for its enjoyment. The regime has given its attention to both local and Peking operas as mediums of propaganda. Since it would be impossible to describe adequately the many forms of local opera in the scope of this book, a description of the Peking opera will be used to indicate, very roughly, the nature of Chinese opera. The reader must remember that what follows

is the most formal and highly-evolved variant of a genre generally much more casual and less stylized.

Unlike Western opera, the Peking opera emphasizes speech, movement, costume, make-up, and musical accompaniment as well as singing. Song is very important and the actor sings a large portion of his parts, but a Chinese opera aims at a harmony of effect which is achieved by a strict formalism applied rigorously to every aspect of the actor's performance.

A good actor is expected to tell the audience a story by word and gesture, and by the symbolism of his dramatic technique. The audience comes to see the actor rather than the play -- which explains the relative unimportance of the playwright in traditional opera; writers for this medium have been, for the most part, unsuccessful scholars. The stage has no scenic aids: a bare platform from which the actor declaims his part, a hanging curtain at the rear, a single carpet on the floor, two plain wooden chairs, and a small table are the basic requirements for a typical stage, whatever its size.

If the stage itself lacks ornament, the costumes of the actors more than make up for it. The contrast is designed to concentrate the attention of the audience on the actor.

The actors' roles are divided into four main types: sheng, tan, ching, and ch'ou, or male, female, painted face, and comic. These symbolize the characters and qualities of certain stereotyped personalities. Each type of role has its own stylized gestures, way of talking, and particular vocal technique.

For nearly two hundred years women's parts were acted by men; only within the past three decades or so have women taken to the Chinese stage, including the Peking opera, sometimes even playing men's roles. However, the most distinguished and talented player of feminine roles today is a man, Mei Lang-fang.

The orchestra is placed on the stage, generally to the right of the audience; the members sit in an arrangement dictated traditionally by the instruments they play. The attire of the musicians is often informal.

The musical accompaniment is carried primarily by the hu-ch'in, a stringed instrument, assisted by other strings and

wood winds. Percussion is used to accentuate the rhythm of body movements and to heighten dramatic moments. The pattern of the music is not itself very flexible, but permits the well-known actors to vary the style according to their own interpretation.

The plays of the Peking opera are customarily divided into wen-hsi and wu-hsi, the former dealing with domestic and social affairs and the latter with military events, the exploits of brigands, and the like. Characteristics of both are often intermingled in the plays, whose plots are drawn from mythology, folklore, and historical sources, both real and legendary. The supreme consideration in composing a play is dramatic effect.

Expansion Under the Communist Program

Since the opera was, and has remained, the most popular form of public entertainment among the Chinese, the new regime had at hand an indoctrination tool of great potential efficiency which needed only internal modification and encouragement, not external expansion.

There are no figures on the size of opera audiences before 1954, but a survey of sixty-nine major cities in 1950 revealed that opera theaters there had a daily audience of 1,800,000.¹ The Communists placed the total national opera audience in 1956 at 500,000,000.²

In September, 1954 there were some 2,300 professional opera companies in China, containing about 150,000 performers.³ The Minister of Cultural Affairs, Shen Yen-ping, reported that at that time there were 1,740 opera theaters in the country.⁴ Opera companies, however, perform not only in theaters but in temple-yards, army camps, and other public gathering places. Furthermore, there are many amateur opera companies, in factories and on farms, that perform on holidays or during times when farm work is slack. It is among these amateur groups that the regime has encouraged expansion by placing them under the supervision of cultural centers, peasants' associations, and rural governments.

According to Communist sources amateur opera companies appeared in the countryside after land reform like "a growth of mushrooms following a spring shower."⁵ The same sources report that in 1951 there were from 1,000 to 5,000 amateur companies in each province. The same development apparently continued. In February, 1953 it was reported that in the villages of the five provinces of East China there were 33,000 amateur opera companies which had already given more than 330,000 performances for 140,000,000 people.⁶ The latest figures show that, as of the fall of 1954, China had more than 100,000 amateur opera companies in rural districts and about 10,000 in the factories.⁷ In their encouragement of these amateur opera companies it will be observed that the Communists are taking advantage of an already-existing and enthusiastic audience.

Formal Control

The emphasis with which formal administrative control must be applied varies from one kind of entertainment to the other. The major problem in the opera is to adjust content to the regime's demands. Supervision of companies and theaters is required, as well as re-education of actors and script writers, but no serious attention need be given to building up audiences, since the opera is already extremely popular.

Of the 2,300 professional opera companies that existed in 1954, 142 were operated by the state and the rest by private interests.⁸ As the collectivization movement advanced, more private opera companies were nationalized. For example, in January, 1956 the 115 companies in Tientsin operated by private interests were taken over by the state, and similar action was taken with the sixty-nine privately-operated companies in Shanghai.⁹

As part of a movement starting in 1945, opera performers were asked to attend special training classes designed to remould their political orientation. These classes usually lasted for three months, during which from several hundred to more than a thousand actors and actresses listened to political speeches by Communist officials and took part in mutual criticism and

self-criticism. In Peking alone two such training classes were held before the end of 1949, with approximately 2,000 actors and actresses.¹⁰ Among these actors and actresses were some of the outstanding performers of the Peking opera such as Hsun Hui-sheng, Shang Hsiao-yun, T'an Fu-ying, and Hsiao Ts'ui-hua.

Meanwhile, opera companies and opera houses were required to apply for licenses from local bureaus of civil affairs; only with such licenses could they continue to produce operas.¹¹ By threatening to withhold the licenses the authorities were able to force companies and opera houses to undergo organizational reform which, in effect, transferred their control to Communist agents or "progressive elements" within the profession.

Lack of co-ordination between agencies or local authorities such as police offices, cultural bureaus, and garrison headquarters led to confusion and chaos. While some corrupt officials were willing to accept bribes from theater owners in return for allowing them to continue to present operas with "reactionary or otherwise undesirable content," other officials resorted to wholesale banning of traditional operas.¹² The municipal government of Hsuehchow outlawed at one stroke the presentation of 200 such operas, and the city of Chi-ning, Shantung Province, approved the presentation of a mere twenty out of 120 local operas.¹³ The Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of Kao-an Hsien, Kiangsi Province, decreed that pending a thorough reform no operas could be presented on the stage.¹⁴

By 1950 the reaction to such sweeping and ill-judged attempts at reform caused the government to take action. The Ministry of Cultural Affairs' Opera Reform Bureau in July, 1950 appointed an advisory committee consisting of forty-three famous opera performers and dramatists including Mei Lan-fang, Ch'eng Yen-chiu, T'ien Han, Ou-yang Yu-ch'ing, Hung Shen, Yuan Hsueh-feng, and Ma Yen-hsiang, and charged it with the responsibility of making recommendations on opera reform policy in general.

On November 27 of the same year the Ministry of Cultural Affairs took another step by convening a National Conference on Opera Reform. Attended by more than two hundred opera reform cadres and representatives of the acting profession from forty-seven provinces and municipalities, the Conference

suggested that henceforth opera reform on the local levels should be handled exclusively by local authorities in charge of cultural affairs, and that the final decision for banning any opera should be reserved for the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Echoing the desire of the regime to utilize opera as "a medium of propaganda," the Conference concluded that while the state should adopt a policy of "letting all flowers flourish," the "feudalistic" opera companies would be expected to undergo a further process of organizational reform along democratic lines, and that a real effort must be made to intensify the political, cultural, and professional education of members of the acting profession.¹⁵

A directive issued on May 4, 1951 by the State Administrative Council embodied practically all of these suggestions.¹⁶ Since that time the indiscriminate suppression seems to have been curtailed, although there continues to be close supervision of all opera activities.

In order to link the presentation of operas with tasks of national reconstruction, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs issued a directive on December 27, 1952 calling upon all professional opera companies to draw up semi-annual or quarterly performance schedules and to submit them for approval to the local authorities in charge of cultural affairs.¹⁷ This directive permits the regime to control not only what operas can be presented, but when they can be performed.

Manipulation of Content

In May, 1942 Mao Tse-tung delivered a series of now famous speeches on the problems of literature and the arts, in which he established the broad principles of Chinese Communist policy toward all cultural activity. The entertainment media as well as literature are ideal instruments for teaching proletarian philosophy to the general public and for raising the cultural level of the population, since they can reach everybody and be universally enjoyed. Mao's views are pragmatic in the extreme: an acceptable cultural activity is one useful in forwarding the aims of the regime.

The most important aim of the opera reform movement has been the revision of repertoires with a view to "replacing the operas' feudalistic, superstitious, and anti-labor themes with ones that might help publicize and eulogize the people's dictatorship, the Communist party, and the People's Government; awaken the political consciousness of the people; stimulate the zeal for production on the part of the people; and praise the new personalities and events of the new era."¹⁸

Much of the reform work has been over-enthusiastic. Local cadres of the regime have been censured for their refusal to consult opera performers and opera-house executives about the revision of scripts, for their dogmatic approach to rewording, for making unwarranted analogies between historical events and the people's revolutionary struggles, and for their failure to distinguish superstition from fairy tale, or romance from lewdness.¹⁹

The kind of violence done to the traditional opera scripts can be seen in what happened to the typical and popular Su San the Courtesan, or Yu-t'ang Ch'un.

The play is set in the Ming Dynasty. Wang Chin-lung, a young scholar of Nanking, falls deeply in love with Su San, a beautiful sing-song girl at a brothel in a town in southern Shansi. Su San returns his love. The young man then builds a pavilion, Yu-t'ang Ch'un, the Happy Hall of Jade, in the gardens of the brothel where they while away the lotus-eating hours. Taking advantage of his infatuation, the mistress of the establishment bleeds the young man white. Finally, on a bitter winter day she turns him out when he has spent all his money. Taking refuge in a temple, the young prodigal eventually meets Chin Ke, a flower vendor whom he had patronized in his prosperous days. Through his offices the lovers meet in the temple. Su San weeps bitterly at Wang's plight and gives him three hundred tails of silver with which to go to Peking and take the imperial examinations, promising that she will wait for his triumphal return. With tears in their eyes, they part.

Unfortunately, Wang is robbed and reduced to beggary. He returns to his old haunts, begging for his living until Su San again gives him money and sends him on his way. This time he

reaches Peking safely, passes his examinations, and is appointed circuit judge. Meanwhile Su San, pining for her lover, refuses to entertain guests any longer in the brothel, and her mistress decides to sell her.

Shen Yen-lin, a rich merchant who has long coveted Su San, is the buyer. Su San is enticed to his home by a story that Wang Chin-lung has been given an appointment and has sent for her. When she finds that she has been trapped it is too late. P'i Shih, the spiteful and violent wife of the merchant, jealous of the girl's beauty and charm, decides to kill Su San with a bowl of poisoned noodles. By accident the merchant swallows the noodles instead and drops dead. His wife accuses Su San of the murder.

A dishonest magistrate, bribed by the merchant's wife, has Su San tortured until she confesses to the crime. In the county jail, awaiting confirmation of the death sentence by a higher court, Su San has a fellow prisoner write out a true statement of her case and conceals it on her person.

Soon the higher court in Taiyuan summons Su San to her new trial. Her lover, Wang Chin-lung, has meanwhile arrived at the provincial capital of Shansi as circuit judge to re-examine all cases transferred there from the various county courts.

When Su San presents her petition to the presiding judge, he is, of course, none other than Wang Chin-lung himself. On the bench with Wang are the provincial judge and the provincial treasurer. The provincial judge, knowing about the past relationship between the prisoner and his superior, questions Su San unmercifully about her personal life. Wang Chin-lung, mortified by the provincial judge's insinuations, finally adjourns the court. That evening he disguises himself and visits Su San in the cells. The provincial judge, anticipating Wang's move, appears at the same time on a pretended tour of inspection. There follows a scene in which the provincial judge threatens to report Wang's activities to the Imperial Board of Justice in Peking, but is dissuaded by the more liberal-minded treasurer, who says that such faithful lovers deserve a better fate.

The real criminals are brought to justice, Su San and her lover are married in the presence of the whole court, and the story ends.

The play as revised according to Communist principles is quite a different matter. Instead of being essentially the love story of Su San and Wang Chin-lung, the revised version is a modern morality play exposing faults in traditional society such as prostitution, polygamy, and official corruption. The new play ends with the mass trial of the real criminals, during which the accusers explain at length how the sins of society have led to Su San's misfortunes; the happy ending is merely a by-product of a general improvement in social conditions.

The Reform Movement

Utilization of traditional opera as a propaganda medium has meant a general reform of script content. As early as 1937, the Communist party organized a special institute within the Lu Hsun College of Arts in Yenan to study the problem.²⁰ Shortly thereafter some opera companies in Communist-controlled regions were persuaded to present only those operas which might arouse revolutionary spirit and help the party enlist popular support. A number of left-wing playwrights and directors, among them T'ien Han and Ma Yen-hsiang, addressed themselves to the promotion of the so-called new operas in Chungking and Kweilin, which were still under Kuomintang control.

After Mao's May, 1942 speech on the role of literature and the arts in a socialist state, the real opera reform movement began, moving with the victorious Communists as they extended their power into areas formerly controlled by the Kuomintang.

One typical part of the reform movement was the establishment of training classes for actors mentioned earlier. Licensing of companies and theaters gave the regime control over the kinds of operas performed, but the most important part of the movement was the reform of repertoires.

The attempt to make these changes brought much confusion and distress into the opera business — the arbitrary outlawing of old operas, the writing of hasty and unsatisfactory new scripts, bribery, corruption, and widespread unemployment (in Shanghai

alone there were some 3,000 unemployed actors in the summer of 1950).²¹ There was eventually much public resentment of the movement: once when a local censor attempted to stop an opera performance the indignant audience attacked him.²² To correct the situation formal measures were adopted by the State Administrative Council's directive of May, 1951, and the reform movement was thus enabled to proceed in a more orderly fashion.

First of all, the political indoctrination of opera performers became routine rather than sporadic. Political commissars are now permanently attached to all opera companies; they lecture the performers on Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and guide them in the study of current affairs and in the weekly conduct of group- and self-criticism. The number of political commissars in an opera company varies according to the size of the company. In October, 1954 Actress Ch'ang Hsiang-yu's company, consisting of some 200 performers, apprentices, and musicians, had, for example, five political commissars attached to it.²³ Besides making political indoctrination of performers a permanent activity, the regime gave members of privately-operated opera companies a voice in the management of their companies, rewrote repertoires, issued new opera scripts, trained new performers, granted financial subsidies to existing privately-owned troupes, and promoted the formation of new companies.

Since then more and more privately-owned opera companies have been nationalized and the opera has been fitted more comfortably into the regime's propaganda system.

In order to make opera performers work faithfully and enthusiastically for its cause, the regime has taken measures to provide them with incentives. The kinds of incentives offered so far have been quite varied: the Communists have tried to create in the actors and actresses a conviction that under the present regime the actor is no longer a social pariah but a "cultural and artistic worker who has the responsibility and honor of educating the people." Indeed, members of the acting profession are no longer referred to as actors or actresses,

terms which had acquired derogatory connotations in traditional China, but as "artists" or "teachers of the people."

Another incentive is to give members of the profession ample opportunity for public recognition. All levels of the government from the basic local units to the national administration regularly hold opera festivals in which the performers of the nation's many kinds of operas can show their talents before dignitaries of the party and government, receive handsome prizes, and win wide publicity through all the media of mass communication. When the First National Opera Festival was held in Peking from October 7 to November 14, 1950, 1,652 actors and actresses, representing twenty-three major kinds of operas from various regions, attended and gave ninety performances. Besides making the famous Hui-jen-t'ang — a hall in the ancient palace within the Forbidden City ordinarily used for state ceremonies — available for the festival, the Central People's Government spent some JMP \$200,000,000 to finance the whole show. To demonstrate the regime's deep interest in the event, Mao Tse-tung, himself a Peking opera fan of long standing, found time to be in the audience every evening, chatting with the performers and having his picture taken with them, gestures of respect for the acting profession never made before by any Chinese chief of state. On the last day of the festival Premier Chou En-lai was present on the platform and witnessed the bestowal of 204 prizes and citations on nearly two hundred contesting teams and performers.²⁴ Following the festival many hitherto obscure actors and actresses from little-known local troupes became nationally famous overnight. Subsequently they were sent to one foreign country after another to make appearances, and were thus enabled not only to see many foreign places but to acquire international reputation.

The Communists also encourage the acting profession by giving selected actors and actresses membership in the New Democratic Youth Corps and the Communist party, a reward that carries with it both material advantage and political prestige. Also, many opera performers have been elected to local people's congresses, and some actors and actresses such as Mei Lan-fang, Chou Hsin-fang, Ch'eng Yen-ch'iu, Yuan Hsueh-

feng, and Ch'ang Hsiang-yu have even found their way to the National People's Congress, the highest law-making body in Communist China. Through such extraordinary honors and favorable treatment, the Communist regime has apparently been able to cultivate good feeling among some segments of the acting profession and thus to secure their fuller cooperation.²⁵

Resistance to the Program

Despite the efforts of the regime to keep the acting profession loyal and happy, some discontent and uneasiness still overcast the Chinese stage. This is evidenced by the criticism and complaints of actors during the short period of "contending and blooming" in 1957. For example, Yeh Sheng-ch'ang, a well-known actor of the Peking opera, told a symposium on opera that the Communist officials in the Peking opera theaters behaved like dictators, making decisions arbitrarily and demanding absolute obedience. Incompetent but subservient actors and actresses were promoted, said Yeh, whereas capable and self-respecting ones were usually discriminated against. Yeh further charged that the Communist party workers treated many non-Communist performers as if they were "convicts" to be pushed around and humiliated at will. Finally, the famous actor said that if the regime could not trust the non-Communist actors and actresses, it might as well liquidate them altogether, for, as he saw it, outright liquidation would save them from further humiliation and frustration.²⁶ According to another critic, ever since the Communists had entered the theaters there had been "perpetual tensions backstage and such tensions might explode at any time."²⁷

Although these outspoken critics were subsequently purged by the regime, it is probable that the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Chinese theater was not corrected by the purge. Indeed, the purge and the rectification campaign that followed the "contending and blooming" may have intensified the tensions in the theatrical circles. If so, the regime must have found it more difficult to win the active support of the acting profession.

THE SPOKEN DRAMA

Background

The history of the spoken drama in China goes back no more than three or four decades; it is a modern development, and differs from the traditional Chinese opera in several ways — the dialogue imitates ordinary speech, there is no operatic singing at all, and even folk songs are merely incidental. There is no musical accompaniment. Less firmly founded in tradition, the spoken drama has never achieved the kind of popularity the opera has long held.

Expansion Under the Communist Program

The regime has had a difficult problem in trying to use the spoken drama as a propaganda weapon. Because of the relative youth of this art form, there is no firmly-established tradition of content or presentation to modify, but at the same time there is no large, ready-made audience eager to attend its productions. It is thus necessary to train and educate writers and actors to produce plays in line with the aims of the regime and at the same time to increase audiences. The two factors are interdependent — if the plays are not good enough, the people will not go to see them.

For this reason, since 1949 the regime has had nothing like the success achieved during the years of the Anti-Japanese War. In those years Communist and pro-Communist writers came up, one after another, with play scripts skillfully and dramatically expressing themes that exploited the people's dissatisfaction with various wartime phenomena — inflation, scarcity of goods, high prices, market speculation, and corruption in government — and won popular sympathy and support for the Communists. When these plays were presented in either Communist- or Kuomintang-controlled territory, they drew large audiences, ran for weeks at each theater, and won prolonged applause.

After the present regime was established, however, the Communists found that the spoken drama had lost much of its appeal to the public. Since then the booking record for the spoken drama theaters has generally been poor; for the last nine years or so, the theaters have had good luck with only half a dozen plays.

Formal Control

The objectives of formal administrative controls over the entertainment media vary with the popularity of the media. Since the spoken drama is still a relatively new art form lacking tradition and acceptance, the regime can make use of it only if it first builds up its popularity. There is no backlog of plays that can be revised to fit the demands of the regime, and thus, while no police-action is required to keep reactionary material out of its productions, supervision is needed to encourage the writing of effective scripts in sufficient quantity. The actual formal controls have in general paralleled those of the opera, and involve supervision of scripts and licensing of companies and theaters. Much effort has been invested in attempts to get scripts produced; the resulting pressure on writers will be taken up later. Actors in the spoken drama lack the prestige accorded automatically to opera performers, and a good deal of attention has been given to raising their morale and to improving their standing in the public eye.

Manipulation of Content

Mao Tse-tung, in his speeches of 1942, considered the spoken drama, like all popular art forms, an excellent instrument for educating the people in proletarian philosophy and for raising general cultural standards. Accordingly, most spoken drama scripts, of recent vintage and written to order, reflect quite accurately the regime's political line. The only problem is to arrive at productions which are as acceptable to the public as to

the regime. A couple of examples will illustrate the nature of the productions so far.

One, a relatively successful play, is The White-Haired Girl or Pai-mao Nu. Written by a group of Communist playwrights in Yen-an shortly before V-J Day, it is aimed at exposing the crimes of the land-owning class in pre-Communist society, but revolves around the life of a peasant girl named Yang Hsi-erh. As the play begins, the father of the heroine is driven to suicide by an evil landlord's cruel exploitation. The landlord then seduces and debauches the bereft daughter. She escapes to a hidden cave where she bears his child. As a result of her sorrow and hardship, her once lovely black hair turns white. She keeps herself and her child alive by stealing back to the village at night and taking the food offerings left on the altar of the local temple. The villagers glimpse but do not recognize her. They refer to her with awe as "the white-haired fairy" and keep on leaving food for her. The mystery is unraveled by the Communists after their arrival in the village, and they call the peasants together for a mass trial of the landlord, Huang, who receives the death penalty for his criminal behavior. When the sentence is announced, the village party secretary proclaims:

The old society forced human beings to live like ghosts, but the new society has transformed ghosts into human beings, and brought salvation to many of our good, long-suffering sisters.

The play ends as all the players on the stage triumphantly sing:

Huang Shih-jen, at last your head is bowed and you are trembling. Your feudalism of a thousand years has been uprooted. Your ten-thousand year-old chains are smashed to pieces. We who have long suffered begin a new life today.

Another spoken drama that has been well-received is The Dragon-Beard Ditch or Lung-hsu Kou. The play is a eulogy of the Communist regime's "genuine concern" for public welfare; it was written in 1951 by Lau Shu, author of the well-known

novel, The Rickshaw Boy of some twenty years ago. The setting of the play is a suburban slum outside the city wall of Peking through which runs a small creek known as the Dragon-Beard Ditch. Although local officials of previous regimes had collected exorbitant river-dredging and sanitation taxes from the local residents, they had consistently neglected this ditch, which eventually accumulated so much filth that it became a menace to public health. The Communist liberators arrive, promptly clean up the little stream and build a road along one of its banks. Upon completion of the road, the local residents hold a meeting to celebrate the memorable event. Many people speak with great feeling, expressing their gratitude to the Communists and denouncing the poor administration and lack of public-mindedness of the former rulers. One participant makes a resounding final remark:

Our good government loves us poor people, and enables us to live a new and wholesome life; it has improved the ditch and built a new paved road, so that we may walk erect, with a proud stride. We, the laboring masses, will forge ahead with a single mind, striving to put forth an even greater united effort, so that our country will prosper and our people live in peace.

The success of these two plays was exceptional. In general, Communist playwrights have failed to produce drama scripts that carry political messages in what the regime's Minister of Cultural Affairs once called "a full-blooded form of artistic expression, capable of arousing an enduring interest on the part of the theater-goer."²⁸ Play scripts written since 1949 are almost all one-act plays dogmatically portraying the new life of the Chinese people, zealously paying high tribute to the Communist regime, and passionately calling upon the population to make greater exertions in the building of a socialist society.²⁹ Even the Minister of Cultural Affairs has confessed that such plays, when presented on the stage, evoke disparaging remarks among the audience, such as: "Oh, another propaganda show."³⁰

The Reform Movement

During the first few months of 1956, the Communist regime took several steps toward a more effective utilization of the spoken drama. In March a spoken drama festival was held in Peking for the first time since the founding of the regime. Attended by dramatic troupes from all over the country and by high-ranking officials of the party and government, this festival was designed to heighten the morale of the performers, directors, and playwrights and to arouse fresh popular interest in the spoken drama.

A month later, the Ministry of Cultural Affairs convened a conference on the spoken drama. Among other things, the conference resolved that the authorities should do everything possible to promote playwriting, to give further professional training to players working in dramatic troupes, to expand educational facilities for future players, to improve the organization and operation of dramatic troupes, and to readjust the pay-scales of playwrights, directors, and players.³¹

Shortly after the adjournment of the conference, the Standing Committee of the Executive Council of the All-China Theatrical Association held its fourth meeting and made a decision to reorganize the association so that it could more effectively rally members of the profession around the regime, organize playwrights to write more and better plays, and help the government take any necessary measures for the improvement of the spoken drama.³²

A quota system was established under which playwrights were obliged to produce fixed numbers of play scripts periodically. So far, this measure has been quite effective in increasing the annual output of play scripts, but has completely failed to improve their quality. This lack of good scripts remains the major obstacle to an effective use of the spoken drama as a propaganda medium.

Resistance to the Program

The lack of good drama scripts has caused the regime much concern. Minister of Cultural Affairs Shen Yen-ping, reporting

on the situation to the first session of the National People's Congress, said that playwrights must do some serious self-examination about their performance in recent years.³³ From that time on, the official line ascribed the playwrights' poor performance to their lack of a thorough grasp of Marxism, Leninism, and the thought of Mao Tse-tung, and to their failure to make close observations and earnest analyses of the actual life of the people, which the Communist leaders regard as the only source of raw material for realistic yet creative dramatic works. At an informal conference held late in 1955 in Peking, however, a group of playwrights complained that the shortage of good play scripts was due to the cultural authorities' failure to give constructive help and guidance to the playwrights. They said that government censors and theater managements were sometimes too captious in judging the fitness of play scripts, that playwrights were denied the right to collect royalties from theaters if the latter adopted their scripts for presentation, and that publishers often refused to consider acceptance of play scripts of a substantial size for publication. By implication they indicated that these and other discouraging factors had made playwrights unwilling to pick up their pens or had inclined others to write only short plays with those simple and familiar themes which, though usually devoid of artistic richness, can easily get the censor's approval and the publisher's acceptance without much difficulty.³⁴

At the same conference it was said that the trouble with the spoken drama in recent years was by no means confined to the scarcity of good scripts, that there were a number of other factors equally detrimental to an effective use of plays for propaganda and indoctrination. The speakers mentioned, among other things, the imbalances in the organizational structure of the theaters and dramatic troupes, the bureaucratic work style of the party workers who were in charge of them, the egalitarian remuneration system of the state-owned theaters and dramatic troupes, and the players' lack of adequate training in dramatic arts.

Not only does the scarcity of satisfactory scripts continue, but all the other factors that the playwrights, directors, and

players in 1955 held accountable for the regime's failure to utilize the spoken drama effectively still exist. During the short period of "contending and blooming" in the middle of 1957, for instance, critics repeated practically the same criticisms that had been voiced two years earlier. Some of the later critics went even further in expressing dissatisfaction with the state of affairs; they directly attributed all the shortcomings and mistakes to the party leadership. The famous playwright Wu Tsu-kuang said bluntly that the party's rigid control of dramatic expression lay at the roots of subjectivism, dogmatism, sectarianism, and bureaucratism in theatrical work.³⁵

Although this frontal attack on the party's policy of controlling literary expression and theatrical presentation was quickly rebuked and outlawed, one of the regime's spokesmen had to admit that virtually all the other criticisms were valid.³⁶

As Wu Tsu-kuang pointed out, as long as the Communists refuse to relax their control of dramatic expression, it is unlikely that they will ever be able to improve the spoken drama to any appreciable extent.

THE FILMS

Background

Communist domination of the Chinese film industry had its first beginnings in 1932 with the infiltration of regular studios by playwrights, directors, and performers who were members of the Communist underground. In 1938 the party began its first independent film production in a small way. Until 1949 the films dealt generally with the "war for the people's liberation," and were designed to fit specific situations. They celebrated the exploits of the Eighth Route Army (forerunner of the People's Liberation Army) against the Japanese, the party's mobilization of manpower and material resources in the border regions, its contributions to national independence, and attempted to establish it in the minds of the people as a patriotic group to counteract Kuomintang charges that it was treasonable.³⁷ From 1946 to 1948, when the Northeast was the principal battleground of the civil

war, the films were devoted to documenting victories won by Communist forces and to recording the "enthusiastic support" of those forces by the people; they were intended to demonstrate the might and popularity of the Communist cause, and thus to strengthen the faith of Communist followers in ultimate victory over the Kuomintang.³⁸

As the Communist forces advanced and the Kuomintang retreated, existing film studios were taken over and output increased. The films continued to stress the victories and heroism of the People's Liberation Army and the popular support it received, but coverage was extended to problems resulting from the victory of the revolution. The people had to be persuaded to work enthusiastically for the new regime without much in the way of immediate material rewards, and had to be shown the unavoidable difficulties the regime faced in this early period of its control; the workers had to be shown their responsibility to the new society. To serve these purposes feature pictures like The Red Flag, Be United for a Better Tomorrow, and Going Forward and Singing Loud were produced. There was also the problem of enlisting popular support to uncover agents of the Kuomintang, and thus spy and sabotage detection became a subject of films like The Invincible Battle Front. The land-reform movement in the newly-liberated territory brought forth films stressing the landlords' exploitation of the peasants under the traditional land-tenure system and publicizing the happy life of peasants in the areas where reform had already been carried out — The White-Haired Girl, The Northern Shensi Shepherd, The Cheerful Peasant Family. There were, of course, other themes, such as the Kuomintang's misrule and the "white terror" against Communist underground agents and other "progressive elements," but until 1951 films having a direct bearing on current policies were predominant on the Chinese screen.

During 1951 and 1952 campaigns and movements such as the Anti-America and Aid-Korea Movements, the Three-Anti Movement, the Five-Anti Movement, the Movement for the Suppression of Counterrevolutionaries, and the Campaign to Propagandize the New Marriage Law were reflected in documentary films and newsreels. The Communists' consolidation of power in

Sinkiang and the extension of jurisdiction to Tibet were also reflected in documentary films and newsreels with such titles as Joyful Land — Sinkiang, Tibet Under the Sunshine, and The Great Unity of the Chinese Nation.

In 1953 and 1954 more new themes were introduced in the films. Some pictures showed the individual worker striving for increased efficiency in production, while others dealt with individual participation in government or young people's struggles to attain freedom of choice in marriage.

In 1955, when the movement for the socialist transformation of economy was intensified, the cooperative movement in industry, commerce, and agriculture became an important subject of Chinese films. Other moving pictures emphasized the importance of youth education and naval power. The emphasis on youth education was, of course, evidence of the Communists' high hopes for the younger generation, while the interest in naval development had a direct connection with the regime's preparation for the "liberation" of Taiwan.

The relationship between political pressures and the content of films is constant under the Chinese Communist system. The methods by which control is exerted and the kinds of films the system produces will be discussed later in this chapter.

Expansion Under the Communist Program

The potential audience for films in China is very large, but in order to make use of motion pictures as part of the propaganda network the Chinese Communists had two major problems: how to reach the audience, and what to show it. They were confronted with the necessity of building up an entire industry from practically nothing, they had to train personnel on all levels to run it, and they had to work out a distribution system to reach the audience. They undertook this giant task with enthusiasm, and their efforts have reaped a large measure of success.

The Audience. Although the size of the cinema audience in Communist China has been steadily increasing during the past few years, it is still relatively small compared to the total

Chinese population. With a population of about 600,000,000 in 1957, the average attendance per individual at film shows (except film showings in the armed forces) was less than 2.6 shows per year. Even if this figure is adjusted to exclude all children under ten years of age, the national average number of film attendances for 1957 was only about 3.9 per person.³⁹ The national average, of course, is affected by the lower frequency of film attendance by the rural population. According to a Communist report, during an eight-year period ending on December 31, 1956 the average cinema attendance of a city inhabitant was fifty shows as compared with less than two shows for a rural resident.⁴⁰

Cinema theaters are located in large and medium-sized cities. Mobile screen teams are organized to provide film showings to people in small towns and rural districts, especially at workers' clubs and reading rooms. The use of such workers' clubs and reading rooms for the showings has a particular advantage for the Communist party; it greatly facilitates the attempt to integrate the film with other propaganda and agitation efforts. Film showings are frequently followed by the appearance of a local Communist agitator who "clarifies" the film's content. As in the Soviet Union, a good film which has doctrinal content is a powerful instrument in the hands of an experienced propagandist. On the other hand, if poorly done, such programs may keep people away.

Film Projection. Communist sources disclose that, as of June, 1950, there were only 467 cinema theaters and 100 mobile screen units in China.⁴¹ In the same year, the regime made a tremendous effort to increase film projection facilities in the nation. Besides 1,886 newly-trained projector operators who boosted the total strength of the film projection personnel to some 8,000 persons, the regime was able to report in May, 1951 an increase in the total number of cinema theaters to 674 and the number of mobile screen teams to 700.⁴² During subsequent years, efforts to increase the film projection network have continued. In 1955 there were 821 cinema theaters and 3,548 mobile screen teams (exclusive of those teams in the

armed forces).⁴³ In 1957 the Director of the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts stated that by the end of the year there would be a total of 9,296 film-showing units (exclusive of those in the armed forces), including 975 cinema theaters, 6,844 mobile screen teams, and 1,477 "cinema clubs."⁴⁴ In June, 1958 the same official announced that the regime had decided to expand the film projection facilities still further, so in five years 90 per cent of the nearly 2,400 county seats would have movie theaters and every hsiang (administrative village) a mobile screen team.⁴⁵ According to the official estimate, when this plan was completed city people could go to the cinema ten times a year and the peasants six to eight times annually.⁴⁶ Table 10 shows the growth of film projection facilities in Communist China from 1949 to 1957.

TABLE 9
GROWTH OF FILM AUDIENCE IN COMMUNIST
CHINA: 1950-1957

Year	Approximate Audience
1950	146,000,000
1951	220,800,000
1952	584,190,000
1953	752,000,000
1954	822,000,000
1955	986,400,000
1956	1,367,000,000
1957	1,740,000,000

Sources: Liberation Daily (Shanghai) [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao], January 23, 1953.

People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], October 18, 1954; July 13, 1955; and June 15, 1956.

Popular Cinema [Ta-chung Tien-ying], No. 145 (February 26, 1957), p. 24.

China Daily News (New York) [Hua-chiao Jih-Pao], April 17, 1958.

TABLE 10
GROWTH OF FILM PROJECTION FACILITIES IN
COMMUNIST CHINA: 1949-1957

Year	No. of Cinema Theaters	No. of Mobile Screen Teams
1949	467	100
1950	674	750
1951	700	1,000
1952	755	1,119
1953	783	2,254
1954	800	2,700
1955	821	3,548
1956	953	6,232
1957	975	6,844

Sources: People's Daily (Peking), June 20, 1950 and September 28, 1954.

Liberation Daily (Shanghai), March 17, 1951.

Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao], September 14, 1954; April 25, 1955, and September 23, 1955.

Extracts from China Mainland Magazines [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 123 (March 17, 1958), p. 31.

Development of Technical Facilities. The motion picture, being an even more recent form of entertainment in China than the spoken drama, has received Communist attention since 1932, when several playwrights, members of the Communist underground, gained control of the screenplay department of the privately-owned Star Movie Studio in Shanghai. These writers included Hsia Yen, Hung Shen, Ch'ien Hsing-ts'un, and Cheng Po-ch'i. Other film studios in the city were also infiltrated by Communist and pro-Communist playwrights, directors, and performers shortly thereafter. This movement permitted the injection into the films produced of content designed to further party aims,⁴⁷ but the Communists felt it necessary to make

their own motion pictures as well. In 1938 seven party members were appointed to produce a documentary film, Yenan and the Eighth Route Army.⁴⁸ This was a silent film, not released until 1940. The Communists produced only five more silent films up to V-J Day because of technical limitations and lack of equipment. In 1946 they established the Northeast Film Studio in Manchuria, probably with the help of Soviet experts, and by 1948 it had produced nineteen documentaries and newsreels dealing generally with the "war for the people's liberation." After the capture of Mukden later in the same year they amalgamated the Kuomintang studio there with the Northeast Film Studio, set it up in Ch'ang-chun and gave it the name of that city.

Following the conquest of Peking and Shanghai in early 1949 the Communists took over former Kuomintang film studios there and reorganized them as the Peking Film Studio and the Shanghai Film Studio. When the Central People's Government was formed in October, 1949, these three studios were put under the direct control of the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts in the Ministry of Cultural Affairs. Film studios owned and operated by private interests were not nationalized then, but were made use of through control and supervision of film production. No films could be made whose content contradicted the spirit or provisions of the "Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference" — a document containing the basic policies of the regime.⁴⁹ Films could be produced only if they served political purposes beneficial to the people; they should "portray the new life of the Chinese and their heroic struggles against social injustice, political oppression, and foreign aggression both past and present."

In 1952 the regime merged the eight privately-owned film studios in Shanghai into a "jointly-operated enterprise" known as the China United Film Studio.⁵⁰ In February, 1953 the government purchased the stock of the only remaining privately-owned studio, thus completing the nationalization of the nation's film industry.⁵¹ This latter studio, the Shanghai Scientific and Educational Film Studio, is devoted exclusively to the production of scientific and educational movies. At about the same time the regime established two new film studios, the China Newsreel

Studio and the People's Liberation Army Film Studio. The former, supervised by the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts, is devoted to the production of newsreels and documentary films related to current events. The People's Liberation Army Film Studio makes films for military education and publicizes the achievements and life of the armed forces under the direction of the Political Department of the Supreme Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army.

On January 12, 1954 the "State Administrative Council's Decisions on the Strengthening of Film Production Work and the Expansion of the Film Screening Network" was promulgated, and gave impetus to the development of the industry. Construction of additional studios and the establishment of an adequate technical base for the industry within three to five years was planned in the directive.⁵² To implement the decisions the regime founded in 1955 a school of cinematographic arts in Peking for the training of cameramen, directors, actors, and projection personnel.

Starting in 1956 the regime attacked the problem of technical facilities for movie-making, aiming at freeing China from dependence on imported cameras, projection equipment, raw film, and film-copying machinery. Although the program is not yet complete, many factories are now in operation, and there are no serious obstacles to its success.⁵³

Film Output. Despite the continued expansion and improvement in its physical structure and technical base, the Communist film industry has not so far been overwhelmingly successful in motion picture production. During the seven-year period ending December 31, 1955 the film studios produced only 128 feature pictures, 67 long documentary films, 398 short documentaries 96 scientific and educational movies, 22 art films, and 635 newsreels.⁵⁴

It is noteworthy that during the past nine years, while the Communists have been able to increase gradually the annual production of newsreels, documentary films, and scientific and educational films, their output of feature pictures has been low. Before the Communists' assumption of power in 1949, the non-

Communist film studios in Shanghai alone produced over one hundred feature pictures per year,⁵⁵ whereas the yearly output under the Communist regime has never exceeded sixty.⁵⁶ The peak was reached in 1950, but the next year not a single film studio produced a feature picture.⁵⁷ Although the film industry was able to resume production of feature pictures in 1952, it produced only four that year.⁵⁸ The low productivity has persisted since, even though the situation is somewhat better than it was three years ago. The following table shows the annual output of feature films from 1949 to 1958:

TABLE 11
ANNUAL OUTPUT OF FEATURE PICTURES OF THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST FILM INDUSTRY: 1949-1958

Year	Number of Pictures
1949	23
1950	60
1951	None
1952	4
1953	10
1954	13
1955	18
1956	38
1957	40
1958	(planned target) 75

Sources: Liberation Daily (Shanghai), May 7, 1951.
Wang Lan-hsi's article cited in Note 57 of this chapter.
People's Daily (Peking), January 12, 1954.
Popular Cinema, No. 118 (January 11, 1956), p. 32.
Ibid., No. 143 (January 20, 1957), p. 18.
New China News Agency Release, February 27, 1958.

Imported Films. Partly as a result of its inability to produce enough films of its own, and partly for reasons of policy, the Chinese Communist regime has made considerable use of motion pictures produced in Soviet Russia and other countries under Communist influence.

One prominent Communist observed in the fall of 1954 that Chinese film studios had dubbed Chinese dialogue sound tracks onto 199 feature pictures and twenty long documentary films imported from the Soviet Union and other countries within the Soviet orbit.⁵⁹ As of July, 1957 the total number of foreign films (including feature pictures, documentary films, scientific-educational films, art films, and newsreels) that had been given Chinese soundtracks was placed by a Communist official at 1,426.⁶⁰ It is believed that Communist China will continue to import large numbers of such films in future.

The Soviet films have proven to be quite popular.⁶¹ By October, 1957, according to a Communist report 465 Soviet films (exclusive of newsreels and art films) with Chinese soundtracks had been shown to audiences totaling 1,497,280,000 persons.⁶² Certain Soviet films were said to have drawn especially large audiences: the total number of people who saw the Great Battle of Stalingrad was placed at 8,000,000, and the number who saw the Fall of Berlin was estimated at 15,000,000.⁶³

According to the Communists, the growth of attendance at Soviet films in China "has strengthened the great friendship between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union, has made the Chinese people more fond of Lenin and Stalin and appreciative of the superiority of the Soviet system . . . and has convinced the Chinese people that the Soviet society is the best model upon which their own society should be patterned."⁶⁴

Meanwhile, measures were taken to get rid of the American films that had dominated Chinese screens before the Communist accession to power in 1949. Systematic efforts to suppress both American and British films began in September of that year, four months after the liberation of Shanghai, where such films were most popular.

In September, 1949 the Liberation Daily of Shanghai published a great number of letters to the editor urging the regime to

inspect and ban "pernicious" films imported from Hollywood. Some of the letters bore the signatures of well-known script writers, directors, and film stars. Shortly thereafter, the Shanghai Bureau of Literary Affairs met and announced that immediate steps would be taken by the government to inspect the imported films, and that all pictures whose contents were "inconsistent with morality and the interests of the Chinese people in general" would be banned from the screen.⁶⁵

From then on, the number of Anglo-American films in Shanghai theaters and the size of their audiences diminished. By the middle of 1950, the Communists were able to announce that American and British films no longer dominated the theaters in Shanghai and would soon be completely suppressed.⁶⁶ They reported that only one cinema theater in Hangchow was still showing American films and that American and British productions had disappeared from all screens in Nanking six months earlier.⁶⁷ In Peking and Tientsin the last showing of American films was in July, 1950 soon after the outbreak of the Korean War.

While the regime has permitted a certain number of films made in non-Communist countries to be imported and shown during the past four years or so, the policy which led to the banning of American and British films has not been abandoned; films with bourgeois or otherwise unacceptable themes are still prohibited. The remaining importation of foreign films is a part of the cultural exchange program used by the regime to encourage non-Communist countries to open their doors to Chinese films, cultural missions, and propaganda literature. The showing of such films is done under the direct sponsorship of the regime itself, and the countries from which the films originate are those with whom the regime wants to establish friendly relations. In 1955 the regime proclaimed an "Indian Film Week," for example, during which four Indian movies were shown in the metropolitan areas, and in 1956 a "Japanese Film Week" was similarly proclaimed. According to the playwright Ch'en Pai-ch'en, many such foreign films proved far more popular with Chinese audiences than those produced in Communist China.⁶⁸

The cultural exchange, so far as motion pictures are concerned, has apparently been rather successful. From 1950 to 1956 the Chinese Communist regime was able to have 304 of its films shown in fifty-two non-Communist lands, including twenty-five Asian-African countries, thirteen Western European nations, eleven Latin American republics, and Canada.⁶⁹ Before the outbreak of the Korean War some Chinese Communist documentary films were also shown in New York. Usually the Peking regime donates the films going to non-Communist countries, sometimes sending with the film a special delegation of Chinese movie stars. When the Egyptian government proclaimed a "Chinese Film Week" on September 16, 1957, a delegation of movie stars headed by Pai Yang, one of the leading actresses in Communist China, appeared in Cairo. It is not yet possible to assess the political effect, if any, of the Chinese Communist films' penetration into non-Communist lands.

Formal Control

Of the three entertainment media under discussion, the motion picture industry has required the most varied administrative activity and machinery. Technical production had to be stimulated and directed, actors, directors, and writers trained and supervised, and distribution techniques perfected.

The film industry is, essentially, a government agency and is so administered. A survey of the regime's measures to control production and distribution will demonstrate this point.

Production. Besides taking over the physical facilities for film production, the regime in 1954 laid down rules to insure the ideological correctness of films produced.

Before producing a film, a studio had to seek "guidance" from appropriate government agencies in the selection of themes for its script, and submit a résumé of the script to the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts for preliminary review. The same bureau examined the completed film. After final approval had been granted by the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, the film could be distributed.

This procedure, however, applied only to films without significant political implications. The Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the party had direct control over individual films of greater political significance, and over the examination and approval of annual film production schedules.

While new film studios were still being built, the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts in May, 1958 held a national conference on film work, to plan a reorganization of the film industry.⁷⁰ The conference decided that the Central People's Government was to hand over all of the existing film studios except the China Newsreel Studio and the People's Liberation Army Studio to appropriate provincial or municipal governments for direction and supervision.⁷¹ All provinces and autonomous regions in the country were to establish their own film studios by the end of 1961. Such studios must have facilities and personnel capable of producing all kinds of films.⁷² It was reported that newsreels had already been produced in the provinces of Kiangsu, Shensi, Shantung, Kwangtung, Chekiang, and Anhwei and the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, and that all other provinces and autonomous regions would set up newsreel studios before 1959.⁷³ The conference declared that all its measures were designed to bring about an upsurge in film production and enable the industry to turn out films of high quality that would be national in style but would have a distinct local flavor, in order to advance the country's socialist construction and serve the needs of workers, peasants, and soldiers.⁷⁴

Distribution. Since 1950 there has been a nation-wide film distributing network known as the China Film Company. Operating under the direction and supervision of the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts, this network is designed to bring the most appropriate films at the most appropriate time before the most appropriate audience, in order to advance the propaganda goals of the regime.

Although film distribution as a whole has been quite satisfactory, it is apparently not without shortcomings.⁷⁵ In allocating films, some officials apparently do not make sufficiently careful studies of local needs. Too many or too few films may be sent

to a given area during a given period; films intended for urban inhabitants may be sent to the countryside or vice versa; new films often reach rural and small-town audiences long after they have been shown in the cities. The latter trouble can be attributed to shipping difficulties and lack of sufficient film copies, although some Communists feel it could be avoided if the distributing agencies gave more attention to the matter.⁷⁶ The inefficiencies of the film distribution network appear to parallel those in the book distribution area, and probably spring from similar causes: lack of coordination and a shortage of properly trained and experienced personnel.

Manipulation of Content

The motion picture, like the spoken drama, is a recent newcomer to China, and therefore yields greater opportunity for the presentation of new ideas and messages than does the opera. Yet writers and directors, for a while at least, must be drawn from intellectuals trained under another political system; film scripts therefore have been carefully supervised by the regime to insure their political acceptability. The problem is not dissimilar to that in the publishing industry and presents the Communists with the same dilemma: tight policies of supervision may result in mediocre productions, while loose policies might entail political dangers. Still, the regime has pressed hard for expansion of the industry, despite unevenness of production, rebellious writers, and distribution difficulties.

Three typical films produced in 1956 indicate the kind of fare approved by the regime. The first features the life of Li Shih-chen, the famous Chinese herbal specialist of the 16th century. It is designed to show the usefulness of traditional Chinese medical science and to provide inspiration for its advancement in the light of modern medical and pharmaceutical developments.

The second picture, Fifteen Strings of Cash, celebrates judicial integrity. It is the story of a conscientious judge of ancient China who, suspecting the validity of evidence, refused to approve three lower-court death sentences imposed on a girl and young man charged with stealing fifteen strings of cash and

committing murder; he subsequently found the accused pair innocent after further investigation proved the falsity of the evidence. The object of the movie plot was apparently to assign the blame for miscarriages of justice to individual judges, rather than to the regime's judicial system.⁷⁷

The third and perhaps most noteworthy picture is an art film called The Arrogant General. As its title indicates, this short film was apparently designed to discourage and restrain overbearing and presumptuous militarists who tend to be potentially dangerous once the violent days of revolution are over.

Among the forty feature pictures made in 1957, two are of particular interest. The Deep Friendship shows how scientists dedicate their knowledge and talents to the fatherland. The production of this film was undoubtedly synchronized with the regime's campaign to win the cooperation and support of scientists for the task of socialist reconstruction. Many members of the Chinese scientific professions had not been happy under the Communist regime, and had revealed their dissatisfaction during the short period of "contending and blooming" in May, 1957; at that time leading scientists and engineers, including Professor Ch'ien Wei-ch'ang and Dr. Ts'eng Chao-lun, formerly admirers of the Communists, made scathing criticisms of the Peking regime for its interference with scientific pursuits.

A Party Militant Returns from the City is concerned with the changed attitude of the village-born party worker whose experiences in the city have given him false notions of his position. He no longer sees himself in his proper role as a member of the proletariat, but is arrogant and overbearing; he alienates the villagers, and does not even recognize his own parents. This film, reflecting the rectification campaign launched in 1957, shows the regime's alarm at the arrogance, corruption, and bureaucratism that had developed within the ranks of the party and the government.

The Reform Movement

The reform movement in the film industry was concerned mainly with the content of scripts, and resulted more in imme-

ciate confusion than in improvement. Because of Communist dissatisfaction with the doctrinal and political content of previous feature pictures, production was halted in 1951 and there was a low output in ensuing years.

The history of the Biography of Wu Hsun, a picture to which the Communists objected, had almost as many ramifications as that of the ill-fated Dream of the Red Chamber. Wu Hsun was a man who had devoted his life to an attempt to raise educational funds for illiterate peasants by begging. When the picture was released it was warmly received by audiences and highly praised by critics for its content as well as its artistic quality. Reaction set in, however, in April, 1951: the film was attacked from all sides. It was pointed out that Wu Hsun's effort to improve the lot of the poor peasants through education showed that he considered illiteracy to be the main cause of their suffering, that he was blind to the reality of class exploitation, and that his actions served only to allay class hostility, to the benefit of the landowners.⁷⁸

The script's author was himself accused of failing to recognize these facts, even though he presented Wu Hsun as a man who waged a life-long struggle against the governing class on behalf of the exploited peasantry, and who possessed the admirable qualities of industry, courage, and intelligence. On May 20, 1951 the People's Daily (Peking) pointed out in an editorial that the errors of the script writer and the earlier critics resulted from socio-political confusion, and demanded that such confusion be thoroughly cleared up.⁷⁹ Encouraged by this editorial, the Communist press as a whole joined in an attack on the producer and the entire cast of the picture as well as the newspapers and periodicals that had publicized it and commented favorably upon it.

Under this pressure the newspapers and magazines made public confessions of their "imprudent and irresponsible" actions in publicizing the film originally. On May 23rd Sun Yu, the author of the script and director of the picture, published his self-criticism in an article in the Liberation Daily of Shanghai entitled "A Preliminary Examination of My Mistakes Made in the Motion Picture, The Biography of Wu Hsun."⁸⁰ The next day the

Kun-lun Film Studio announced that the picture had been withdrawn and that all the studio's personnel would conduct thorough group- and self-criticism of their part in the production of the film.⁸¹

Meanwhile, high-ranking officials in charge of cultural and educational affairs in Shanghai publicly blamed themselves for failure to discover the "undesirable and harmful" content of the picture when the studio first sought their approval of its production.⁸²

Since the demarcation line between "correct" and "incorrect" attitudes is so thin, and since the case of the Biography of Wu Hsun had amply demonstrated the penalties of carelessly going astray, people in the film industry became increasingly cautious as the campaign to detect deviations went on. The greatest impact of the campaign was on the writers of film scripts. Since they ran the greatest danger of being caught in socio-political deviation, they practically stopped writing, with the result that production of feature-length pictures also stopped in 1951, and the output in subsequent years was low.

Alarmed by the script shortage, the regime held a special conference in the spring of 1953 at which the writers were reportedly soothed and encouraged to step up their work again. Although some writers did increase their output in the next two years, the total number of scripts was still inadequate to meet the needs of the film industry.

During the period of "contending and blooming" in 1957 it was revealed that the Communist authorities had never actually relaxed their control of film-making despite such public gestures. In addition to interfering with script content, casts, and compensation for script writers, political commissars in studios were reported to have gone so far as to prescribe even the manner of saying "Thank you" on the screen.⁸³ Other means aiming at the achievement of ideological orthodoxy included orientation conferences of film workers and systematic reviews in the press.

In 1955 the Political Bureau of the party decided that it was necessary to sacrifice quality for quantity, and the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts was therefore instructed that "since the broad masses were urgently in need of culture and recreation, "

only a few of the films produced each year must be on a high artistic and doctrinal level; the remaining pictures would serve their purpose well enough if they were "beneficial to the people" and could be generally understood and enjoyed.⁸⁴ In the meantime, the Writer's Union was told to initiate a quota system like the one imposed on writers for the spoken drama, under which playwrights must produce certain numbers of film stories periodically.⁸⁵ Since the adoption of these measures the writers have further increased their output, but apprehension and hesitation still hamper their productivity, and the production of feature pictures is still well below the "pre-liberation" level.

By the end of 1956 the rigidity of this control had reached such proportions that it not only caused a great deal of grumbling among the rank and file of the film industry but alarmed the regime itself. According to Wang Lan-hsi, Director of the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts, in October, 1956 the Ministry of Cultural Affairs submitted to the central authorities of the party a report on the defects and errors in the regime's control policy.⁸⁶ It was felt that the administrative controls had been too centralized, that the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts had undertaken to do too much, and that therefore censorship of motion pictures had become too rigid; creative work had been unduly interfered with, and the working personnel had not been given full opportunity to work or act. The report concluded by recommending that efforts be made to improve the organizational structure and administration so that there would be less interference with creative work and less restriction of film production. Both authority and responsibility should be given to the various studios, and the responsibility for creative work detailed to the units concerned, thus eliminating the old system which required an excessive amount of control and inspection.

On April 1, 1957, the regime announced its decision to change the control system of the film industry.⁸⁷ Studios, playwrights, and directors have a nominal joint authority and responsibility for artistic expression and selection of casts, while administrative officials of the studios are empowered to make decisions only on scripts and films.

However, this delegation of authority and responsibility is not as firm as it appears. Studios today, while making decisions, must still follow the directives and instructions of the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts, which is ultimately responsible to the central authorities of the party. This is particularly true in the selection of themes for films. The central authorities of the party and government still control, either directly or through the provincial bureaus of cultural affairs, the organizational structure and financial operations of the studios as well as the selection of administrative personnel. With these controls the regime has no difficulty in keeping the studios in line, and meanwhile there remain the omnipresent party cells among the directors, playwrights, actors, actresses, and administrative officials of the studios. Members of such cells are always under obligation to exert party influence and maintain the party line in organizations to which they are attached. The regime also continues such control devices as national conferences on film work and film reviews in the press.

Resistance to the Program

The Chinese Communist regime's utilization of the films as a medium of propaganda still has its defects and shortcomings. The small number and low quality of productions has resulted directly from the rigid rules governing motion-picture making. Thus restricted, writers have hesitated to produce new scripts, a shortage of which has been felt since 1951, and the movie studios have lost initiative because film production, including the selection of scripts and performers, is so strictly controlled by the central authorities of the party and government. The films produced during the past few years have been few and, for the most part, less than satisfactory.

There are many factors responsible for the relatively small audiences. There is an inadequate number of film projectors, and the mobile screen teams frequently fail to maintain time schedules. Technical failures of projectors or generating units often interrupt film showings in small towns and rural districts, which has tended to reduce interest in movies.⁸⁸ The most

important reason for small attendance, however, is the inadequate number of films of high dramatic quality. According to Communist reports, during the past few years whenever the local party organizations relaxed their efforts to urge people to attend, cinema theaters usually found that 70 to 90 per cent of their seats were unoccupied,⁸⁹ and from 1953 to 1956 about 70 per cent of the productions lost money.⁹⁰ Some films yielded only about 10 per cent of the production costs. The showing of the documentary film The Happy Children, depicting the life of Chinese youngsters in the Mao Tse-tung era, failed to recover even advertising costs, let alone other expenses.⁹¹ The audience appears to be least interested in those films to which the regime has attached the greatest importance.⁹² A remark by a woman resident of a village near Peking is possibly indicative of the public's reaction to such motion pictures, "Even if they paid me, I still would not go to see it."⁹³ To make the screen both interesting and politically powerful is a real challenge to the Communist regime, and the imperfections of the system so far do not detract from the regime's real achievement in making the screen available to small towns, to the vast countryside, and even to the remote border regions.

Public criticism from within the film industry during the last two months of 1956 and early in 1957 indicates the general dissatisfaction. In November, 1956 the Wen-hui Daily in Shanghai sponsored a film symposium. At a series of meetings many noted figures from the city's film studios criticized the regime's movie-making policy. Veteran movie director Ch'en Li-t'ing said that the regime's relegation of the movie director to a completely subordinate role in film production had stifled creative work and made artistic production extremely difficult if not utterly impossible.⁹⁴ The director, not the administration, Ch'en contended, should be the central link or the "commander-in-chief" in film-making.⁹⁵ He said that whenever a script writer or a director showed any initiative in his work he was apt to be accused of "attempting to put the administrative leaders in a passive role."⁹⁶ He also took the regime to task for its indifference to popular reaction to films. Some of the prize-

winning films, Ch'en pointed out, were precisely the ones which the public disliked most.⁹⁷

Others brought up the party's lack of trust in non-party personnel in the film industry and its discrimination against them.⁹⁸ Some party members in the studios were reported to be "resident spies" checking on the actions of the non-party people and reporting their findings to the party organizations. Party members and so-called progressive elements were said to be paid better, promoted faster, and given more important roles to play in films than non-party personnel, who were either left idle or assigned to play insignificant parts, thus causing low morale among the people in the film industry.

Still other members of the symposium spoke of waste and inefficiency in the film studios, which they attributed to the superimposed bureaucracy in the industry and the lack of professional knowledge on the part of the Communist officials.

Similar complaints were heard at symposia held early in 1957 in Peking and Ch'ang-chun,⁹⁹ but the most pointed criticism of the regime's film work was made by Chung Tien-fei, a Communist editor of the motionpicture column of the Wen-hui Daily. In an unsigned article, "Gongs and Drums of Motion Pictures," published in the Journal of Literature [Wen-i Pao], Chung said that the regime's policy of placing the film at the service of workers, peasants, and soldiers was a complete failure.¹⁰⁰ The workers, peasants, and soldiers, Chung said, had clearly shown their dislike for those films which describe their life, eulogize their virtues, or spur them to greater efforts. Having supported his argument with a number of examples, Chung concluded, "The more the party tries to control the film industry, the worse is the result."

Chung was subsequently labelled a "rightist" who "plotted to undermine the Communist party's leadership over film work." Even now the regime's bitterness toward Chung seems not to have subsided; the officially controlled press still continues the verbal attack on him.

SUMMARY

The Chinese Communist regime has encountered many problems in its effort to develop the entertainment media into an efficient component of its propaganda machine. It has achieved some success in building or expanding facilities, such as film production studios, plants for the manufacture of film and projection equipment, and the like. It has encouraged an increase in the number of dramatic troupes, and is working hard to improve the professional training of performers and technicians.

As in literature, its biggest problem has been the development of the creative artist who is at the same time a committed Communist. Actors and actresses had operated under a social disadvantage under previous regimes, and it was a relatively simple matter to raise their morale and attach them to the regime by giving them pointed public recognition; but writers for the drama and the film presented a more complicated problem. Script writers under the Kuomintang, while not under such a serious social disadvantage as actors, were not highly regarded, being for the most part unsuccessful scholars and thus probably of lesser caliber than writers in more respected fields. The suitable political content of operas, spoken dramas, and movies is, to the regime, of overriding importance, and most of its administrative controls have been directed to this end. This has meant that writers must work under close supervision and direction and under the threat of public disapproval if they err; thus, both their morale and the quality of their writings suffer.

At this distance it is not possible to assess the present effectiveness of the regime's efforts to educate the writers politically, although complaints made by members of the industry suggest that so far political suitability has been gained at the expense of artistic quality. The government has, however, succeeded in extending cultural facilities much more broadly throughout the nation than ever before.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Liberation Daily (Shanghai) [Chieh-fang Jih-Pao], December 11, 1950.

2. See Shen Yen-ping's report to the Fourth Session of the National People's Congress. A text of the report may be found in New China Fortnightly (Peking) [Hsin-hua Pan-yueh K'an], No. 116 (September 25, 1957), p. 42.

3. See Shen Yen-ping's speech at the People's Congress. A text of the speech may be found in People's Daily (Peking) [Jen-min Jih-Pao], September 27, 1954.

4. Shen's speech, Note 2, supra.

5. See the Ministry of Cultural Affairs' report in Liberation Daily (Shanghai), May 9, 1951.

6. Chang Li-hui "Opera Teams in the Rural Districts of East China" [Hua-tung Ko-ti Ti Nung-ts'un Chu-t'uan], ibid., February 6, 1953.

7. See Shen's speech, Note 2, supra.

8. People's Daily (Peking), September 27, 1954.

9. News item in Opera and Drama Journal [Hsi-chu Pao], No. 26 (February, 1956), p. 6.

10. Po Sheng, "Reforming the Old Acting Profession" [Chiu I-jen Ti Kai-tsaol], People's Daily (Peking), January 19, 1950.

11. See "The Municipality of Peking's Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Control of Theatrical Organizations" [Pei-ching Shih Chu-i T'uan-she Teng-chi Kuan-li Tsan-hsing Kuei-tsel], ibid., May 4, 1950.

12. Yangtze Daily (Wuhan) [Ch'ang-chiang Jih-Pao], September 3, 1950.

13. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), October 15, 1950.

14. Ibid., September 3, 1950.

15. People's Daily (Peking), December 17, 1950.

16. For its Chinese text, see ibid., May 7, 1951.

17. "The Ministry of Cultural Affairs' Directive Concerning the Reorganization and Strengthening of the Opera Teams of the Nation" [Chung-yang Wen-hua Pu Kuan-yu Cheng-tung Ho Chia-chiang Ch'uan-kuo Chu-t'uan Kung-tso Ti Chih-shih], People's Daily (Peking), December 27, 1952.

18. See People's Daily (Peking), December 17, 1952. See also Ch'en Huang-mei, "Strengthening the Unity of the Acting Profession and Improving our Opera Reform Work" [Chia-chiang T'u'an-chieh Kai-chin Hsi-ch'u Kai-ko Kung-tso], Yangtze Daily (Wuhan), October 16, 1952.

19. "The Ministry of Cultural Affairs' Report on the Cultural and Artistic Work of the Nation in 1950 and on the Essential Programs Planned for 1951" [Chung-yang Wen-hua Pu 1950 Nien Ch'u'an-kuo Wen-hua I-shu Kung-tso Pao-kao Yu 1951 Nien Chi-hua Yao-tien], Liberation Daily (Shanghai), May 9, 1951.

20. People's Daily (Peking), December 17, 1952.

21. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), July 30, 1950.

22. Ibid., October 15, 1950.

23. Ch'iang Hsiang-yu, "An Actress's Glory and Gratitude" [I-ko Yen-yuan Ti Kuang-yung Ho Kan-chi], People's Daily (Peking), October 8, 1954.

24. Ibid., November 16, 1952.

25. See the statements made by Mei Lan-fang, Chou Hsin-fang, Ch'ang Hsiang-yu, and Hou Pao-lin regarding the Communist regime's treatment of the acting profession. Ibid., November 29, 1951; October 8, 1954; and April 11, 1955.

26. Ibid., August 17, 1957.

27. Ibid., September 16, 1957.

28. Shen's speech reported in People's Daily (Peking), September 27, 1954, Note 3, supra.

29. Play Script Monthly [Chu-pen Yueh-k'an], published only one multiple-act play script in 1952, four in 1953, five in 1954, and ten in 1955, but each year the same magazine published several dozens of one-act play scripts. News item in Opera and Drama Journal, No. 24 (January, 1956), pp. 15-16.

30. Shen's speech, Note 3, supra.

31. News item in Opera and Drama Journal, No. 29 (May, 1956), p. 34.

32. News item in ibid., No. 29 (May, 1956), p. 9.

33. See Note 3, supra.

34. News item in Opera and Drama Journal, No. 24 (January, 1956), pp. 15-16. Even after a play script has been approved by the censor and has received initial applause from reviewers, there is no guarantee that

later on it will not be suddenly denounced and banned by the authorities for belatedly-discovered ideological errors. This unpredictability is best illustrated in the case of the play, The Song of the Red Flags or Hung-ch'i Ko. The play, depicting shock-teams in a production drive, was first praised by the Communists; later, it was severely criticized because it did not give a strong portrayal of the trade union and the party. The author, said the official critics, should have used the play to emphasize the role of the trade union before the worker-audiences as well as to stress the "heroic" qualities of the leading propagandist, a Communist militant. The portrayal of the party man, P'eng Kang, in the story was deemed incorrect, "for the party's leadership is invariably collective, but in the play P'eng seems to be working independently of the party organization." The play subsequently disappeared from the stage.

35. New China News Agency Release, July 9, 1957.

36. Shen Yen-ping, "Some Problems in the Cultural Work" [Kuan-yu Wen-hua Kung-tso Ti Chi-ko Wen-t'i], New China Fortnightly (Peking), No. 116 (September 25, 1957), pp. 42-45.

37. People's Daily (Peking), March 1, 1950.

38. Undoubtedly the Chinese Communists also wished to produce other kinds of pictures during this period. They were simply forced to concentrate on the production of newsreels by lack of material and technical resources.

39. China Daily News (New York) [Hua-chiao Jih-Pao], April 17, 1958.

40. Ibid., July 2, 1957.

41. Kuo Mo-juo, "Report on the Cultural and Educational Activities of the People's Government" [Kuan-yu Wen-hua Chiao-yu Kung-tso Ti Pao-kaol], People's Daily (Peking), June 20, 1950.

42. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), May 9, 1951.

43. Enlightenment Daily (Peking) [Kuang-ming Jih-Pao], April 26, 1955.

44. Wang Lan-hsi's article in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 123 (May 17, 1958), p. 31. China Daily News (New York), May 9, 1957. People's Daily (Peking), July 23, 1955. On July 12, 1955, the China Daily News also reported that the Chinese Communist regime would open special theaters in Shanghai, Mukden, Harbin, Nanking, Wuhan, Canton, Chungking, Kunming, and five other cities for screening newsreels exclusively. In July, 1957 a Communist writer stated that the newsreel theaters in Shanghai and Peking had been converted to spoken drama and art film theaters, respectively. This suggests that Communist newsreels were not very popular in Mainland China. See Hsu Hsiao-ping's speech at the fourth session of the National People's Congress, a text of which appears in New China Fortnightly, No. 115 (September 10, 1957), pp. 137-139.

45. Wang Lan-hsi, "Liberate Thought, Resolutely Carry Out the Party's Socialist Line in Film Work" [Chieh-fang Ssu-hsiang Tsai Tien-ying Shih-yeh-chung Chien-chueh Kuan-ch'e Tang-ti She-hui Chu-i Chien-she Lu-hsien], People's Daily (Peking), June 3, 1958.

46. Ibid.

47. Hsia Yen, "History of Film-Making in China and Party Leadership" [Chung-kuo Tien-ying Ti Li-shih Ho Tang-ti Ling-tao], People's Daily, November 16, 1957. An English text of this article may be found in Survey of China Mainland Press [compiled and mimeographed by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong], No. 1, 695 (January 21, 1958), pp. 26-32.

48. People's Daily, March 1, 1950.

49. "The Ministry of Cultural Affairs' Provisional Regulations on the Registration of the Cinema Industry" [Chung-yang Wen-hua Pu Tien-ying-yeh Teng-chi Tsan-hsing Pan-fa], Liberation Daily (Shanghai), July 12, 1950.

50. Yin Tso-chen, "Cinema in the Communist Bandits' Territory" [Fei-ch'u Ti Tien-ying], Mainland Today (Taiwan) [Chin-jih Ta-lu], No. 23 (June 1, 1953), p. 17.

51. Ch'en Huang-mei, "Struggling to Improve the Ideological and Artistic Standards of the Cinematographic Arts" [Wei T'i-kao Tien-ying I-shu Ti Ssu-hsiang I-shu Shui-p'ing Erh Fen-tou], People's Daily (Peking), October 18, 1954.

52. For Chinese texts of these decisions, see ibid., January 12, 1954.

53. In 1956 construction was begun in Peking of an automatic film-copying plant. Designed by Czechoslovakian experts and basically completed in May, 1958, the plant has the most modern equipment available and can produce sixty million meters of film copy annually, thus boosting China's total film-copying capacity eightfold, according to Communist sources. [Popular Cinema (Ta-chung Tien-ying), No. 119 (January 26, 1956), p. 26. Also see China Daily News (New York), May 27, 1958.]

Cinematographic machine plants in Nanking, Shanghai, and Harbin were instructed to improve their technical efficiency with a view to producing all essential tools and equipment needed by the film industry. In mid-1957 Ts'ai Ch'u-sheng told the fourth session of the National People's Congress that these plants had been able to produce 4,000 regular film projectors. [New China Fortnightly (Peking), No. 116 (September 25, 1957), pp. 16-18. Also see news item in Popular Cinema, No. 149 (April 26, 1957), p. 32.] In January, 1958 Wang Lan-hsi, Director of the Bureau of Cinematographic Arts, disclosed further progress by the industry, the manufacture of movie cameras except for lenses. He said further that China was, for the first time, manufacturing her own film-developing and sound-recording machines. ["To Strengthen the Party Leadership Over, and to Safeguard the Socialist Line of, the Motion Picture Industry," Extracts from China Mainland Maga-

zines, No. 123 (March 17, 1958), p. 32.] A Communist news bulletin reports that the Harbin Cinematographic Machine-Building Corporation has succeeded in making wide-screen and three-dimensional film projectors. [China Daily News (New York), May 19, 1958.] The regime is also making preparations for the construction of a film projector factory in Tientsin with an annual capacity of 600 projectors. [New China News Agency Release, June 28, 1958.]

According to Popular Cinema [No. 119 (January 26, 1956), p. 26] the regime also made plans to build three new film studios and one plant for producing raw film stock. The latter was designed to reduce importation of raw film from abroad, while the construction of new film studios would augment the facilities for production of feature-length films, especially in color. One of the proposed studios, still under construction in Sian, will be able to produce six feature pictures a year. Another studio is being built in Canton with a production capacity of eighteen films a year, and still another will be located in Peking. The Communists announced early in 1958 that the new studio in Canton had been partially completed and that it was planning to start production in 1958 on a limited scale. According to the announcement, the 1958 target includes the production of a colored feature film and eight documentary films as well as the making of Cantonese sound tracks for 150 films produced by other studios. [China Daily News (New York), April 3, 1958.] Planned as the largest film studio in the land, the Peking plant will be able to produce thirty feature pictures in color annually. Although its construction is scheduled for completion no earlier than 1967, the last year of the regime's third five-year plan, the studio was expected to begin making some films in 1958.

Prior to 1950 no Chinese film studio had ever produced any color movies, but in that year one of the Communist film studios made two documentary films in color entitled The Chinese People's Victory and Liberated China. These were made with the technical assistance of the Soviet film industry. [Lo Ching-yu, "The First Year of the People's Cinema Industry" (Jen-min Tien-ying Shih-yeh Ti Ti-i Nien), Liberation Daily (Shanghai), March 17, 1951.]

In 1954 the Communists decided to make another documentary color film featuring the theatrical life of the most famous Peking opera actor, Mei Lan-fang. The biography of this very popular actor was designed to reach a wide audience. Because of technical difficulties, the project was not started until 1955, when the Soviet film industry sent two experts to the Peking Film Studio to give technical advice on the production. [Popular Cinema, No. 118 (January 11, 1956), p. 32.] Meanwhile, this studio and the China Newsreel Studio reportedly made five short-length art films and seven newsreels, all in color, using only their Chinese technicians [China Daily News (New York), December 28, 1955]. Having acquired some experience, the Peking Film Studio announced early in 1956 that it was preparing to make two more full-length color pictures in the next few months without the help of foreign experts [Popular Cinema, No. 123 (March 26, 1956), p. 32].

Thus the year 1956 will probably be remembered by the Chinese film industry as the year in which it first began producing color films on its own.

The first wide-screen film ever produced in China was a documentary color film made by the Peking Film Studio in the spring of 1957 [Popular Cinema, No. 154 (July 11, 1957), pp. 22-23]. As production equipment is further improved and more projection facilities become available, the annual output of color and wide-screen films will certainly be increased.

54. China Daily News (New York), July 2, 1957.

55. Ch'en Pai-ch'en, "I Do Not Know Where to Start" [Ts'un-ho Shuo-ch'i], Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai) [Wen-hui Pao], December 13, 1956.

56. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), May 9, 1951.

57. See Wang Lan-hsi's article in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 123 (March 17, 1958), p. 29.

58. Ibid., p. 31.

59. See Ch'en Huang-mei's article cited in Note 51 of this chapter.

60. See Ts'ai Ch'u-sheng's speech cited in Note 53 of this chapter.

61. The sizes of audience enjoyed by Soviet films in Communist China during the first three and one-half years were as follows: 6, 629, 977 (1949); 48, 287, 169 (1950); 64, 957, 825 (1951); 66, 151, 672 (the first six months of 1952). See Wang Lan-hsi, "Soviet Films in China" [So-hien Tien-ying Tsai Chung-kuo], People's Daily (Peking), November 5, 1952.

62. Wang Lan-hsi, "Sino-Soviet Friendship in Film Work" [Tien-ying Shih-yeh Chung-ti Wei-ta Yu-i], Popular Cinema, No. 161 (October 26, 1957), pp. 22-23.

63. Ibid., and Wang Lan-hsi's article in People's Daily (Peking), November 5, 1952.

64. Wang Lan-hsi's article, Note 63, supra.

65. Liberation Daily (Shanghai), September 18-21, 1949.

66. Ibid., July 24, 1950.

67. Ibid.

68. Ch'en Pai-ch'en's article cited in Note 55 of this chapter.

69. China Daily News (New York), July 2, 1957. From 1950 to 1956 a total of thirty-four Chinese films were screened in the Soviet Union and 320 in the "people's democracies."

70. People's Daily (Peking), June 3, 1958.

71. The Shanghai Film Studio underwent re-organization earlier. Renamed the Shanghai Film Corporation, it now carries on production

through three relatively small studios rather than a single large one. Each of the component studios has its own management and artistic troupes, but it is subject to the over-all direction and supervision of the governing body of the corporation. News item in Popular Cinema, No. 149 (April 26, 1957), p. 23.

72. People's Daily (Peking), June 3, 1958.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid., July 13, 1955.

76. See the "Letters to the Editor" column in Popular Cinema, No. 121 (February 26, 1956), p. 36.

77. The writer made this observation early in 1957 in an article published in the Journalism Quarterly, 34 (Fall, 1957), 481-492. Criticisms of the regime's judicial system during the short period of "contending and blooming" in May, 1957 support the correctness of this observation.

78. Chia Chi, "The Criticism of the Motion Picture The Biography of Wu Hsun" [Tien-ying Wu-hsun Chuan Ti Pi-p'an], People's Handbook, 1952, pp. 425-430.

79. Editorial, People's Daily (Peking), May 20, 1951.

80. Ibid., May 23, 1951.

81. Ibid., May 24, 1951.

82. Ibid.

83. Chung Tien-fei, "Gongs and Drums of Motion Pictures" [Tien-ying Ti Lo-ku], New China Fortnightly (Peking), No. 103 (March 10, 1957), pp. 146-148.

84. See Wang Lan-hsi's article in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 123 (March 17, 1958), p. 291.

85. Ibid.; also see "The Praesidium of the All-China Association of Literary Writers' Resolution Concerning the Acceleration of the Production of Motion Picture Scripts" [Chung-kuo Tso-chia Hsieh-hui Chu-hai-t'uan Kuan-yu Chia-chiang Tien-ying Wen-hsueh Chu-pen Chuang-tso Ti Chueh-i], Enlightenment Daily (Peking), March 14, 1956.

86. Wang Lan-hsi's article in Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, No. 123 (March 17, 1958), p. 28.

87. New China News Agency Release, April 1, 1957.

88. People's Daily (Peking), July 13, 1955.

89. See Chung Tien-fei's article cited in Note 83 of this chapter. Also see Sun Yu, "Upholding the Artistic Tradition of the Cinema" [Tsun-chung Tien-ying I-shu Chuan-t'ung], Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), November 29, 1956; news item in Popular Cinema, No. 151 (May 26, 1957), p. 17.

90. Chung's article cited above, Note 83.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. News item in Popular Cinema, No. 151 (May 26, 1957), p. 17.

94. Ch'en Li-t'ing, "The Director Should Be the Central Link in Film Making" [Tao-yeh Ying-kai-shih Ying-p'ien Sheng-ch'an Chung-ti Chung-hsin Huan-chieh], Wen-hui Daily (Shanghai), November 23, 1956.

95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.

97. Ibid.

98. The minutes of the symposium were published in ibid., November 15-30, 1956.

99. News item in Popular Cinema, No. 142 (January 21, 1957), p. 1; No. 153 (June 26, 1957), pp. 18 and 23; and No. 158 (September 11, 1957), pp. 3-4.

100. Chung's article cited above, Note 83.

This study has been limited to a description of the policies and practices of Chinese Communism regarding the communication of ideas within the country. It has dealt primarily with education, the mass media, and methods of political conversion. Yet, despite its necessary limitations, it has been able to shed light upon problems central to the structure and development of the Communist regime on the Chinese Mainland. For communication is of major importance to both economic development and political consolidation. Clearly, policies of rapid, planned industrialization and of collectivization in agriculture, both of which the Chinese Communists have adopted, can be executed only to the extent that they can be supported by the systems of education and communications. A similar generalization applies to the regime's efforts to marshal the support and loyalty of the general populace and the social, economic, and intellectual leadership.

The two stated purposes of Chinese policies of education, propaganda, and indoctrination -- i. e., the socio-economic and political objectives -- are not always easily reconciled. Often there are conflicts of policy from which the regime is unable to escape. Broadly, these dilemmas appear to be of two kinds: (1) Efficient utilization of specialists and intellectual elites vs. insistence on political loyalty and dedication, and (2) Expansion of audiences through the circulation of meaningful materials vs.

the alienation of the same audiences through insistence on the political utility and acceptability of communication content.

To trace these dilemmas is to discover some of the tensions within Chinese Communism. The preceding chapters have brought together, under topical headings, the information bearing upon this discussion. These facts will now be summarized as a series of findings from which the main problems of Communist Chinese communications policy will emerge.

(1) Efforts to increase the flow of communications from government to the people have consistently been combined with increases in political control.

The measures taken to strengthen communications within the country have been of three kinds:

- (a) Campaigns against illiteracy, and other educational measures designed to enlarge the number of people able to make use of mass communications, (b) Steps to insure a wider distribution of messages originating with the government and the mass media, and (c) Efforts to build up the volume of the message flow.

Campaigns against illiteracy have invariably been combined with efforts to increase political loyalty. Spare time and winter schools, as well as the Houses of Culture, are to a very large extent centers of political indoctrination. While literacy has certainly risen dramatically, it is impossible to judge either the actual quality of such literacy or whether the political content of the courses taught has tended to encourage or inhibit learning.

The policies aimed at wider distribution of messages have typically resulted in public, and therefore closely supervised, consumption of media content. This is true of the newspaper reading groups in villages, of the radio diffusion exchanges that channel uniform messages to millions of people constrained to listen to them in public and semi-public places, and of the radio monitoring teams which adapt official messages to the needs of local audiences. The need for mass reading and listening arose from technological inadequacies and was ostensibly intended to compensate for them; at the same time, these devices have made it only too easy to expose the public to a monotonous rehearsal

of official messages, and thus to have inhibited the development of private reading and listening.

Efforts to increase the volume of messages have led to some expansion of technical facilities, such as transmitting stations, film studios, and printing plants. Yet volume has not actually increased. The larger number of printed publications reflects merely the sustained propaganda efforts of the government, not an actual increase in creativity among writers. There has been a dearth of manuscripts of all kinds, whether for publication in books and magazines or for production on stage and screen. This scarcity of literary production is ascribable to the imposition of a strict political line on all creative work and the fears of writers as to the political acceptability of their works. Communist efforts have thus fallen far short of their goal; the intended expansion of message volume has been inhibited by the regime's insistence on political conformity.

(2) The Communist communications apparatus, although receiving a large amount of audience reaction or "feedback," has been fairly insensitive to popular reaction.

The regime employs several methods to insure a steady stream of information from the people to the officialdom of government and party. Among these are the use of propaganda officers, reporting officers, and monitoring teams. In addition, the Communist Party cells in all enterprises and mass organizations keep a watchful eye upon public reactions to official policy. Moreover, communications between the government and the people involve an unusually large number of personal contacts. Thus, propaganda officers and Communist Party members are in direct daily contact with the citizenry; if there is resistance to official messages, they should be able to sense it immediately and to report its existence.

All this might lead to an expectation that the Communist authorities would be particularly sensitive to popular pressures, and thus able to adapt their communications policies rapidly to changes in the popular mood. In actuality this is not so. The Communists appear to be able to use feedback only as a spotting device whereby they can recognize resistance and areas of

acceptance of official policy; information so gained does not enter directly into the formulation of policy. Whether, in the long run, policies are affected by information gathered in the field, or only by economic successes and failures, is a matter of conjecture. In any event, Communist attitudes make for an exceedingly long route from field information to policy formulation.

(3) The development of the communications industries has been accompanied by steady intensification of centralized administrative and political supervision.

Practically all media of mass communication are now publicly owned. Each communication industry comprises a bureaucratic hierarchy in which local organs are subordinated to regional ones, and regional organs to national ones. This pyramidal structure does not exist merely for purposes of administrative and financial management; rather, local radio stations and newspapers depend on Peking for much of the materials they present. There is, also, some division of labor, so that national radio stations, newspapers, and magazines deal primarily with matters of nation-wide concern, while regional and local papers emphasize special problems and efforts to execute government policy and fulfill economic plans on the local level.

The policy of centralization is, no doubt, efficient economically and politically. It permits maximum utilization of available channels, and it simplifies political control by central authorities. At the same time, the policy makes for extreme uniformity in subject-matter and presentation, and for dreary repetitiveness. The pressure for political conformity thus substantially reduces the regime's chances of appealing to varying audiences through a diversity of style and content in materials presented.

(4) A sustained drive for specialization, while serving certain economic and political objectives, has inhibited intellectual creativity.

The Communist regime has taken a variety of measures to increase the number of specialists and of specialized institutions designed to further its program of economic and political

development. Institutions of higher learning, which traditionally encompassed all fields of knowledge, have been broken up and reconstituted, and the new universities have been given the form of specialized professional schools. In the communications industries there has been a tendency to create newspapers and magazines designed for special rather than general audiences, such as farmers, industrial workers, young people, women, and the like.

The reorganization of the universities has not only served the purposes of professionalization, but has had distinctly political overtones. The Communist leadership had come to regard traditional university faculties as foci of possible resistance to the regime, and by thus dispersing them eliminated them as political forces.

It has been argued that pre-revolutionary university faculties gave insufficient attention to modern scientific developments and their technological application, preferring instead to remain within the areas of traditional philosophical and literary scholarship. A reform of the universities to adapt them to the needs of a modern industrial society thus seemed desirable to many people, even those outside the communist movement. However, the drastic changes in the organization of the institutions of higher learning have deprived many intellectuals of the context in which they could do their best work, to the detriment of their productivity. An important element in the reduced productivity of the intellectuals may be the loss of their traditionally high status; the forced reorganization of the universities was to them but one indication that they had been demoted from their position of leadership to that of mere soldiers of the revolution.

The development of specialized media has tended to produce a certain amount of segregation among various segments of the population. The specialized organs, addressed to particular audiences, have an even greater tendency toward monotony of style and content than the common run of newspapers and broadcasts in Communist China. Such monotony may already have produced audience fatigue, and correspondingly reduced the benefits the Communists hoped to gain from their appeals to special audiences.

(5) Insistence on political participation has reduced the professional activities and competence of intellectuals and technological elites.

While the Communists have recognized the country's need for teachers and other high-level professionals, they have forced the intellectual groups to participate actively in political affairs -- that is, in the Communist Party and the satellite "mass organizations" surrounding it. In addition, the ideological definition of the intellectual as merely a specialized member of the proletariat has been interpreted to mean that intellectuals should have experience with manual labor. Teachers and students have thus been spending a third of their time working on farms or doing other kinds of manual work.

These pressures for political and social conformity have resulted in a drain on the time of professional people and a corresponding loss of competence and effectiveness in their own fields. Since the highest rewards the regime can bestow go to political activists, students in secondary and higher education have increasingly concentrated on political tasks rather than academic subjects. The dilemma between economic and political effectiveness has thus been most often resolved in favor of the latter.

(6) Various attempts to make the intellectuals conform to the ideology of the regime have reduced their effectiveness as communicators of ideas.

Three kinds of techniques have been employed by the Chinese Communists to obtain the support of the intellectuals for the regime. These are (a) imposition of administrative and political controls, (b) criticism in the public press, and (c) re-education or "remoulding" in special schools and camps.

The first two techniques have resulted in great changes in the intellectuals' status positions. Scholars steeped in the traditions of pre-revolutionary China were bound to resent these changes and develop attitudes antagonistic to the regime. Whereas intellectuals had previously been the chief candidates for public office, and had spent much of their time directing the affairs of

the country, they were now relegated to the role of technicians whose advice might or might not be accepted by the new ruling group of political activists. At the same time criticism in the public press tended to destroy the security which outstanding scholars had previously enjoyed by virtue of their age and reputation. The anxieties produced by these sudden changes in status have tended to reduce to a mere dribble the production of worthwhile new literary works.

The technique of "ideological remoulding" in special schools and camps has not generally yielded the results that the public confessions might suggest. While the psychological pressures generated in the "remoulding" process may well produce temporary shifts in attitude toward the regime, in many known instances conversion to the regime was either accompanied by mental reservations or followed by "backsliding."

There can be little doubt of the Communists' desire to see a vigorous development in literature and the arts. Congresses and special meetings of writers, playwrights, and screen-writers have been called repeatedly and asked to examine the reasons for the dearth of worthwhile productions. The Communist leadership is either unaware or unwilling to admit that works of literary merit cannot be ordered into existence by administrative action, but grow out of the private sensitivity of their creators. The efforts of writers subservient to the regime to create the kind of literature apparently demanded of them have usually resulted in works of small significance and slight literary merit.

The history of the spoken drama is a case in point. As a new and popular art form in China, the spoken drama flourished and was highly appreciated by the modern Chinese so long as it was able to carry its messages of social criticism; it decayed and virtually vanished once it was restricted to singing the praises of the new order.

The number of productive intellectuals and artists upon whom the regime can count is probably not large. Among those most indebted to the regime are the performers of the classical Chinese opera. Their reputation in pre-revolutionary China was, at best, doubtful. Their history as victims of social discrimination enabled the Communist leadership to make special gestures

in raising their status. As a result the actors have offered little resistance to the rewriting of classical opera plots to permit the infusion of modern social themes. The influence of the opera performers does not, however, reach much beyond the limits of their stage.

(7) New leaders developed by the Communist regime have not, thus far, been able to assume intellectual leadership roles.

The communist movement has given birth to a new class of leaders in the fields of education and mass communications. Among these are the newly trained teachers, propaganda and reporting officers, and functionaries in various government agencies.

These new arrivals on the scene bear the marks of the transition period in which they rose to their present positions. They are often poorly trained and lacking in perception. As a result, they do not seem to inspire confidence. Even the lowly salesman of the Hsin-hua Book Company, the major book distribution enterprise in the country, comes in for public criticism where this is permitted; he is said to be uneducated and self-important -- a bureaucrat rather than a reliable guide to good literature.

The generally low level of the new professionals is reflected in the current communications output in China. The poor quality of editorial employees in publishing houses accounts in part for the prevalence of cheap propaganda literature. The level of newspaper writing is generally poor, and there is an overabundance of communist jargon. The art of editorial writing has practically disappeared except in the papers and magazines of national circulation. The reason for this is not merely lack of ability but, in all probability, fear of criticism and loss of position of the official policy should subsequently change. Even seasoned Communist writers with a long history of high position in the Party, such as Miss Ting Ling, have been subjected to severe criticism, accompanied by retroactive condemnation of earlier works. Their experience undoubtedly serves as a warning to other writers.

The tensions which beset the Chinese Communist systems of education and communication may account for the frequent shifts

in policy and the recurring campaigns of "purification," "re-education" and the like. Whenever the disparity in Communist goals entangles the leadership in serious difficulties, recourse is had to force. The resulting fear tends to reinforce the intellectuals' mistrust of the regime and makes for further setbacks in the productivity of writers and artists. The regime then tries to restore a balance and erase the effects of its punitive actions by solemnly announcing a new policy of relaxed supervision.

The campaigns involving the reform of intellectuals frequently coincide with political crises. At such times the tensions inherent in the Communist policies seem to be least bearable, and cause the leadership to feel the necessity of intervention to be most urgent. The first campaign to reform the intellectuals occurred in 1942-1943, just after Japan's entrance into the war. Other campaigns with similar aims were launched after the Communists' seizure of power during the Korean campaign, and during the internal crises of 1954 and of 1957-1958. "Softer" treatment of the intellectuals appears to characterize politically more quiescent periods.

Such alternations between force and persuasion are typical of revolutionary periods. Strong ideological positions, coupled with a propensity to make drastic changes at a rapid pace, tend to be productive of internal and external crisis. Any brief stability the regime may have achieved is disrupted when large-scale social experiments (like the wholesale collectivization of agriculture in Communist China) meet with failure. The system of communications and the communicators of ideas are the first victims of such upheavals: there is a tendency in all societies to put the burden of guilt on those who, through the use of word and image, can stimulate action.

Thus far there has been no evidence to indicate that Communist China is settling down to a steady course of internal development and external accommodation. So long as the Communist leadership is aware of a lack of social and economic stability, policies concerning education and mass communications will be subservient to the immediate political needs of the moment, rather than being used as instruments of long-term consolidation.

APPENDIX

LIST OF NEWSPAPERS AND JOURNALS

NEWSPAPERS
(LISTED BY ENGLISH TITLE)

CHEKIANG DAILY (Hangchow):
Chekiang Jih-Pao
CHINA DAILY NEWS (New York):
Hua-chiao Jih-Pao
THE CHINESE CHILDREN (Peking):
Chung-kuo Shao-nien Pao
ENLIGHTENMENT DAILY (Peking):
Kuang-ming Jih-Pao
HEILUNGKIANG DAILY (Harbin):
Heilungkiang Jih-Pao
HSIN-MIN DAILY (Shanghai):
Hsin-min Pao
KWANGSI DAILY (Nanning):
Kwangsi Jih-Pao
LIBERATION DAILY (Shanghai):
Chieh-fang Jih-Pao
NEW CHINA FORTNIGHTLY (Peking):
Hsin-hua Pan-yueh K'an
NEW CHINA NEWS (Yenan):
Hsin Chung-hua Pao
NORTHEAST DAILY (Mukden):
Tung-pei Jih-Pao
PEKING DAILY (Peking):
Peking Jih-Pao
PEKING DAILY WORKER (Peking):
Peking Kung-jen Jih-Pao
PEASANT NEWS (Hunan):
Nung-min Pao
PEOPLE'S DAILY (Peking):
Jen-min Jih-Pao. Editions also in
Canton, Chungking, Mukden,
Shanghai, Sian, Urumchi.
SHANGHAI DAILY NEWS (Shanghai):
Hsin-wen Jih-Pao
SHANGHAI DAILY WORKER
(Shanghai): Shanghai Kung-jen Pao
SINO-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP JOURNAL
(Peking): Chung-so Yu-ho Pao
TA-CHUNG DAILY (Shantung):
Ta-Chung Jih-Pao

(continued on p. 240, left column)

NEWSPAPERS
(LISTED BY CHINESE TITLE)

CH'ANG-CHIANG JIH-PAO (Wuhan):
Yangtze Daily
CHEKIANG JIH - PAO (Hangchow):
Chekiang Daily
CHIEH - FANG JIH - PAO (Shanghai):
Liberation Daily
CHUNG-KUO SHAO-NIEN PAO
(Peking): The Chinese Children
CHUNG-SO YU-HO PAO (Peking):
Sino - Soviet Friendship Journal
HEILUNGKIANG JIH-PAO (Harbin):
Heilungkiang Daily
HSIN CHUNG - HUA PAO (Yenan):
New China News
HSIN-HUA PAN-YUEH K'AN (Peking):
New China Fortnightly
HSIN-MIN PAO (Shanghai):
Hsin-min Daily
HSIN - WEN JIH - PAO (Shanghai):
Shanghai Daily News
HUA-CHIAO JIH-PAO (New York):
China Daily News
JEN-MIN JIH-PAO (Peking):
People's Daily. Editions also in
Canton, Chungking, Mukden,
Shanghai, Sian, Urumchi.
KUANG-MING JIH - PAO (Peking):
Enlightenment Daily
KWANGSI JIH-PAO (Nanning):
Kwangsi Daily
NUNG-MIN PAO (Hunan):
Peasant News
PEKING JIH-PAO (Peking):
Peking Daily
PEKING KUNG-JEN JIH-PAO (Peking):
Peking Daily Worker
SHANGHAI KUNG-JEN PAO (Shang-
hai): Shanghai Daily Worker
TA-CHUNG JIH - PAO (Shantung):
Ta-chung Daily

(continued on p. 240, right column)

NEWSPAPERS

(LISTED BY ENGLISH TITLE) contd.

TA-KUNG DAILY (Peking):
Ta-Kung Pao. Published in
Tientsin until October, 1956.
TIENTSIN DAILY (Tientsin):
Tientsin Jih-Pao
TSINGTAO DAILY (Tsingtao):
Tsingtao Jih-Pao
WEN-HUI DAILY (Shanghai):
Wen-hui Pao
YANGTZE DAILY (Wuhan):
Ch'ang-chiang Jih-Pao

JOURNALS

(LISTED BY ENGLISH TITLE)

CHINESE YOUTH: Chung-kuo Ching-nien Pao
CONTENDING: Chen-ming
CURRENT AFFAIRS POCKET MAGAZINE: Shih-shih Shou-ts'e
FATHERLAND WEEKLY: Tsu-kuo Chou-k'an. Published in Hong Kong.
FREEDOM FRONT: Tsu-yu Chen-hsien. Published in Hong Kong.
THE HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT: Chung-Hsueh-sheng
LEARNING: Hsueh-hsi
LITERARY GAZETTE: Wen-i Pao
MAINLAND TODAY: Chin-jih Ta-lu
NEW CHINA MONTHLY: Hsin-hua Yueh-Pao
THE NEW OBSERVER: Hsin Kuan-ch'a
OPERA AND DRAMA JOURNAL: Hsi-chu Pao
PEOPLE'S LITERATURE: Jen-min Wen-hsueh

(continued on p. 241, left column)

NEWSPAPERS

(LISTED BY CHINESE TITLE) contd.

TA-KUNG PAO (Peking):
Ta-kung Daily. Published in
Tientsin until October, 1956.
TIENTSIN JIH-PAO (Tientsin):
Tientsin Daily
TSINGTAO JIH-PAO (Tsingtao):
Tsingtao Daily
TUNG-PEI JIH-PAO (Mukden):
Northeast Daily
WEN-HUI PAO (Shanghai):
Wen-hui Daily

JOURNALS

(LISTED BY CHINESE TITLE)

CHENG-CHIH HSUEH-HSI: Political Study
CHENG-MING: Contending
CHIN-JIH TA-LU: Mainland Today
CHUNG-HSUEH-SHENG: The High School Student
CHUNG-KUO CHING-NIEN PAO: Chinese Youth
CHU-PEN YUEH-K'AN: Play Script Monthly
FA-CHENG YEN-CHU: Studies in Political Science and Law
HSI-CHU PAO: Opera and Drama Journal
HSIN-HUA YUEH-PAO: New China Monthly
HSIN KUAN-CH'A: The New Observer
HSUEH-HSI: Learning
HUNG-CH'I: Red Flag
JEN-MIN HUA-PAO: The People's Pictorial
JEN-MIN WEN-HSUEH: People's Literature

(continued on p. 241, right column)

JOURNALS

(LISTED BY ENGLISH TITLE) contd.

THE PEOPLE'S PICTORIAL: Jen-min Hua-Pao
 PLAY SCRIPT MONTHLY: Chu-pen Yueh-k'an
 POLITICAL STUDY: Cheng - chih Hsueh-hsi
 THE POPULAR ILLUSTRATED: Lien-hua Hua-Pao
 POPULAR CINEMA: Ta-chung Tien-ying
 RADIO: Wu-hsien-tien
 RADIO LISTENER: Kuang-po Ai-ho-che
 RED FLAG: Hung-chi
 SCIENCE BULLETIN: K'o - hsueh T'ung-Pao
 STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW: Fa-Cheng Yen-chiu
 WORLD AFFAIRS: Shih-chien Chih-shih

JOURNALS

(LISTED BY CHINESE TITLE) contd.

K'O-HSUEH T'UNG - PAO: Science Bulletin
 KUANG - PO AI - HO - CHE: Radio LISTENER
 LIEN-HUA HUA-PAO: The Popular Illustrated
 SHIH - CHIEN CHIH - SHIH: World Affairs
 SHIH - SHIH SHOU - TS'E: Current Affairs Pocket Magazine
 TA - CHUNG TIEN - YING: Popular Cinema
 TSU-KUO CHOU-K'AN: Fatherland Weekly. Published in Hong Kong.
 TAU - YU CHEN - HSIEN: Freedom Front. Published in Hong Kong.
 WEN-I PAO: Literary Gazette
 WU-HSIEN-TIEN: Radio

I N D E X

- Administration of communications, dual nature of, 22-26
- Ai, Ch'ing, criticizing treatment of writers, 141
- All-China Association of Literary Writers. See Chinese Writers Union
- All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and thought reform in business circles, 54, 66
- All-China Federation of Literature and Art: and Dream of the Red Chamber case, 132; and Hu Feng, 134
- All-China Federation of Students, as a youth organization, 12
- All-China Federation of Trade Unions, role in administration of spare-time schools, 79
- All-China Federation of Youth (formerly All-China Federation of Democratic Youth), as a youth organization, 12
- All-China Theatrical Association, and mobilization of playwrights, 196
- Biography of Wu Hsun, controversy over, 213-214
- Brandt, Conrad, views on thought reform evaluated, 60-61
- Bureau of Cinematographic Arts: control over film studios, 204, 205, 209; convened conference on film work, 210; relation with China Film Company, 210; definition of functions, 215
- Bureau of Radio Broadcasting: administration of communications, 22, 158; establishment of radio diffusion exchanges, 163-164
- Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party: relation with General Political Department of People's Liberation Army, 12; and rectification campaign in 1957, 44; issuance of "Decision Concerning the Establishment Throughout the Party of a Propaganda Network for the Masses," 45; criticized, 64; approved a new list of reading material on socialism, 82, n. 6; relation with the press, 115; launched Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], 118; special translation bureau under, 120
- Central People's Broadcasting Station: special broadcasts to Taiwan, 157; popularization of Mandarin dialect, 157; department for foreign broadcasts (Radio Peking), 157-158; department for domestic broadcasts, 158; issuance of "Regulations on the Work of Monitors," 161; content of programs, 166, 168-171; list of stations, 175; new building of, 176, n. 11; and televising, 177, n. 11
- Chang, Chih-i, on intellectuals' reaction to thought reform, 85, n. 50
- Ch'ang - chun Film Studio, founding of, 204

- "Charter for the Socialist Re-Education of Democratic Parties and Non-Party Democrats," adoption of, 67-68
- Ch'en, Ch'i-hsia, purge of, 134-135, 137
- Ch'en, I, purge of, 139
- Ch'en, Li-t'ing, criticizing film-making policy, 217
- Ch'en, Pai-ch'en, on popularity of foreign films, 208
- Ch'en, Po-ta: as deputy-director of Department of Propaganda and vice-chairman of Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, 36, n. 29; as editor of Hung-ch'i [Red Flag]
- Chen, Shih-hua, pledged to reform himself, 69
- Ch'en, Yuan, on intellectuals' reaction to thought reform, 61
- Ch'in, Chao-yang, purge of, 139-140
- China Democratic National Construction Association, role in indoctrination and thought reform, 61
- China Film Company, founding of, 210
- China News Service [Chung-kuo Hsin-wen She], work of, 146, n. 23
- China Newsreel Studio, founding of, 204-205
- China United Film Studio, founding of, 204
- Chinese Communist Party: growth and social origins of membership, 13-15; role under state constitution, 21; policy of "long-term co-existence and mutual supervision," 21; relationship with mass propaganda networks, 45; control of education institutions criticized, 88, n. 81
- Chinese Communist Youth Corps (formerly New Democratic Youth Corps): founding of, 11; revival of, 11; role in winter schools, 79, 80; role in control of educational institutions, 88, n. 85
- Chinese Writers Union: role in propaganda and indoctrination, 54; and Dream of the Red Chamber case, 131; criticizing Hu Shih, 132, 134; and purge of T'ing Ling, Ch'en Ch'i-hsia, and Feng Hsueh-feng, 135; and purge of Ch'in Chao-yang, 139-140; and movie scripts, 215
- Chou, En-lai: on treatment of intellectuals, 5, 62, 75; on intellectuals' reaction to Communist thought reform, 60
- Chou, Yang, and Hu Feng, 133
- Ch'u, An-p'ing, criticized by son, 64-65
- Chu, Hsi-chun, self-criticism of, 68
- Chung, Tien-fei, criticizing film-making policy, 218
- Commission on Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and administration of communications, 22
- Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs of State Administrative Council: and administration of communications, 25; abolition of, 36, n. 28; personnel of, 36, n. 29
- Communications network, prior to 1949, 27-29
- Constitution of People's Public of China: freedom of speech and of press under, 21; structural changes in administration of communications, 22
- "Dedication of Hearts" campaign, 7, 66-69
- Department of Propaganda of Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party: role of, 23; organization

- of, 23; relation with corresponding departments on lower levels, 24; top personnel of, 25; and press, 91; control of film production, 210
- Dragon-Beard Ditch [Lung-hsu Kou], summarized, 194-195
- Dream of the Red Chamber [Hung-low Meng], controversy over, 130-133, 144
- Education: Communist program prior to 1949, 38; expansion of facilities and enrollment since 1949, 39, 40; and study groups, 39, 40; and party schools, 41-42; emphasis on quantity, 69-70; sacrifice of scholastic attainment for political reliability, 70, 87, n. 72; college and university reorganization, 70-71; curriculum revision, 71-73; problems in, 73-77; combining labor and, 77; in winter and spare-time schools, 78-81
- Enlightenment Daily [Kuang-ming Jih - Pao] and "contending and blooming," 146-147, n. 26
- Fairbank, John K., views on thought reform evaluated, 60-61
- Fei, Hsiao-t'ung, criticizing thought reform, 86, n. 61
- Feng, Hsueh-feng, purge of, 137-139
- Feng, Yu-lan: as a target of thought reform, 58-59; denunciation of thought reform, 62
- Films: prior to 1949, 28, 198, 203-204; confiscation of Kuomintang studios, 204; themes of films produced in 1949-1950, 199; themes of films produced in 1951-1952, 199-200; themes of films produced in 1953-1954, 200; cinema attendance, 201-202; cinema theaters and mobile screen teams, 201-203; fate of privately-owned studios, 204; new studios, 204-205; establishment of school of cinematographic arts, 205; technical base of film-making, 205, 223-225, n. 52; output of, 205-206; Soviet films in China, 207, 225, n. 60; outlawing of American films, 207-208; foreign films and cultural exchange policy, 208; Chinese films in non-Communist countries, 209; control of film production, 209; decentralization of film production, 210; distribution films, 210-211; manipulation of content of, 211-212; ideological controversy in film industry, 213-214; sterilizing effects of control measures, 214; sacrifice of quality for quantity, 214-215; discontent in film industry, 215-218; decentralization of control, 215-216; audience reaction, 217; news-reel theaters, 222, n. 44
- Five - Anti Campaign, meaning and impact of, 19, 35, n. 22
- Fu, Ying: denunciation of thought reform by, 61-62; on selection of students for study in Soviet Union, 70
- General Political Department of People's Liberation Army: role of, 12; and purge of Ch'en I, 139
- Hinton, Harold C., on Mao Tse-tung's speech of February 27, 1957, 33, n. 5

Houses of Culture: as propaganda agency, 54-55, 126; as book distributors, 124

Hsin-chao Press, victim of publication policy, 140

Hsin-hua Printing Company, role of, 113

Hsin-hua Book Company: functions of, 107, 113; criticism of, 123-125

Hsu, Kuang-p'ing, on treatment of teachers, 76

Hsu, T'e-li, as deputy-director of Department of Propaganda and member of Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, 36, n. 29

Hu, Chiao-mu, as deputy-director of Department of Propaganda and secretary-general of Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, 36, n. 29

Hu, Feng, anti-Hu Feng campaign, 133-134

Hu, Shih, criticism of, 132-133

Huang, Yen-pei, participant of "Dedication of Hearts" campaign, 67

Hung-ch'i [Red Flag], founding of, 118-119

"Ideological Transformation," of minor parties, 63-65

Industrialization, and Communist propaganda policy, 26-27

Indoctrination: definition of, 3; and Chinese culture, 3-4

Intellectuals: social status prior to 1949, 29-30; status since 1949, 31. See also Thought Reform

Kao, Kang, purge of, 44

Kuo, Mo-jo, participant of "Dedication of Hearts" campaign, 67

Kuomintang: compared with Communists, 64; confiscation of newspapers of, 109-110

Lenin, V. I. U.: on revolutionary consciousness, 10; party-building principles of, 16

"Let One Hundred Schools of Thought Contend and One Hundred Flowers Bloom" (or "Contending and Blooming"): Mao Tse-tung's slogan of, 6; interpretation of the slogan, 33-34, n. 5; public criticism of Communist policy and the slogan, 64

Li, Chi-shen, participant in "Dedication of Hearts" campaign, 67

Li, Fan-fu, on adverse effects of thought reform on intellectuals, 62

Li, Wei-han: and "contending and blooming," 6; on ideological transformation of bourgeois elements, 19-20, 66

Libraries, as propaganda agency, 54-55

Lifton, Robert J., article cited, 56-57

Literacy: Nationalist Government's estimated rate of, 36, n. 32; Communist regime's fight for, 37

Liu, Shao-ch'i: on importance of awaking masses, 10; on social origin of party membership, 13-14

Liu, Shao-t'ang, criticizing state of affairs in literary circles, 141

Liu, Yen-ping, criticizing thought control, 140-141

Jao, Shu-shih, purge of, 44

- Lo, Lun-chi, on treatment of elementary school teachers, 75-76
- Lu, Hsun College of Arts, and opera reform, 188
- Lu, Ting-i: clarifying policy of "contending and blooming," 6; as vice-chairman of Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs, 36, n. 29; as lecturer at Peking Normal University, 73; on combining labor and education, 77-78; on newspaper reporting, 92
- Ma, Yen-hsiang, opera reformer, 188
- Mao, Tse-tung: and the policy of "contending and blooming," 6, 33, n. 5; on importance of masses, 9-10; on role of armed forces, 12; mentioned by Liu Shao-ch'i, 13; thought of, 16; on correct handling of contradictions among people, 17-18, 33-34, n. 5; on importance of mass organizations, 53; on thought reform of intellectuals, 55, 62; pledges made to minor parties, 68; quoted by Lu Ting-i concerning combining labor and education, 78, 88-89, n. 92; writings circulated abroad, 96; on literary style of editors and writers, 129; on problems of literature and arts, 185; on spoken drama, 193
- Mass organizations, and propaganda and indoctrination, 53-54
- Mass propaganda networks (oral agitation), establishment of, 45. See also Propaganda and Reporting Officers
- Masses, importance of, 9-10
- Mci, Lan-fang, as opera performer and member of National People's Congress, 181, 190
- Ministry of Cultural Affairs: and administration of communications, 22; directive on marketing of books, 124; directive concerning used-book stores and sidewalk book stands, 126; and opera reform, 184-185; and conference on spoken drama, 196; control of film production, 209
- Ministry of Education: and administration of communications, 22; role in control of spare-time and winter schools, 79
- Nationalist Government, Chinese literacy rate estimated by, 36, n. 32
- New China News Agency (Hsin-hua News Agency): and administration of communications, 22; relations with press, 91, 97, 100; history of, 97-98; scope of operation, 98-99; physical facilities of, 99-100
- New Democratic Youth Corps, founding of, 11
- "Newspaper Tax," 150, n. 67
- Newspapers. See Press
- Northeast Film Studio: founding of, 204; merger with Mukden Film Studio, 204
- Opera: traditional Peking opera described, 180-182; size of audiences, 182; number of opera troupes, 182-183; nationalization of opera troupes, 183; indoctrination of performers, 183-184, 189; "democratic reorganization"

of troupes, 184; banning of politically objectionable operas, 184; opera reform bureau and advisory committee, 187; national conference on opera reform, 184-185; opera reform policy, 185-186; official approval of periodic performance schedules, 185; errors committed by performers, 186; reform of repertoires, 188; impact of reform, 188-189; political commissars in opera troupes, 189; incentives for performers, 189-191; criticism of opera policy, 191

P'an Fu-sheng, criticizing Party, 64

P'an, Tzu-nien, deploring lack of good textbooks, 142

Party schools. *See* Education

Peking Film Studio, founding, 204

P'eng, Chen: on social origin of party membership, 13, 16, as a reporting officer, 49

People's Daily [Jen-min Jih-pao]: circulation of, 104; format and contents of, 104-105; editorial on newspaper subscription policy, 122; subscription rates of, 122; editorial on book distribution, 124-215; on quality of news reporting, 129; on editorial work of provincial and local newspapers, 130; featuring article criticizing Yu P'ing-po, 131; criticizing Wen-i Pao, 132; featuring Hu Feng's confessions, 133-134; editorial on Biography of Wu Hsun, 213

People's Liberation Army Film Studio, founding of, 205

Periodicals, functions and circulation of, 118

Press: in Kiangsi period, 27; in Yen-an period, 27; functions of, 91-92; fate of privately-owned papers, 100-102; newspaper financing, 102-103; structure of, 103-107; administrative control of, 109-100; editorial control of, 110-112; personnel control of, 115-116; circulation of newspapers, 120-123, 127-128, 150, n. 66, 151, n. 78; mimeographed, handwritten, and blackboard newspapers, 127; lack of trained personnel, 129; sterilizing effects of control on, 129-130; commercial advertising, 147, n. 30, 149, n. 54; newspapers printed horizontally, 147, n. 33; compulsory subscriptions, 150, n. 67

Propaganda: definition of, 3; objectives of, 7-20; principal audiences of, 9; and traditional Chinese belief systems and behavior patterns, 31-32

Propaganda Officers: selection and appointment of, 46; training and duties of, 46-47; number and distribution of, 47-48, 83, n. 22; "non-party propaganda army," 48-49; role of, 50-51; shortcomings of, 51-53

Publications Administration (later Bureau of Publications), relations with publishing industry, 107-108

Publishing Industry: condition in 1930's, 28; output of Marxist classics, 93-94; output of Soviet works, 94; analysis of composition of books printed, 95-96; output of foreign language publications, 96; publication for overseas Chinese, 96; reorganization of, 107-108; structure of, 108-109, 113-114; book-burnings, 113; annual output of books and periodicals, 116-117; publications for

- minority nationalities, 119;
Chinese translations of foreign
works, 120; distribution prob-
lems in, 123-126; personnel of,
128; author-remuneration system,
128-129; importation of Chinese
translations of Soviet books, 149,
n. 64
- Radio Broadcasting Industry: con-
dition prior to 1949, 29, 155; con-
fiscation of Kuomintang stations,
155; post-1949 structure of, 155-
157, 158-159; audience reaction,
171-172; audience participation in
broadcasting, 172-173; list of
stations, 175
- Radio Reception: regular reception
facilities, 159-160, 177, n. 13;
collective listening, 160-161,
172; radio - diffusion exchanges,
162-166
- "Rectification Campaign": of Chinese
Communist Party, 6, 42-45, 63;
against "rightists," 7, 64-65
- Reporting Officers: relations with
propaganda officers, 49; number
and distribution of, 49; work of,
50; role of, 50-51; shortcomings
of, 51-53
- Schwartz, Benjamin, views on
thought reform evaluated, 60-61
- Second Administrative Office of State
Council, role in administration of
communications, 22, 36, n. 28
- Shanghai Film Corporation, found-
ing of, 225-226, n. 70
- Shanghai Film Studio, founding of,
204
- Shanghai Scientific and Educational
Film Studio, founding of, 204
- Shao, Chuan-lin, accusing Ch'in
Chao-yang, 139-140
- Shen, Chun-ju, presiding over "Ded-
ication of Hearts" parade, 66-67
- Shen, Yen-ping: criticizing Hu Feng,
133; criticizing playwrights, 196-
197
- Slides, as propaganda medium, 84-
85, n. 42
- "Socialist Transformation," meaning
and implications of, 19-20
- Spare-Time Schools. *See* Education
- Spoken Drama: history of, 192;
special problems in, 192; loss of
appeal since 1949, 193; control of
presentation, 193; some special
plays, 194-195; scarcity of good
plays, 195; attempts at improve-
ment of, 196; playwrights' com-
plaints, 197-198
- Stalin, Joseph, party-building prin-
ciples of, 16
- Study Groups. *See* Education
- Su, Chi-ts'ang, criticized, 140
- Su San the Courtesan [Yu-t'ang
Ch'un], described, 186-188
- Sun, Tso-ping, criticizing Party, 64
- Sun, Yu, self-criticism of, 213
- Television, 177, n. 11
- Thought reform: of intellectuals, 5,
55-63, 85, n. 50; unique role in
China, 10; of minor parties,
63-69. *See also* "Dedication of
Hearts" Campaign and "Ideologi-
cal Remoulding"
- Three - Anti Campaign, meaning of,
35, n. 22
- T'ien, Han, opera reformer, 188
- Tientsin Municipal People's Broad-
casting Station, content of pro-
grams of, 166-167
- Ting, Ling, purge of, 134-137

- Ts'ui, Chih-lan, denunciation of thought reform by, 62
- Tsui, Shu-chin, views on effectiveness of thought reform, 61
- Voice of America, Communist regime and, 173-174
- Wang, Lan-hsi, director of Bureau of Cinematographic Arts, 215
- Wang, Shih-wei, and T'ing Ling, 136
- Wang, Teh-chou, criticizing Communists, 64
- Wen-hui Daily [Wen-hui Pao], and "contending and blooming," 146, n. 26, 217
- Wen-i Pao [Literary Gazette], involved in Dream of the Red Chamber case, 132
- White-Haired Girl [Pai-mao Nu], summarized, 194; on screen 199
- Winter Schools. See Education
- Workers' and Peasants' Clubs, as propaganda agency, 54-55
- Writers, effects of control measures on, 140-144
- Wu, Han, urging non-Communists to surrender hearts to Party, 68
- Wu, Tsu-kuang, criticizing Communist control of stage, 198
- policy, 141
- Yeh, Sheng-ch'ang, criticizing opera reform, 191
- Young Pioneers, membership and role of, 11-12
- Yu, P'ing-po, involved in Dream of the Red Chamber case, 130-133, 144, 152-153, n. 111
- Yang, Fan, criticizing Communist treatment of editors and reporters, 141
- Yang, Yu-ch'ing, criticizing Communist regime, 64
- Yao, Hsueh-yin, criticizing literary

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



124 038

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY